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Participation is the engine of cultural production. In the case of literature, the privileged modality 
that enables participation is auditory perception. In order to articulate a theory of literary cultural 
production based on auditory perception, participation needs to be analyzed in the context of 
Platonic methexis, understood as an embodied experience facilitated by brain mechanisms of 
sensory processing and cognition, which manifest in specific ways in written texts. The Siete 
Partidas, the first complete and systematic legal code of the Western World, provides the perfect 
case study to test a theory of literary cultural production based on methexis via auditory 
perception, because it is one of the first complete texts written in Castilian, making it ideal to 
illustrate the ways in which methexis affects the process of elaboration of a cultural product in a 
language that does not have a precedent in the form of an extensive body of texts, nor has it had 
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And thus by constantly hearing words, as they occurred in 
various sentences, I collected gradually for what they 
stood; and having broken in my mouth to these signs, I 
thereby gave utterance to my will. 










































Et ait ei: “Egredere et sta in monte coram Domino”.  
Et ecce Dominus transit, et ventus grandis et fortis 
subvertens montes et conterens petras ante Dominum; 
non in vento Dominus. Et post ventum, commotio;  
non in commotione Dominus.  
Et post commotionem, ignis; non in igne Dominus.  
Et post ignem, sibilus aurae tenuis.  
Quod cum audisset Elias, operuit vultum suum pallio et 
egressus stetit in ostio speluncae; et ecce vox ad eum 
dicens: “Quid agis hic, Elia?” 















Participation is the engine of cultural production. Long before humans started writing, 
maybe even speaking, they started producing culture.1 From paintings in cave walls to 
rudimentary idiophones and aerophones, the archaeological record is full of traces of the human 
drive to produce culture and to pass it on to future generations.2 From the initial formation of 
early social units, people have strived to accompany the daily tasks aimed at their survival with 
other activities that helped them to make their life more bearable and even enjoyable. Ultimately 
this is what cultural production entails: a series of activities leading to the production of things 
that are not indispensable for survival. Music, poetry, dance, or decorative work on walls, like so 
many other cultural products, are not devices meant for nutrition, shelter, warmth, hydration, or 
any other basic necessity of human biological existence. And yet, humans from recorded history 
have used them to make their toil more bearable, to help time pass faster, to celebrate joyous 
events and commemorate painful ones, to communicate with forces unknown and, more 
importantly, to communicate with each other in order to maintain the cohesion of social units. 
Though cultural production might not have been important for individual survival, it was always 
essential for the preservation of social structures on which rests collective existence. This thesis 
argues that the reason cultural production is fundamental for coexistence is because it makes 
participation possible. Social units are built around participation; and participation, as stated at 
the beginning, is the engine of cultural production. Participation means more than just a series of 
                                                          
1 For an overview of recent research on this subject, focusing on the scientific evidence that 
supports the idea that humans started producing music, and probably dance, before developing 
language, see Mithen.  
2 An aerophone is “any musical instrument in which the sound is produced by a vibrating column 
of air,” mainly what we know as wind instruments, and an idiophone is “a percussion instrument 
that consists simply of material such as metal or wood that is itself capable of producing sound, 
as opposed to a membranophone, in which stretched skin or similar is used as the agent of 
sound” (OED). For an archaeological perspective of acoustics and the study of sound see Scarre 
and Lawson. See also Mills.  
 
 5 
actions undertaken as part of larger endeavors, or belonging to a determinate group, or taking 
part on a communal activity. Participation is before anything else a feeling: the feeling of 
belonging to something, of being part of something. Participation is what saves people from 
isolation and alienation, for it is alienation that leads human beings to literal and metaphorical 
death. Participation is what makes a teenager feel that he “fits in” a group at school, or what 
makes a scholar feel that he has earned his place among his peers. Participation is what compels 
people to extreme violence but also to incredible acts of self-sacrifice. Participation is what 
makes the public share in the exhilaration of a sports game, almost as if they were the ones 
scoring a goal or breaking a record. Participation is what makes it so hard to put down a good 
book when one is absorbed in the climax and gripped by the denouement of the action. It makes 
one’s heart rate increase, it accelerates one’s breathing, it gives one goosebumps, makes one 
sweat and shiver. All of these feelings are somatic manifestations of the way bodies and brains 
react to cultural products, because participation is the result of a sensory experience. Hence, the 
study of participation is, first and foremost, the study of an embodied aesthetic experience. 3   
The body’s agents that make participation possible are the senses. It is through the 
aesthetic experience that people participate in the world around them and that they are able to 
recognize that others participate as well. The senses also provide the raw material for the making 
of cultural products, such as sounds, words, melodies, images, contrasts, textures, smells, tastes, 
just to name a few. And cultural products, in turn, evoke the richness of human aesthetic 
experiences, and allow them to be reframed, developed or replaced. Since the very inception of 
Philosophy, the senses have been made the object of study, both as bodily mechanisms and as 
                                                          
3 An aesthetic experience encompasses all interaction and engagement with art or nature, 
characterized by an ineffable aspect and high value when compared to other experiences of the 
surrounding environment (Tomlin 1). 
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abstract processes; just as old has been the debate to establish a hierarchical order among them. 
Throughout centuries of Western Philosophy, vision has been accorded a privileged rank.4 Even 
with the advent of the scientific era, vision has maintained precedence, while hearing has 
occupied the second place. The purpose of this thesis is to argue that this value judgment 
regarding the senses has been a major factor that has contributed to a historically limited 
understanding of how auditory perception works and to underestimating its many contributions 
to human experience. This argument is needed to lay the foundation for my first premise: 
namely, that auditory perception is the privileged sense that makes human social structures and 
participation possible. The perception of sound is what takes people out of their individual selves 
and makes them aware of the presence of others. In fact, thanks to hearing, people start being 
aware of the existence of others before birth. 
Though a developing fetus does not receive a considerable amount of visual, tactile, 
olfactory, or gustatory stimuli, permanent contrasting auditory stimuli penetrate the womb 
throughout the gestational cycle. In the womb, the fetus is surrounded by the sounds of the 
mother’s body like heartbeat, breathing, digestion and blood circulation. The fetus also perceives 
external sounds, and even voices, both the mother’s and that of others who come close enough to 
be heard. All of these sounds are attenuated and muffled, especially in the higher frequencies, but 
it gives a rough idea of what it sounds like in the womb to remember the experience of hearing 
under water.5 The fetus may not have anything in the way of language awareness at that point, 
                                                          
4 For an extensive study of the primacy of visual perception since Antiquity, and of the study of 
optics on the Middle Ages, see Meyering, who concentrates in the study of optics. For Aristotle’s 
explicit hierarchy of the senses, see the beginning of the Metaphysics: “All men by nature desire 
to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their 
usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight.” 
5 For an overview of the transmission of sounds in utero, see Sohmer and Freeman. Hearing and 
reactions to hearing in fetuses are believed to start after the 20th week of gestation, and to occur 
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but there is where it receives the first samples of the various meaningful contents of a 
vocalization: inflections, rhythm, loudness, timbre, and pitch. While hearing those sounds, it is 
also exposed to interacting physiological changes to heart and breathing rates.6 Before birth, the 
fetus is already receiving information about the complex relationship between sound and 
emotion, and learning to recognize the first familiar voice, that of its mother. Furthermore, in the 
advanced stages of gestation, it starts to respond to some of these auditory stimuli. In sum, 
during gestation the fetus begins to be primed for the social existence that awaits it via the ear. 
This is not an attempt to advance an overly enthusiastic view of the potential intrinsic to the 
ability to hear in the womb. The last couple of decades have shown that playing Mozart to a 
growing belly does not guarantee giving birth of the next musical genius. But it is important to 
highlight the fact that the first contact with the social world occurs while one is still in the womb, 
and that this sensory experience through the ear lays the foundations for the basic interactions 
one will engage in after birth. It is obvious that the other senses also have very important 
functions for socialization, but they lack basic features that only hearing possesses. Hearing 
helps to detect the presence of others even when they are outside of the range of the other senses: 
one can detect the presence of sound without needing to see, touch, taste or smell its source; 
there is no need to be in contact with that source in order to hear it; and, lastly, hearing allows 
one to make judgements about that source, to classify it, to estimate its distance, and even to 
anticipate if it poses a danger. What is more, hearing is what allows humans to learn language 
and to communicate. This leads me to posit that hearing is the social sense par excellence, and 
thus the most important sense for participation and cultural production. 
                                                          
through the rest of gestation (91). The attenuation effect is due to the tissue and liquids 
surrounding the fetus. See also Hepper and Shahidullah. 
6 For the effects of combined stimuli in fetal brain development, see Webb at al. See also Spence. 
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The present study aims to prove and support the stated claim by focusing on literature as 
the cultural product that better illustrates the central role of auditory perception. To provide a 
suitable case study, a specific historical period in the Middle Ages has been selected, because it 
was characterized by changes highlighting those aspects of cultural production under study and 
by documentary evidence that illustrates the impact auditory perception had in them. This period 
is the middle of the thirteenth century, and the region is the part of the Iberian Peninsula where 
Castilian was one of the spoken varieties of what is now the Spanish language.7 In this region, at 
this specific point in time, a process that had started two centuries earlier reaches its culmination, 
with the initial attempts to put in writing some of the spoken varieties of what was no longer 
Latin, but still lacked the official identity of a separate language.8 Of the many writings of the 
time, this thesis will focus specifically on one of the first complete and systematic cultural 
products written in Castilian, the Siete Partidas of Alfonso the Wise, for it offers a case study 
that best illustrates the various ways in which auditory perception helped shape the beginnings of 
Iberian literature. This legal corpus, written in Castilian, is a landmark of the cultural project of 
the Wise King. Together with the principles of Civil and Canon Law, it encompasses other 
aspects of the Castilian culture of the thirteenth century. It contains exempla, legends, proverbs, 
quotes from ancient authors, short narrations, tales, and references to the most important sources 
of knowledge of the era. It is precisely this encyclopedic diversity of oral and written traditions 
that makes the Partidas an ideal case study to analyze a fundamental aspect of written 
communication which until now has not been explored. The use of a legal text as case study has 
other advantages. As a discipline, Law has its foundations in human experiences and thus in the 
                                                          
7 For a recent approach focused on linguistics see Ralph Penny. 
8 The classical study of this process is Ramón Menédez Pidal’s Orígenes del español.   
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different manifestations of sensory perception that are inherent to the nature of said experiences. 
It arises from the interaction between individuals and collectives, and it is largely a result of the 
need to regulate the consequences of such interactions in order to ensure the peaceful coexistence 
of a community. For medieval readers and listeners alike, legal and ecclesiastical precepts were 
the voice of authority and power in its divine and human manifestations. 9   
The practice of the law is intertwined with the aesthetic experience, and within it, most 
particularly with sound and its perception. Starting with legal terminology, one can see that the 
daily practice of the law has always been mediated by its relation to the ear: hearings, audits, 
interrogatories, depositions, oaths, juries, oral testimony, pronunciation of sentences, and the 
written representations of all these and other legal proceedings, represent the preeminence of the 
ear in the exercise of the law.10 Sound, moreover, also has a role in what is considered the 
written, and supposedly visual, representation of the law: legislation, legal opinions, textbooks, 
and other legal writings that are not the result of, or intended for, oral performance, still bear in 
different ways the marks of the aesthetic experience that underlies them. Among the written 
law’s aims is the intent to regulate and normalize sound and its perception in order to make them 
conform to the expectations and interests that led to the drafting of the legal norm. The very 
inception of legal processes in general is based on an auditory event, the reception of a civil 
                                                          
9 It should be noted that Law at the particular moment of the Middle Ages when the Partidas 
were written, included not only Civil and Canon Law, but also some of the writings of the 
Church Fathers, the Scholastics, which facilitated access to divine Law, as well as collections of 
exempla and sermons, whose narrative techniques and influence were paramount for the rise of 
Castilian Literature. 
10 For an analysis of this permanence in English-speaking legal traditions, as well as the often-
conflicting relation to written instruments, see Bernard J. Hibbitts. For an in-depth study of the 
oral legal tradition in Castile and its written codification, see Alvarado Planas and Oliva Manso. 
See also Bermejo Cabrero. For the case of oral fazañas, see Bermejo Crespo. See also Soler 
Bistué, “Derecho, narración y racionalidad jurídica,” and “Los usos del pasado.” 
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claim or a criminal complaint, both instances of spoken events that need to be heard, often 
requiring a written record of such auditory event taking place, to become legally valid. This is 
one of the most ancient features of the law, from the time when disputes were settled in the 
public square or in front of tribal chiefs or other figures of authority. The practice of the law 
necessitates the aural reception of a spoken statement in order to allow the initiation of a legal 
process. Conversely, the process can only end with a legal decision or verdict which is 
communicated out loud to the interested parties. The etymology of the word verdict is a fitting 
testimony of the oral/aural substrate of legal practice from Antiquity to the present.11  For this 
reason, in order to study the way in which sound and its perception impact the writing of the law 
as a cultural product it is essential to have a basic understanding of current knowledge on the 
subject, as well as the accepted theories that circulated in the Western Middle Ages. The latter 
will be discussed further ahead. First, some fundamental facts about the ear and auditory 
perception will be surveyed by reviewing recent research about aspects of this topic that are 
attracting increasing scrutiny.  
 
From Wave to Sound 
The ear, like the rest of the human body, is still somewhat mysterious and awe-inspiring. 
Although in the last century scientific knowledge of this organ has vastly increased, it is still 
very far from a complete understanding of how it works. Besides hearing, the ears are essential 
to keep balance and to walk. Hearing is what is normally associated with the ear: the perception 
                                                          
11 Middle English verdit, verdict, borrowed from Anglo-French veirdit “announcement, finding, 
judicial decision,” from veir “true” (going back to Latin vērus) + dit “statement, judgment” 
(going back to Latin dictum), after Medieval Latin vērumdictum, vēredictum. . . . First Known 
Use: 15th century (Merriam-Webster.com).  
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and processing of sound. And even though this may seem to pertain more to a scientific endeavor 
than to the study of cultural production, there is a lot more at stake:  
Sound and hearing are so useful because things make sounds, and different things make 
different sounds. Sound waves carry valuable clues about the physical properties of the 
objects or events that created them, and when we listen we do not seek to sense vibrating 
air for the sake of it, but rather we hope to learn something about the sources, that is, the 
objects and events surrounding us. (Schnupp et al., 2-3)  
The perception of sound is a form of interaction between the body and the world, where the body 
experiences the environment that surrounds it and extracts information about the nature of the 
things present in that environment from the sounds they make. Sounds give information about 
both the things that can be seen and those that fall outside the visual range, allowing one to make 
decisions about future actions and to detect possible threats before they are visible.  
Auditory perception is a field where there are more dilemmas than certainties. 
Notwithstanding the current state of knowledge in this area, it would seem anachronistic to 
attempt to apply it to a legal code like the Siete Partidas, or to medieval culture in general. It is 
certainly justifiable to call it anachronistic if the aim of this study were to compare ancient and 
medieval discourses with modern theories in order to point out deficiencies and errors in the 
medieval and ancient accounts. But such a qualifier is not applicable when the goal is to inquire 
into the different manifestations of the distance between old and modern conceptions of aurality 
as applied to the emerging practice of writing texts in Castilian.12 It is in that space where 
medieval theories are sometimes at odds with the physical and somatic phenomena of auditory 
perception. It is in that distance that one can study the relation between perceptual processes and 
                                                          
12 For an in-depth discussion of aurality, see Chapter 2, pp. 96-107.    
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cultural products. That distance is the sphere where most receptors of literature dwell, and for 
them theoretical accounts are something completely foreign. They interact with texts, legal texts 
in the case of the Partidas, at a level where the sensory predominates: what is seen, what is 
heard, what is felt, smelled, or even tasted. It is also a place from which to look at narrative and 
pedagogical techniques from a different perspective, as communication strategies that want to 
make experience present, and, through this production of presence allow the simultaneous 
participation of the receiver.13 It is the sphere of action of what will be referred to as auditory 
expectation: a set of audible features that together represent something specific when perceived 
by the ear, giving it a particular sonority that helps its identification, classification and relative 
positioning; these features depend on the unique experience of the individual and on the 
strategies deployed by producers of written discourse.  
Medieval theories relating to auditory perception postulated that perceptive and cognitive 
processes were separate and consecutive. A completely different view emerges when auditory 
perception is studied from the vantage point of current knowledge. Recent research has shown 
that they are in fact simultaneous and interconnected processes. Moreover, even before 
perception takes place, in the listener start taking place a series of conscious and unconscious 
extrapolations in anticipation of the act of hearing, thus creating an expectation of what will be 
heard (Plomp 7). During the emission of sound, the brain has to isolate the desired sound from 
within a complex soundscape. In most cases, overlapping sounds can effectively interrupt 
                                                          
13 Here, I partially follow Gumbrecht in his groundbreaking work Production of Presence. 
Although I am not interested in a direct connection with Phenomenology, his concept of 
production of presence as ideal for describing the dynamics between medieval listeners/readers 
and written texts, given the fact that its effects “exclusively appeal to the senses” (xv). His stated 
purpose of recovering the material, spatial and movement-related aspects of intellectual activity 
lays a solid foundation to the theory of cultural production proposed in this thesis.  
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auditory perception; this is known as auditory masking (51). When one is listening to a particular 
voice and more than one person is speaking the same time, for example, the competing voices 
can cause one to miss parts of what one is trying to hear. What is interesting is that this happens 
quite frequently without anyone ever realizing it; the brain actually fills these gaps with 
information it has accumulated from previous perceptual experiences (59). A lot of what one 
believes to have heard was never a real sound emission, but it is rather an interpolation of the 
brain which can at times be inaccurate (58). Speech perception is a process of prediction and 
recognition where reasoning is actively involved, and where individual experience directly 
affects what is perceived (93). Context is of paramount importance in this process, especially in 
the case of speech, given that the interpretation of spoken messages depends on experience as 
well as on what happens during and after the emission of sound (105).  
Once sound is perceived, the brain classifies and stores sensory stimuli in ways that not 
always correspond to the actual way events unfolded. There is also a complex multimodal 
process of integration in the brain, where auditory stimuli come together with information from 
the other sensory organs to produce a structured memory. Aside from these stages, sensory 
stimuli are also processed in other neuronal structures not related to memory, but to the centers 
in charge of responses and reward systems that affect bodily function. All these mechanisms will 
become part of future perceptual experiences in a continuous cycle of adaptation and feedback 
that helps the individual to act in specific situations based on previous experience, as recently 
shown in the work of Arbib, Cook, Eichenbaum, Hurford, Kohler, Plomp, and Schnupp et al., 
among others. In sum, auditory perception depends on context, accumulated experience and the 
listeners’ expectations. In order to understand these dynamics, it is necessary to have a general 
understanding of how sound is generated and of the anatomy and function of the ear. 
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Things that Sound 
So, one may ask, what 
is a sound? A sound, in the 
physical sense, is a wave of 
pressure changes produced by 
the vibration of a physical 
object, which propagates 
through an elastic medium, 
usually air or water 
(“Auditory Perception” 247; 
Schnupp et al. 1; Plomp 1).14 
The term “sound” can also refer to the “the psychological construct of perceiving those 
vibrations” (“Auditory Perception” 247). For the purposes of formulating a theory of cultural 
production, the focus will be on this second meaning of sound; however, this overview of sound 
will refer to the physical sense of the term. When an object vibrates, it creates areas of high 
pressure or compression, and low pressure or rarefaction, in the surrounding molecules. What 
one hears are these changes in sound pressure. Each occurrence of a compression followed by a 
rarefaction is called a cycle. The succession of these pressure areas is called a wave. In their 
most simple manifestation, these oscillations obey the rules of simple harmonic motion which 
result in sinusoidal behavior (Schnupp et al. 6). Figure 1 illustrates a basic sinewave. The 
distance between identical points where the shape of the wave reoccurs is called wavelength or 
                                                          
14 This overview of sound mainly follows Baldwin, supplementing relevant areas with other 
sources like Mills, Mithen, Pinch and Bijsterveld, Plomp, Schnupp et al., and Wolfe et al.   
Figure 1. Sine wave.  
By Booyabazooka at English Wikipedia (Transferred from 






period. These basic sine waves are also known as pure tones, which are the kind of sounds 
normally identified as beeps (3). This is important because the vast majority of laboratory 
experiments related to sound use pure tones, not real sounds, which are extremely complex. The 
main attributes of a sound wave are frequency, amplitude and phase. Frequency is the measure of 
the number of oscillations or cycles per second (“Auditory Perception” 248). A slow cycle 
results in a long wavelength, and a rapid cycle results in a short wavelength, this leads to low 
frequencies having a longer wavelength than high frequencies. Low frequencies are perceived as 
low in pitch, and pitch increases with frequency. The units for measuring frequency are called 
hertz (Hz). The human rage of audible 
frequencies, or audible spectrum, goes 
from 20 to 20,000 Hz; this assumes 
that the listener enjoys optimal 
conditions of health and young age. 15 
As age increases, there is a decrease in 
the audible spectrum.  
Everyday sounds are much 
more complex than pure tones. 
Complex sounds consist of several 
frequencies vibrating at the same time 
in modes of vibration, commonly 
known as harmonics or overtones 
                                                          
15 This range also reflects the mechanical limitations of the outer and middle ear, due to the 
resonant shape of the ear canal and the inertia that limits the reception of high frequencies by the 
middle ear ossicles (Schnupp 53).  
Figure 2. Harmonics or overtones.  







(Schnupp et al. 8). The lowest frequency present is the fundamental frequency, while the 
remaining overtones will be frequencies that are ½, ⅓, ¼, etc. of the fundamental, as illustrated 
in Figure 2. Most of the time, what one perceives as the pitch of a complex sound is its 
fundamental frequency, which is the greatest common denominator of all the frequencies present 
in a complex sound (“Auditory Perception” 248). This circumstance generates one of the many 
intriguing aspects of auditory perception; it is known as the missing fundamental, and it occurs 
when what is perceived as the pitch of a sound is a fundamental frequency that is not part of the 
actual physical sound.16 This happens when the spectrum of frequencies results in a common 
denominator that corresponds to a fundamental that is not being generated by the source. This is 
one example of how the perception of sounds does not necessarily correspond to their physical 
characteristics. There are 
many other instances of 
auditory perception where 
one hears sounds that were 
never produced, which are 
the focus of the field of 
psychoacoustics.17 
Returning to the subject of 
                                                          
16 See p. 19 for the definition of fundamental frequency. 
17 On a more personal note, it was getting acquainted with psychoacoustics that started me on the 
path that led to this research. When I first started reading about psychoacoustics in the 90’s the 
field was very much in its infancy, yet it also had the advantage of encompassing disciplines like 
music and oral studies, which made its focus much closer to the humanities than other disciplines 
at the time. This helped me see the first connections when I started studying literature, and the 
fact that there was considerable common ground, which could provide abundant material for the 
study of aesthetics and cultural production.  
Figure 3. Complex soundwave.  
From Public Domain Vectors: Vector illustration of sound 






frequency, the key notion to remember is that a complex sound is composed of a number of 
frequencies vibrating at the same time, as illustrated in Figure 3, and not all of them are inside 
the human audible spectrum. The importance of these frequencies will become clear later on, in 
the discussion about the qualities of sound, because frequency is connected to pitch perception. 
The amplitude of a sinewave is “the amount of vibratory displacement resulting from the 
energy or power present in the sound wave” (“Auditory Perception” 248). It is perceived as the 
intensity or loudness of a sound. At higher amplitudes, one hears louder sounds and vice versa. 
The human ear can perceive such a wide range of amplitudes that it is necessary to measure them 
in logarithmic units known as decibels of sound pressure level, or dB SPL. Sound pressure level 
is a measure of “the effect that the power of a sound has on its surroundings” (Mills 28). A 
healthy ear can hear sounds from 0 dB SPL to 120 dB SPL (Schnupp et al. 46). The threshold of 
pain is 140 dB SPL (Mills 29). Keeping in mind that these are logarithmic units, the range of 
intensity that the ear can perceive is staggering, because 120 dB SPL is 1,000 billion times 0 dB 
SPL. This sensitivity is the result of “hundreds of millions of years of evolution during which 
you get eaten if you can’t hear the hungry predators trying to creep up on you.” But the physical 
intensity of a sound is not the same as its perceived loudness, and for one to detect changes in 
amplitude there needs to be an increase of at least 10% (48). Amplitude interacts with frequency, 
and some frequencies are easier to perceive than others (“Auditory Perception” 248-9). The 
optimal range of hearing is between 500 to 3500 Hz, which is the range of the human voice. The 
human vocal tract has evolved to amplify some overtones while suppressing others, resulting in 
resonant frequencies known as formants, which are important for speech perception (Schnupp et 
al. 35-6). Phase is a representation of the fraction of the wave cycle that has been completed 
relative to the point where a sinusoidal oscillation starts, called starting phase (“Auditory 
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Perception” 249). Since one complete cycle of a sinusoidal wave is equivalent to a complete 
circle (360º), phase can be measured in degrees. Phase is important in the measurement of sound 
phenomena like constructive or destructive interference, noise cancellation and frequency 
filtering, which are fundamental for technologies of noise reduction and acoustic design. 
 
Things We Hear 
The interaction of frequency, amplitude and phase result in many major features of 
auditory perception. Sound can behave in different ways depending on external factors, like the 
movement of the source or the receptor, changes in temperature, or the presence of natural or 
man-made barriers. The case of sound propagation in enclosed spaces is perhaps more familiar 
since its various effects are part of daily life: resonance, reverberation, standing waves, echoes, 
amongst others (Mills 29). It is a common error to mistake frequency for pitch. Frequency and 
pitch are only equal in the case of pure tones. But, while frequency is a physical characteristic of 
sound, pitch is a subjective quality of sound and cannot be measured objectively (Mills 31). Pitch 
is formally defined as “that auditory attribute of sound according to which sounds can be ordered 
on a scale from low to high” (Schnupp et al. 93). This attribute is very salient in music, but that 
is not its only role. Pitch is very important for the ear’s ability to differentiate human voices, 
adults from children, men from women. It also helps to estimate the size of a source: “larger 
creatures produce vocalizations with a lower pitch.” The absence of pitch is a good indicator that 
the source of the sound is inanimate. It is also essential to convey meaning in oral 
communication by the use of inflections, and in the differentiation of word meaning, as is the 
case in tonal languages. Pitch is one of the qualities of sound that helps to isolate and focus on 
 
 19 
one particular voice in settings where multiple speakers are talking at the same time.18 Pitch, as 
was explained above, cannot be measured objectively, because it “is a percept that is evoked by 
sounds, rather than a physical property of sounds.”19 Actually, the perception of pitch still 
puzzles researchers. On the one hand, there are important psychophysical considerations that 
have been the subject of a large body of research focused on the development of assistive 
technology and the improvement of sound reproduction devices.20 On the other hand, there have 
been recent discoveries in the study of how information about pitch is transmitted and encoded in 
the auditory pathways and in the auditory cortex.21 Most of these considerations are still subject 
to intense debate and exceed the limits of this study, but there are a couple of elements that 
should be mentioned because they will be further developed ahead.  
A common topic of interest between the psychophysical and the neurocognitive research 
is the importance of periodicity in the perception of pitch: “A sound is periodic when it is 
composed of consecutive repetitions of a single short segment” (Schnupp et al. 94). A period is 
the duration of said segment, although the most common way of calculating periodicity is 
determining the number of periods per second. This number is the fundamental frequency of the 
sound, which in most cases will also be the perceived pitch of a complex sound. The longer the 
period, the lower the perceived pitch will be and vice versa, although there are numerous 
exceptions, like the missing fundamental phenomenon previously mentioned. Given that 
                                                          
18 Most experts have called this phenomenon the “cocktail party problem.” For a current 
overview of this topic see Haykin and Chen.  
19 Percept: “The mental product or result of perceiving something (as distinguished from the 
action); a way in which something is perceived mentally” (OED). 
20 For the uses and problems of pitch in assistive technology, see Schnupp et al., pp. 269-319. 
For the psychophysical aspects in the design of sound reproduction devices see Fastl and 
Zwicker. 
21 For an overview of current knowledge regarding the auditory cortex see Weinberger. For an 
analysis focused on pitch perception and encoding see Schnupp et al., pp. 156-159.  
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frequency and pitch are not always equivalent in complex sounds, sounds with equal pitch can be 
composed of different overtones, while sounds with similar frequency compositions can be 
perceived as having different pitch (Schnupp et al. 95). The auditory organs are highly attuned to 
periodicity, and can perceive pitch even when the periodicity of the physical sound deteriorates 
(Schnupp et al. 101). It has been argued that this may be because most sounds in nature are not 
strictly periodic. Another important characteristic of pitch is that it survives changes to other 
properties of sound. For instance, most of the time a periodic sound can be played at different 
levels without a noticeable change in pitch. Pitch is also independent of location, and in most 
cases, of the relative levels of the overtones. In music, one can order sounds sequentially by 
pitch, with similar distances along a continuum, to form scales (102).  
 As previously discussed, complex sounds are composed by a fundamental frequency and 
its overtones. The resulting quality of sound is called timbre. When faced with more than one 
sound with the same pitch, location, and intensity, timbre is the attribute that helps the ear to tell 
them apart (Mills 31; Schnupp et al. 101). It is most noticeable in the case of music, where it 
helps to identify different instruments even when they are playing the same note (“Auditory 
Perception” 251). The ear can distinguish between several instruments playing the same melody 
or several voices talking at the same time because their timbre varies depending on the physical 
features of each source, which result in a different distribution and amount of energy of the 
fundamental frequency and its overtones (Wolfe et al. 289). Timbre plays a very important role 
in speech recognition, but it is also affected by factors external to the source, like the materials 
used in the construction of an enclosed space. The experience of hearing how different one’s 
own voice sounds when singing in the shower as opposed to, say, the living room, is quite 
common. It happens because highly reflective surfaces like tile or concrete enhance high 
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frequencies, while others like carpets or fabric tend to absorb them (Wolfe et al. 289-90). 
Different materials affect frequencies differently; as a consequence, the auditory system relies on 
a variety of parameters to extract identifying information from the frequency spectra of sounds.  
 
The Mystery of Our Ears 
After summarizing some basic knowledge about sound as a physical phenomenon, it is 
time to focus on the organs responsible for capturing waves and turning them into the subjective 
percept known as sound. The part of the body usually associated with hearing and that is 
normally called ear, is in reality only its visible part, the pinna, which is part of the outer or 
external ear. Figures 4 and 5, show two other 
distinct parts, the middle and the inner ear. The 
main functions of this three-part organ are 
transducing and encoding. To understand what 
these functions entail, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at the way this organ is structured. The 
shape of the pinna is important for sound 
localization (Wolfe et al. 249). The sound waves 
captured in the pinna enter the ear canal, which is 
about 25 millimeters long. The canal’s shape 
enhances the frequencies in the range of 2000 to 
6000 Hz, and also serves to protect the tympanic membrane located at its end. The tympanic 
membrane or eardrum separates the outer and middle ear, and it vibrates when it is affected by 
the changes of pressure in the sound waves (Schnupp et al. 51). On the opposite site of the 
Figure 4. The Anatomy of the Ear. 
Blausen.com staff (2014). "Medical 
gallery of Blausen Medical 
2014". DOI:10.15347/wjm/2014.010. 




eardrum is the middle ear, which is about one centimeter long and contains three small bones 
called ossicles. The first one is the malleus, and it is attached to the inner side of the eardrum. It 
is attached on the other end to the incus, which in turn is attached to the stapes. The stapes is 
attached on its other end to another membrane called the oval window, which separates the 
middle ear from the inner ear. The soundwaves are amplified as the vibrations pass from the 
eardrum through the ossicles to the oval window. The 
pressure in the oval window is 18 times larger than the 
one in the eardrum (Wolfe et al. 250). 22 This is 
necessary because the inner ear, which starts on the 
other side of the oval window, is filled with fluid, 
which offers a very high mechanical resistance 
compared to the air that fills the outer and middle ear 
(Schnupp et al. 51).  The middle ear also has two small 
muscles attached to the malleus and stapes, which 
tense in response to very loud sounds, limiting the 
movement of the ossicles to prevent damage to the 
inner ear (Wolfe et al. 250). This system is known as 
acoustic reflex, and it also acts as a way to limit the transmission of sounds caused by 
swallowing, talking or other bodily movements. Unfortunately, the time response of the acoustic 
reflex is not fast enough to counter the effect of sudden loud sounds, which can cause permanent 
damage to the ear (Schnupp et al. 53).  
                                                          
22 The ossicles are the smallest bones in the human body. They act as a lever system that allows 
the concentration acoustic of energy in a smaller area (Schnupp et al. 52). 
Figure 5. The Middle Ear,  
Blausen.com staff (2014). "Medical 
gallery of Blausen Medical 2014". 
WikiJournal of Medicine 1 (2). 
DOI:10.15347/wjm/2014.010.  
ISSN2002-4436. - Own work 
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The inner ear is perhaps the 
direct responsible for some of the 
mysterious aura that has shrouded 
auditory perception for thousands of 
years. Unfortunately, a detailed 
discussion of this incredibly 
sophisticated organ, though 
fascinating, exceeds the scope of this 
work, so this will only be a brief look 
at its major features.23 It is here that 
transduction from mechanical to 
electro-chemical energy occurs.24 The 
most important part of the inner ear is the cochlea, which has a coiled shape, similar to a snail 
(Wolfe et al. 250; Schnupp et al. 54). Its outer wall is made of bone, and it has two openings: the 
oval window and the round window. The cochlea is filled with fluid and it is divided inside by 
Reissner’s membrane and by a structure called the cochlear partition, which is where sound 
waves are ultimately transduced into neural impulses (Wolfe et al. 251). The cochlear partition 
contains two very important structures: the basilar membrane and the Organ of Corti. The latter 
is formed by hair cells, a special type of neurons that are connected to the auditory nerve (252). 
These cells are covered by minuscule bristles that move in response to the pressure waves 
traveling through the fluid-filled canals of the cochlea, converting the mechanical energy into 
                                                          
23 For a detailed description of the inner ear see Schnupp et al., pp. 51-75.  
24 Transducer, n. Any device by which variations in one physical quantity (e.g. pressure, 
brightness) are quantitatively converted into variations in another (e.g. voltage, position) (OED). 
Figure 6. The Internal Ear,  
Blausen.com staff (2014). "Medical gallery of 
Blausen Medical 2014". WikiJournal of 
Medicine 1 (2). DOI:10.15347/wjm/2014.010.  
ISSN2002-4436. - Own work  
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neural impulses that will then be carried through the auditory nerve to the brain (254).  The 
cochlea has a place coding for frequency or tonotopy, that is, different frequencies create 
vibrations in different sections of the basilar 
membrane. It should be noted, however, that 
this tonotopy is for frequency, not for pitch 
perception, because, as discussed above, 
complex sounds are made up of many 
simultaneous frequencies (Schnupp et al. 62). 
The cochlea encodes information about time, 
frequency and amplitude, which is then 
transmitted through the auditory nerve to the 
brain. It will become apparent throughout the 
sections that follow that the information 
encoded does not necessarily correspond to all 
the physical characteristics of the pressure 
waves the ear captures.  
Several auditory nerve fibers are connected to each hair cell (Schnupp et al. 76). They 
maintain their tonotopy, while showing varying degrees of sensitivity to loudness depending on 
the frequency range (80). The frequency to which each nerve fiber responds the most is known 
as its characteristic frequency (Wolfe et al. 256). In the case on low frequencies, auditory nerve 
fibers behave in a particular way known as phase locking (Schnupp et al. 82). This means that 
they tend to reach their maximum release of neurotransmitters near the crests of the wave, but 
Figure 7. The Cochlea.  Cochlea-
crosssection.png: The original uploader 
was Oarih at English Wikipedia derivative 
work: Fred the Oyster - This is a retouched 
picture, which means that it has been digitally 
altered from its original version. 
Modifications: Vectorised. The original can be 
viewed here: Cochlea-crosssection.png. 
Modifications made by Fred the 
Oyster. This vector graphics image was 





they do not do so in every crest, and they may skip cycles.25 Scientists believe this ability to 
phase lock is what allows for time coding of sounds, and it is also used in pitch perception and 
sound localization (84). The transmission of complex sounds presents some complications that 
further change the information that is transmitted through the auditory nerve. One of the most 
studied is called two-tone suppression. When there are two tones of similar frequency present, 
one of them, usually the one with the lower frequency, will have a suppressing effect that makes 
the other tone seem much weaker than it really is (75). This is an additional instance where the 
perceived sound is not an exact replica of the actual wave that reaches the ears. Another example 
is rate saturation, where at higher intensities the firing rate of nerve fibers reaches its peak for 
other frequencies that are not the characteristic frequency (Wolfe et al. 258). In this case, the 
auditory system must use information from many auditory nerve fibers to detect the correct 
frequency of a stimulus (259). These are just two examples to illustrate the challenges inherent to 
the transmission and processing of information happening already at the level of the auditory 
nerve, and the many ways in which those processes change the characteristics of the physical 
wave into the percept called sound.  
The three parts of the ear just described form what is known as the peripheral auditory 
system, which is connected via the auditory nerve to the central auditory system. Here it is 
necessary to acknowledge the existence of a part of the ear that has not been mentioned so far, 
and which is notoriously absent in most of the literature about auditory perception. Figure 6 
illustrates another component to the inner ear called the vestibular system. The traditional 
explanation for ignoring this very important part of the inner ear is that it senses the motion of 
                                                          
25 The concept of phase is explained in p. 17. For a more detailed explanation of phase locking 
see Schnupp et al., pp. 82-86.  
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the head and the orientation of gravity, and this information is essential for the processing of tilt, 
self-motion and balance, which together form the sense of spatial orientation (Wolfe et al. 329). 
The most a reader will find about the vestibular system in a study of auditory perception is that, 
yes, it is in the inner ear but aside from that it has no relation with its more famous neighbor, the 
cochlea. It is misleading, however, to think of it as only structurally adjacent. The vestibular 
system also has hair cells and nerve fibers. These nerve fibers share the same nerve with auditory 
nerve fibers, the VIIIth cranial or vestibulocochlear nerve. But, different from the other senses, 
the vestibular system’s function is “largely automatic,” which means that most of it consists of 
reflexive reactions, and one only becomes aware of it when there are problems like motion 
sickness, vertigo, or imbalance. Given that the chief function of the vestibular system relates to 
space and movement, its main interaction is with visual perception, and there is ample literature 
about the integration of information from both systems. There is much less information regarding 
any possible interaction with auditory perception, but very recent research has proposed a link 
between the vestibular system and the perception of rhythm.26 It is important to remember that 
the peripheral auditory system consists of two ears, conveniently located at opposite sides of the 
head, and their location is critical to the human ability to have a sense of space and place. This 
also means that from each comes a set of auditory nerve fibers that transmit what the ears 




                                                          
26 For some recent perspectives on the interaction of the vestibular and auditory systems see: 




There is still much that is uncertain about the 
way the brain processes the electrochemical 
impulses transmitted through the auditory nerves. 
Unfortunately, the details exceed the scope of this 
thesis, and this section only undertake a description 
of major processes and structures that are essential 
to a basic understanding of auditory perception. 
Before describing what are widely accepted as the 
main stages of auditory processing, it is necessary to 
understand that most of these conclusions have been 
drawn from research either done directly on animals 
or indirectly on humans, and therefore should 
always be taken as subject to further changes or revisions. The main caveat is that, although it is 
true that the latest technology (PET, fMRI), has supported and expanded the conclusions drawn 
from previous decades of research, it is still limited both by the scope set by different research 
studies for which it is used, and by its resolution, and therefore by the inability to represent the 
most detailed structures of the brain.27 Functional magnetic resonance (fMRI), for instance, is an 
indirect functional method of brain imaging that measures changes in the oxygen concentration 
of the blood flow. The resulting data that does not directly represent the neural activity under 
study and can thus be imprecise (Hickok 251). Just like the rest of the body, brains are 
                                                          
27 In this context, the term resolution refers to the level of detail an imaging device can render in 
the depiction of anatomical structures. 
Figure 8. Hearing mechanics,  
by Zina Deretsky, National Science 







structurally similar, but they are not identical, so in order to draw general conclusions, studies 
need to be conducted on a significant number of subjects, and this is not always the case. In 
addition, more direct and invasive methods of research cannot be used in human subjects, and 
are instead used in animals, whose brains are not necessarily like the human brain.28 Still, many 
recent neuroimaging studies have provided support for what are currently the most widely 
accepted theories of auditory processing in the brain. 
The auditory nerve fibers coming out of the cochlea “join the VIIIth cranial 
(vestibulocochlear) nerve and enter the cochlear nucleus (CN) in the brainstem” (Schnupp et al. 
86). They then proceed to several major centers located in both sides of the brainstem: the 
superior olive, the inferior colliculus and, finally, the mediate geniculate nucleus of the thalamus 
(Wolfe et al. 262). Their path, the ascending auditory pathway, is not a straight line between 
each of these points. As can be seen in Figure 8, the nerve fibers bifurcate into two branches in 
the CN (263). This information pathway is bilateral, and there are many binaural interactions 
between hemispheres (Schnupp et al. 88). There are a large number of specialized neurons that 
interact with many neurons from other non-auditory areas.29 This contrasts with the information 
pathways of the other senses, which usually remain contralateral all the way up to the cerebral 
cortex, so stimuli coming from one side of the body are transmitted to the opposite hemisphere 
of the brain (Auditory Cognition 40).30 Some of these binaural interactions, especially at the 
superior olive, are very important for the stereophonic perception of sound, which is basic for the 
perception of space. Tonotopy is maintained throughout many of the midbrain structures of the 
                                                          
28 For a discussion of individual methods and the limitations of experiments in humans see 
Hickok, pp. 249-53. 
29 For an overview of the main types of neurons in auditory processing see Schnupp et al., pp. 86. 
30 Contralateral refers to structures located on the opposite side of the brain, while those on the 
same side are called ipsilateral (Auditory Cognition 40). 
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ascending auditory pathway (41). As Wolfe et al. note, this shows the importance of frequency 
composition for auditory processing (263). From the thalamus, most nerve fibers continue to the 
auditory cortex, located in the temporal lobes; however, a small portion of them “connect to the 
limbic structures of the brain, such as the amygdala, which is thought to coordinate certain types 
of emotional or affective responses and conditioned reflexes to sound” (Schnupp et al. 90). The 
bilateralism continues, as the auditory cortical areas of both hemispheres share common 
connections in the corpus callosum, so the information from both ears can reach all neurons.   
The study of the auditory cortex brings many challenges. The cerebral cortex is “the 
youngest and most malleable part of the brain in evolutionary terms” (Schnupp et al. 91). While 
the ascending auditory pathway is similarly organized in all mammals, the auditory cortex is 
different among species (90). Many of the studies that have helped map the cortex in other 
mammal species cannot be performed in humans, so the human auditory cortex map is still 
imprecise. Although there is no certainty about the details of how certain areas of the brain work, 
there is evidence of the results of many processes, and the existence of certain mechanisms. This 
awareness makes it possible to explore the ways in which cultural products evince the existence 
of such mechanisms; it suggests, moreover, the particular ways in which cognitive processes 
have evolved and interact with other brain functions. The auditory cortex has a primary and a 
secondary area, both of which interact at all levels with the rest of the brain (91). In addition, 
there is a descending auditory pathway (Schofield). Auditory processing involves feedback. 
There are descending projections of information from neurons at several levels of the pathway: 
from the frontal lobe to the auditory cortex, and from there to the different midbrain levels, the 
brainstem, and some even reaching the cochlea (Schnupp et al. 92). These are believed to form 
feedback loops that support various aspects of auditory processing, either reinforcing or 
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inhibiting signals and responses to stimuli; they help in the perception of frequency, intensity and 
specific sounds within complex environments (He and Yu; Schofield).31 As Schnupp et al. have 
observed, these projections and loops show that “auditory processing does not occur on a purely 
feedforward fashion,” and these projections “make it possible to retune the system on the fly, 
right down to the level of the mechanics of the cochlea, to suit the particular demands the 
auditory system faces in different environments or circumstances” (92). Most of these loops 
work around the medial geniculate body of the thalamus, and the thalamus is believed to be 
central for multimodal integration:32 
The thalamus is actively involved in shaping afferent signals through both facilitatory and 
inhibitory processes. It selectively facilitates or inhibits frequency channels, amplifies or 
attenuates signals depending on their intensity, and minimizes the interference from other 
sensory inputs. It participates in highly complex integrative functions, and is crucial for 
shifting the functional mode of the brain between an adaptive behavioral state, open to 
the outside world, and a disconnected state such as in slow-wave sleep when thalamic 
gates are closed. (He and Yu) 
The thalamus is not the only part of the pathway where loops and projections occur; it illustrates, 
nevertheless, the general complexity of the descending pathway, whose many aspects are still 
poorly understood.33 It is important to recognize their underlying presence at all levels of 
                                                          
31 For a description of current theories about feedback loops see also Weinberger.  
32 “Multimodal (or multisensory) integration refers to the neural integration or combination of 
information from different sensory modalities (the classic five senses of vision, hearing, touch, 
taste, and smell, and, perhaps less obviously, proprioception, kinesthesis, pain, and the vestibular 
senses), which gives rise to changes in behavior associated with the perception of and reaction to 
those stimuli” (Holmes et al. 2457).  
33 For a detailed analysis of the descending auditory pathway see Schofield. For traditional but 
still relevant theories before the advent of advanced imaging technologies, see Oertel et al., and 
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auditory processing because they show a system designed to use past experience in order to 
adapt, improve and modify future auditory perception. It is worth reiterating that both the 
concept of participation and of auditory expectation rely on a similar model of cognitive and 
perceptive processes where experience is essential to the ability of an individual to interact at any 
level with a cultural product. As will be further argued, these loops and projections facilitate the 
functions of reward that ensure a continued motivation for individuals to engage in and, more 
importantly, to innovate in cultural production.  
The existence of ascending and descending auditory pathways also illustrates two very 
important concepts: bottom-up and top-down processing. Both concepts are applied to the study 
of the mind as part of the information processing approach (Rookes and Willson 13; Bermudez 
47). Bottom-up processing is based on the analysis of low-level individual sensory inputs, which 
are assumed to control perception, and which can be as detailed as to look at the molecular level, 
for instance. This information is then combined at higher cognitive levels with neural input from 
other sensory modalities to eventually arrive at a percept. Conversely, top-down processing 
begins with the general high-level functions which drive and inform the mechanisms that work at 
lower levels. A bottom-up approach attempts to arrive at the general principles of cognitive 
processes through the study of low-level processes, while the top-down approach starts from the 
general principles, based on accumulated sensory experience, to arrive at an understanding of 
low-level mechanisms. For students of the humanities, it is not hard to see the similarities of 
these two approaches with two long-standing concepts of logic: inductive and deductive 
reasoning. Hence, the way the brain works influences the production of knowledge and the 
                                                          
Syka and Masterton. See also He and Yu, and Weinberger. For examples of psychoacoustic 
studies involving the auditory pathways see Ando and Cariani. 
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systems that are developed to enhance and improve on such knowledge. This is also the case 
with auditory perception, as Plomp explains: “Audition can be primarily seen as bottom-up 
processing stressing the significance of information in the actual stimulus, versus cognition as 
top-down processing stressing the significance of concepts, expectation, and memory as a 
context for stimulus perception” (6). It is clear from the previous discussion regarding the 
auditory system that these are not separate modes of processing either in terms of time or space. 
They occur simultaneously and share the same anatomical structures; they enable the 
aforementioned process of conscious and unconscious extrapolations that starts before a 
perceptive event takes place, anticipating what will be heard (7). This dynamic is what underlies 
the concept of auditory expectation, which is a manifestation of it in the context of cultural 
production.34 The ability to anticipate does not only mean old information is used to predict 
future perceptive events, but also that such information will have an impact on the way one 
produces and conceptualizes sound. It is key to keep this framework in mind for the following 
overview of how the auditory system processes and integrates the different qualities of sound.  
 
(Not So) Perfect Pitch 
The foregoing discussion highlighted the importance of periodicity for pitch perception, 
and the importance of distinguishing frequency as a physical characteristic of a sound wave from 
pitch, which is a percept and not necessarily equivalent to frequency.35 As mentioned, complex 
sounds are composed of many different frequencies, and, although most of the time the 
fundamental frequency of a sound may determine its pitch, this is not always the case. The 
                                                          
34 For the definition of auditory expectation see p. 12. 
35 Regarding phase, see p. 17. For periodicity, see p. 19. 
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discussion also included some of the many important functions of pitch: how it helps to 
distinguish the gender and age of a speaker, and to pick out their voice when several individuals 
speak at the same time; similarly, it facilitates the identification of musical melodies, and  
contributes to the interpretation of meaning according to voice inflections and melodic contours; 
finally, it helps to determine if the sound source is alive or inanimate, and to estimate qualities 
like the size or material it is made of (Schnupp et al. 93). For more than a century, the periodicity 
of the fundamental frequency was believed to be what determined pitch (Plomp 25). Decades of 
experiments have shown a more complex picture. The ears not only can perceive a missing 
fundamental, as discussed previously, but they also can, for instance, perceive the pitch of a 
single sinusoidal tone as that of its subharmonic (27).36 This becomes even more complicated in 
the presence of noise (28). Another problem is related to the length of the sound’s periods. When 
the they are too long, the pitch perceived is not that of the fundamental, and when they are too 
short, it causes a deterioration in the perception of pitch (Schnupp et al. 96). On the other hand, 
the ears can perceive pitch even if sounds are not strictly periodic, as is the case with the human 
voice. The ears can even create an “internal representation of periodicity” when a different sound 
is presented to each ear. In addition, although periodicity is certainly an important factor, pitch 
perception depends also on frequency content.  
It was said before that pitch is independent of sound level and spatial location, and that it 
is partially independent of the level of the harmonics of a sound. Pitch is also mostly independent 
of timbre. As with many other abilities, pitch perception improves with training; this is called 
                                                          
36 A subharmonic is “a component of a periodic wave having a frequency that is an integral 
submultiple of the fundamental frequency” (Merriam-Webster). There is a subharmonic series 
that can be calculated mathematically and partially mirrors the harmonic series of a given pitch 
(Paynter et al. 267). Subharmonics have traditionally been considered to be inaudible, but as 
Plomp’s example shows, this is not completely accurate. 
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perceptual learning (103).37 This is visible not only through formal training, but also in the fact 
that the ear adapts when faced with altered inputs (291). Improvement can happen as a result of 
perceptual learning tasks that are not specifically designed for that purpose, like playing video 
games.38 What is impressive about pitch perception is that “the brain is ready to accept rather 
weak evidence of periodicity and transform it into the sensation of pitch” (138). It is easy to see 
how this is an essential ability given that humans are constantly surrounded by noise. What 
makes it possible is the fact that the sensation of pitch is a product of top down processing, 
probably at the highest levels of the auditory cortex. Although the ears capture and process 
detailed information about sound waves, in order to create the sensation of pitch, the brain has to 
ignore most of it:  
Thus, an explicit representation of pitch is almost antithetical to the general rules of 
representation in the early auditory system, which seems to be optimized for keeping all 
the details of sounds, rather than ignoring those that may be irrelevant for a particular 
purpose. It makes sense for the auditory system (and presumably for any sensory system) 
to push generalizations far up in the processing hierarchy. (Schnupp et al. 138) 
In spite of such generalizations, the ear is able to perceive very small changes in frequency, 
especially in the middle range (Wolfe et al. 266). As part of the description of the ascending 
auditory pathway, there was brief mention of the concept of phase locking, the propensity of 
auditory nerve fibers to produce spikes at specific points in a period, mostly at or close to the 
point of maximum amplitude, generating periodic firing patterns (Schnupp et al. 117). The 
                                                          
37 Perceptual learning may but does not necessarily result in increased brain activity in areas 
related to the attribute of sound on which training focuses, in this case pitch (Schnupp et al. 291).  
38 Improvement can come from the performance of unrelated tasks that involve the brain areas 
necessary for pitch perception (Schnupp et al. 291). 
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patterns come from the combination of the firing trains of dozens of fibers attuned to different 
frequencies. This is necessary to account for an additional complexity in this process: the limited 
bandwidth of nerve fibers, which makes it necessary to integrate information from across 
frequencies (120).39 But, although at this level of processing the information necessary to extract 
periodicity is encoded and available, the actual processes to determine periodicity and pitch 
occur at higher levels (122). At different stages in the ascending auditory pathway different 
attributes of a stimulus are enhanced, including periodicity (124). There is evidence that at the 
level of the ventral cochlear nucleus a certain type of neuron enhances periodicity independent of 
sound level (126). Some experts think there are neurons that attune to periodicity at the level of 
the inferior colliculus, although it is not clear if this is specifically related to pitch perception.  
As discussed above, the auditory cortex is still poorly understood. Yet, there is evidence 
that points to a response to periodicity in some of its areas (129). But the fact that pitch is a 
percept implies that its representation in the auditory cortex should correspond more to the 
experience of the listener than to the sound itself (130). Given that the experience of perception 
is subjective, the resulting representations should reflect the inherent flaws of an individual’s 
perceptual process. In this context, the studies that have attempted to locate specific centers or 
modules of cortical pitch processing have proved insufficient, as they do not provide evidence 
beyond selective responses to sounds with pitch (131). Something similar has happened with 
attempts to prove the existence of a periodotopic map in the cortex.40 Recent research, however, 
                                                          
39 Auditory nerve fibers have limitations in both the range of frequencies they are attuned to, and 
the amount of time it takes them to be available again after firing, known as refractory period. 
One proposed solution to this problem is known as “the volley principle,” which means that 
while one nerve fiber is on a refractory period, one of the neighboring fibers may fire in response 
to the stimulus (Schnupp et al. 85-6). 
40 Similar to the idea of tonotopy presented in p. 24, a periodotopy would be a topographical map 
for periodicity in some of the brain areas related to sound perception and processing (Langner 
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continues to make positive findings that might in time provide a clearer picture of how pitch 
processing works. What can be surmised from current knowledge is that top-down processing 
underlies perceptive abilities, and that it helps to look at possible ways in which generalization 
impacts auditory expectation in the context of cultural production. One of the functions of pitch 
already mentioned can help to illustrate this with examples focused on non-verbal sounds. A 
very interesting instance of the importance of pitch in a non-verbal situation is what is known as 
urgency mapping (Auditory Cognition 242). The existence of warning systems is not something 
that comes immediately to mind when thinking about sounds in the environment, and this is the 
way it should be. These systems are designed to alert the listener about events that do not happen 
often, but that require immediate attention when they occur. In the case of time-critical 
situations, visual warnings are not ideal, especially if the intent is to warn individuals who are 
not within reasonable distance of the place where they are located (240). Sound has the potential 
of covering very large distances, and to reach individuals who are not in the visual range where 
an alert might be detected. Beyond that, sound can also be used to enhance the effectiveness of 
these warnings by the appropriate use of specific parameters, one of which is pitch. The concept 
of urgency mapping attempts to improve aural warning design by connecting both the “perceived 
urgency of the warning and the situational urgency of the condition presented by the warning” 
(242). One of the goals of this approach is to design alert systems that can represent different 
levels of urgency corresponding to different situations. Pitch is one of the main parameters that 
help in maximizing the effectiveness of aural warnings. Perhaps the most familiar example is the 
                                                          
143). Although many authors claim to have proven this, there is no consensus on the matter, as 
those studies have failed to show a clear connection of such an arrangement with the subjective 
perception of pitch (Schnupp et al. 131). For a current perspective supporting periodotopy and its 
relation to tonotopy, see Chapter 10 in Langner. 
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sound of a siren.41 Although originally sirens were not invented as warning devices, their use 
became widespread at the beginning of the 20th century.42 The key recognizable characteristic of 
a siren is that its pitch fluctuates at considerable speed. Through long-term use and training, 
listeners have come to automatically recognize them as signs of danger (Edworthy and Adams 
145). Studies have shown that higher pitch is perceived as more urgent (Auditory Cognition 242-
3). In modern fire alarms, sometimes the sound of the siren may be accompanied by an 
intermittent higher frequency sound, which can be extremely annoying, but quite effective to 
enhance the sensation of urgency and the need to evacuate. In naturally occurring sounds, 
everyone has had the experience of the unsettling effects of high-pitched emissions, for instance, 
the cry of a baby or the scream of someone in pain. When accompanied by other adequate 
parameters, the effectiveness of an auditory warning can be even higher. One of these important 
parameters is loudness. Going back to the example of sirens and alarms, increased loudness is 
yet another indication of urgency, and it is a crucial factor in trying to reach a large number of 
people or cover a vast area. Loudness is an essential aspect of sound, as will be explained in the 
following overview regarding the particulars of how it is perceived.  
 
Thinking Out Loud 
It was observed previously that the intensity or loudness of a sound is connected to the 
amplitude of the perceived soundwave; however, it depends also on the characteristics of the 
                                                          
41 This form of warning is the only one that bears the name of a mythological figure associated 
with song, something that professor Ottavio DiCamillo generously brought to my attention. 
Perhaps the name is especially fitting, since, just as one cannot help but hear the beautiful 
melody of the mythical sirens’ song, neither can one avoid hearing a warning siren, although for 
the opposite attribute of extreme dissonance.  
42 For the history of the use of sirens as warning devices, and their previous widespread use in 
experiments related to pitch and periodicity, see Jackson, pp. 205-207. 
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surrounding environment. It important to remember that amplitude is measured according to 
sound pressure level, but perceived loudness varies depending on frequency.43 Between two 
tones presented at the same sound pressure level, the ears will perceive the one with higher 
frequency as louder than the other (Wolfe et al. 265).  Hence, sound pressure level and loudness 
are not equal. Another factor that alters the perception of loudness is the duration of the sound: 
longer sounds are perceived as louder. This is because loudness depends on the summation of 
energy over an interval between 100-200 milliseconds. Sounds below this interval will appear 
softer compared to others with the same amplitude that are in or above this window. Due to the 
structure of the cochlea, amplitude impacts the amount of displacement in the cochlear partition, 
resulting in more force in the movement of the tectorial membrane in the organ of Corti, which 
in turn causes hair cells to bend farther and increase the release of neurotransmitters (254).44 As a 
consequence, in the auditory nerve fibers increased loudness will manifest in increased firing 
rates and vice versa. Nerve fibers have only up to 30 dB of range from the threshold where they 
start firing to the point that their firing rate saturates, and this window varies among fibers. So, 
the proper encoding of sound intensity is achieved by the combined work of many fibers.45 
Nerve fibers also become responsive to wider frequency ranges as intensity increases, so a larger 
number of fibers will fire as a result of higher sound levels. The perception of loudness, as was 
mentioned, is not equivalent to amplitude. Another aspect that affects it is the frequency 
spectrum of the sound. Two sounds with equal intensity can be perceived as different in 
loudness: “The more the intensity is spread over a wider frequency range, the louder the tone 
seems to be” (Plomp 29). A sinusoidal tone sounds considerably softer than a complex tone. 
                                                          
43 See pp. 17. 
44 For the anatomical description of the cochlea see pp. 23-24. 
45 This is another instance of the volley principle, which was mentioned in note 38. 
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Loudness is also remarkably stable. When one hears more than one sound at the same time, like 
human voices, for instance, from a purely physical perspective there is a lot of interference and 
masking between them; however, one perceives them as if they did not conflict with each other 
in terms of loudness.46 In daily life, individuals are used to the fact that distance affects loudness, 
yet they perceive it as a characteristic of the source rather than the sound wave (145).  
 
It All Boils Down to Timbre 
After covering some basic notions regarding the perception of two of the three main 
attributes of sound, frequency and loudness, the focus can shift to the last one: timbre. Timbre, as 
previously defined, is the attribute of sound that makes it possible to distinguish the sound of 
different musical instruments playing the same note, or the voices of several interlocutors, and 
this is mainly due to the different amplitude distributions of the sound’s harmonics or overtones 
(Wolfe et al. 289). As part of the discussion regarding the perception of pitch, it was remarked 
that it is almost independent of timbre; a violin can play many different pitches, and one still 
recognizes its sound. Timbre is also very stable in relation to changes in amplitude: the same 
fictional violin can play at different levels of intensity and still be recognized as a violin (Plomp 
19). Something similar happens with regard to phase. If the violin sounds inside an enclosed 
space, the sound waves will reflect against the walls, the floor and the ceiling, causing the form 
of the soundwave to vary from its original form. This implies changes in phase and also in the 
amplitudes of the overtones, but one continues to hear a violin, because the auditory process 
calibrates according to the most reliable features of the context where sound is perceived (Wolfe 
et al. 291). While changes in phase do not seem to have a major effect on the perception of 
                                                          
46 This is another aspect of the already mentioned “cocktail party problem.” See note 17. 
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timbre, differences in amplitude are more complex, and timbre remains stable to changes in 
amplitude “up to a factor of 3,” while larger changes will lead to the perception of a different 
timbre (20). Different from pitch and loudness, “differences in timbre appear to be 
multidimensional, depending on the amplitudes of a series of harmonics”.47.  
Out of the three basic attributes of sound, timbre is the least resistant to interferences. 
Sounds in enclosed spaces can vary greatly due to physical phenomena like reverberation (146). 
However, timbre remains a fundamental factor in the ability to process and discriminate among 
sounds. For instance, it had been mentioned that pitch helps to identify the approximate age and 
gender of a speaker, but in order to identify individual voices, it is necessary to look at the 
spectral characteristics that determine their timbre. Plomp observes that there is a paradox in 
timbre as a physical reality, because it is “at once the most vulnerable and the most informative 
attribute of sounds” (146). This observation leads him to assert that such instability is 
compensated by the cognitive aspect of auditory perception. Everyone has experienced the 
differences between listening to a voice on the phone versus listening to it inside a highly 
reflective space like a bathroom. Yet nobody gets too concerned with these differences, and they 
seem to be accepted for what they are. This shows the enormous flexibility in the way the ears 
perceive timbre, and this is yet another example of the high level of adaptability of perceptive 
systems in the face of an ever-changing environment. This adaptability is going to be even more 
evident in the following discussion about the main aspects of sound perception and processing.  
 
                                                          
47 One important fact about the auditory processing of harmonics is that one only distinguishes 
the first five, while higher harmonics remain unresolved, and enough information about 
difference in frequency spectra can be drawn from as little as the first two harmonics. The main 
factor for the perception of timbre is the overall slope of the frequency spectra (Plomp 21-24). 
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Focus on sense 
After surveying the most important aspects of sound perception and auditory processing, 
including some of the complexities of what a sound wave is, how it is captured and processed, 
and how it becomes the percept known as sound, the discussion can go back to cultural 
production and the ways in which auditory perception can help achieve a broader understanding 
of it as an embodied experience. The significant advances over the last decades in fields related 
to sensory perception in general, and auditory perception in particular, have become part of the 
subject matter of disciplines such as embodied cognition, musicology, neuroaesthetics, 
neuroscience, psychoacoustics and psychology, opening the way for the in-depth study of the 
link between sensory perception and cultural production. But the majority of research heretofore 
has focused on visual perception, with an emphasis on interdisciplinary studies examining the 
relation between the visual arts, literature, music and the humanities in general. Research that 
explores the role of auditory perception in the arts and the humanities is more recent and scant. 
In the case of literature, these studies have strived to broaden concepts belonging to the fields of 
aesthetics (like memory, harmony, synesthesia, rhythm and prosody), and to the study of 
soundscape and its relation to different cultural products and practices.48 Conversely, auditory 
perception will be analyzed as a set of somatic phenomena that affect the individual both 
emotionally and intellectually, and thus impact cultural production in a specific way. In order to 
do this, it is indispensable to introduce the concept of methexis, the Greek word for participation 
                                                          
48 For a comprehensive bibliography on the subject see Zunshine, “Bibliography” and also her 
Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies. For a historical approach to the relation between 
sound, science and philosophy see Erlman, Reason and Resonance. For a historical survey of 
sound and hearing theories see Burnett. For a specific study of sound perception in the Classical 
period see Butler. For the concept of soundscape, the classic study is Schaffer. For the use of the 
concept in a medieval context, see Cazelles. See also the continuing research of Filippi. For a 
musicological approach to this topic in the Middle Ages, see Boynton et al.  
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or sharing; in this case, it refers to the kind participation that occurs between the producer and 
transmitter of culture and the receiver of a text as consumer of the cultural product, keeping in 
mind that the producer of culture, the author, is always also a receiver, a consumer of other texts. 
The use of the word “receiver” intends to highlight the fact that throughout the Middle Ages 
literacy was exceptional, and the intended audience of a given work was composed of a few 
readers and a multitude of listeners. Similarly, the word “transmitter” encompasses all the 
different actors that may play a part in the oral, aural and/or written transmission of a text, 
among others: authors, copyists, forgers, jurists, notaries, plagiarists, orators, preachers, town 
criers and heralds, lecturers and teachers, anonymous agents that quote the text, lettered 
individuals who read the text aloud to others, or receivers who later repeat sections of the text to 
others. This chapter began asserting that participation is the engine of cultural production. The 
goal of this thesis is to show that auditory perception is the mode of perception that allows the 
methexis of authors, transmitters and receivers of literature. It is the possibility of methexis what 
causes the desire to read more, to hear more and to write more. Within the context of the case 
study, thirteenth-century Castile, a thorough scrutiny of the participatory aspect of auditory 
perception can shed new light on the motivations behind some of the decisions taken by the first 
authors who wrote in Castilian, which are reflected in certain stylistic features that become 
apparent at the dawn of written literature. These features, apparently motivated by rhetorical 
precepts or pedagogical concerns, sometimes hide their functional nature behind a purported 
archaism, an origin in orality or an almost ornamental facade. In reality, they are pragmatic 
solutions to the obstacles and limitations presented by perceptive phenomena in the practice of 
communication, the participatory practice par excellence. It is then necessary to start by 




























Because if that’s your desire, I’d like to weld 
you together and join you into something that 
is naturally whole, so that the two of you are 
made into one. Then the two of you would 
share one life, as long as you lived, because 





















Methexis, as previously mentioned, is the Greek word for participation or sharing. It was 
first used in philosophy by Plato, and continued to be developed throughout history by some of 
the most important figures of the Western tradition. In English, the preferred word to refer to this 
tradition has been participation. Aside from Philosophy, participation has been explored 
extensively as a concept in the fields of Anthropology, Education, Sociology, Political Science, 
Theology and Religious Studies. Anthropological perspectives could be said to constitute the 
earliest to study this subject, given that scholars consider participation as already present in 
primitive societies, mainly in cultural practices regarding the relation between humans and the 
world around them, like animism and mysticism (Thomas et al. 598). For the purposes of this 
thesis, however, the focus is on the philosophical concept of participation that begins with 
Plato’s methexis, because it is centered on the human creative experience and whose century-old 
tradition eventually culminates in the phenomenological approaches that are linked to enactivism 
and embodiment.49 The use of this Greek word is intended to highlight that in the context of 
cultural production methexis is more than mere participation or sharing.  It goes beyond the 
simple act of taking part in something, possessing something, or the idea of being part of 
something other than oneself. Methexis, in fact, is also the experience of a body feeling actively 
                                                          
49 “Enactivism is an emerging perspective in cognitive science proposed most explicitly by 
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) as an alternative to representational theories of cognition. 
As a perspective in cultural psychology, it was first proposed by Baerveldt and Verheggen 
(1999) as a way to give an account of consensually orchestrated personal conduct, without 
evoking culture as an already established meaningful order. Both enactive cognitive science and 
enactive cultural psychology are characterized by a focus on sense-making as a situated, 
embodied activity” (Baerveldt and Verheggen). Embodiment is a term used in the theoretical 
framework of embodied cognition. Shapiro explains that “there is as yet no firm consensus 
among practitioners about how to understand crucial concepts such as ‘embodiment.’ Nor is 
there unanimity about the goals of embodied cognition, or whether and to what extent ideas and 
methods from traditional cognitive science should have a place in embodied cognition research.”  
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present in something, even when there is no physical act of participation. Methexis is an 
embodied experience, and this is what places it at the center of the study cultural production.  
A look at the way in which the philosophical concept of participation has developed 
reveals a constant interdependence with creativity and embodiment, although most of the time 
this concept seems to be at odds with the actual presence of the body. A great part of its 
evolution occurred in settings where Philosophy and Religion where, if not inseparable, deeply 
intertwined. Even today, participation remains a very important topic of debate in Philosophy 
and Religion. In his essay on Theology and Religious Studies, Jacob Sherman divides the history 
of participatory approaches into three main stages or “turns,” which he describes in terms of their 
leading exponents. The initial stage or “formal turn” begins with Plato’s methexis, and will be 
further explored below. The second stage or “existential turn” reaches its peak with Thomas 
Aquinas’ concept of participatio that shifts the emphasis from describing the status of a being to 
“the ontological question of why a being is” (86-92). Sherman finds support for this 
interpretation in the Summa Theologiae: “Natural things have a natural inclination not only 
toward their own proper good. . . but also to diffuse their own goodness among others as far as 
possible. . . to communicate their own goodness to others.” (I, q. 19, art. 2, quoted in Sherman 
91). The last stage or “creative turn,” which is practiced at present, focuses on dealing with “the 
problem of creative agency,” for which “a third mode of participation had to be discovered or 
invented, a mode whereby not only are essence and existence participated, but creativity itself is 
shared through the series of participatory mediations” (92). Sherman explains that this “turn” 
emerged out of the possibility that, if the source of existence was located outside of creatures, 
they might ultimately become empty vessels devoid of agency. This mode has its origin in 
Hermetism, as well as in the Patristic tradition. It is also rooted in sophists like Dio Chrysostom 
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and Philostratus, and in the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus, and represent a shift from imitation or 
inspiration to contemplation (93). In the fourteenth century, Meister Eckhart links these 
traditions by focusing on the theurgical aspect of participation, that is, on the “operation of a 
divine or supernatural agency in human affairs” (OED). As Sherman explains: “human artistry 
finds its proper object when the imagination rises to contemplate the Divine Ideas. . . . our 
thoughts and imagination are echoes of God’s Logos” (94). This is an important change for the 
purposes of this thesis, because it is connected to Christian conceptions of communion as a truly 
embodied participatory experience where the creature shares fully in the Divine by eating 
Christ’s body and drinking his blood, and eventually leads to what Umberto Eco identified as 
“the germ of new directions in aesthetics akin to our own world” (113).  Sherman argues this 
new direction is taken to the limit in Baruch Spinoza’s pantheism, which “revises the concept of 
participation in a thoroughly immanentist fashion by doing away with the transcendence 
involved in all earlier participatory theories,” opening the way for modern expressionism, 
understood as “the idea that an agent is genuinely present within rather than external to its 
actions” (95-6). Out of the turmoil that Spinoza’s ideas sparked all over Europe during the 
following two centuries, involving thinkers such as Jacobi, Kant and Hegel, came several 
attempts to reconcile immanence and transcendence that culminated in the ideas of Friedrich 
Schelling. Schelling presents three kinds of participation: “in existence, in ideality and in 
creativity” (101). This allows him to argue that human beings can participate in the life of God 
by using their productive imagination (102).  
This survey of the most important stages in participatory approaches gives the necessary 
context for a detailed analysis of Platonic methexis, in order to justify the need to use it instead 
of simply referring to sharing or participation. The best way to do this is to start with a definition 
 
 48 
of participation. Sherman offers the following explanation: “In its most general sense, the 
metaphysical concept of participation refers to a constitutive structure whereby a being or beings 
share to varying degrees in a positive quality or perfection that they receive from a donating 
source that alone enjoys the fullness of this quality or perfection” (81). This definition is 
significant because the debates that lead to important changes in participatory approaches in both 
Philosophy and Religion throughout history are centered on the problem that Plato was facing in 
the first place: the relation between the material world and the divine (82). As Plato conceived it, 
methexis is the kind of relation where a particular shares in a form, and, hence, it lies at the other 
end of the spectrum from mimesis, where the particular only imitates the form. In Sherman’s 
words, “these two realms [forms and particulars] must be distinguished but by no means divided. 
For Plato, the one realm becomes the raison d’etre of the other and participation or methexis 
describes this crucial, constitutive relationship of one realm to another” (83). Note that above the 
word “share” was purposely used alongside the word “participate.” In doing so, it follows what 
Sherman does in the above-quoted definition, as well as the important observation of Gadamer 
about the problems of translating the word methexis in the context of Plato’s philosophy:   
Methexis actually means “participation” [Teilhabe], and if one says it in Latin, it will be 
yet further misunderstood: participatio. For here the idea of the whole and the parts 
intrudes, which, in the Greek expression, as with German equivalents such as 
“Teilnahme” and “Teilhabe,” is really not relevant. 
Can one really speak of taking a part [Nehmen eines Teils] when one takes part [Anteil 
nimmt]? (262) 
The problem of the “part and whole” connotation of the word “participate” does not entirely 
disappear by using the word “share,” but at least such connotation is not reinforced by the visual 
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presentation of the word itself. In any case, it is still necessary to emphasize the two meanings of 
“share” that do not carry this connotation: “Use, occupy, or enjoy (something) jointly with 
another or others; possess (a view or quality) in common with others” (OED). Still, this does not 
mean that the word “participate” can be ignored altogether, precisely because it is the Latin 
translation on which a centuries-old philosophical and religious tradition rests. So, in maintaining 
this ambiguity by using both terms, the need for a word that overcomes these limitations is 
reinforced as well; and what better word than Plato’s.  
Returning to the problem of methexis that starts with Plato, it was suggested above that 
this is an embodied concept. It arises at that undetermined place in the spectrum where mimesis 
fails to establish a dynamic relation between forms and particulars, especially because for Plato 
“the embodied and temporal being is not a second-rate version of the Form it participates; it is 
this Form in embodied and temporal form” (Sherman 83). But here, at the very origin of the 
debate, is where methexis as a philosophical concept becomes problematic. On the one hand, it 
seems to require a conscious distancing from the body in favor of a purely intellectual approach. 
This would conform to Sherman’s assertion that “it is clear that by his middle period Plato 
understands such participation to be analogical in nature. . . . Statements such as the rose is 
beautiful are therefore relational, not attributive.” Indeed, one has but to listen to Socrates at the 
beginning of the Phaedo:  
For example, do men find any truth in sight or hearing, or are not even the poets forever 
telling us that we do not see or hear anything accurately, and surely if those two physical 
senses are not clear or precise, our other senses can hardly be accurate, as they are all 
inferior to these. (65B) 
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What follows this assertion is an argument on how the body and the senses are obstacles for the 
soul to reason and grasp the truth. To grasp the ideal forms, Socrates argues, is something that 
thought can do only when freed from the whole body, “because the body confuses the soul and 
does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom whenever it is associated with it” (66A). Similar 
statements about the body as a distraction and an obstacle to intellectual activity appear several 
other times in the Phaedo, but it is important to remember that Socrates is speaking on the day of 
his death, literally hours away from drinking the hemlock, and within the context in which he 
argues that any philosopher should be happy to die and be rid of his body. The radical separation 
from the body is then something to look forward to, not something that is possible in the here 
and now. There clearly is no way for the Forms to be manifested in the physical world, albeit 
defectively, absent the body’s perceptual mechanisms.  
Plato’s intention in the Phaedo was not to deny the unavoidable fact of the existence of 
the body; on the contrary, he was trying to emphasize the immortality of the soul and its 
primordial role in the work of the philosopher. In this regard, it is crucial to remember that 
another important concept that plays a part in the Phaedo is anamnesis, as a determinant 
component of the participation of particulars in the Forms. When Cebes notes that “. . . learning 
is no other than recollection” (72E), Socrates explains: “when a man sees or hears or in some 
other way perceives one thing and not only knows that thing but also thinks of another thing of 
which the knowledge is not the same but different, are we not right to say that he recollects the 
second thing that comes into his mind?” (73C). Later on, he further elaborates:  
Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he now sees wants to 
be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be like that other since it is inferior, 
do we agree that one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says 
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it is like, but deficiently so? . . . We must then possess knowledge of the Equal before that  
time when we first saw the equal objects and realized that all these objects strive to be 
like the Equal but are deficient in this. (74D -75A)  
Gadamer argues that the concept of anamnesis is a manifestation of the participation of one eidos 
in another, which realizes the meaning of the syllable meta in methexis as being-with (265).50 
But there was another major problem to confront regarding the relation between forms and 
particulars, namely, if Plato considered the essence of the ideas, the eidos, to be present in the 
particulars (261). Gadamer addresses this with a reference to the myth of the soul in the 
Phaedrus: “it is said that the beautiful stands out above all others, because it shines forth (to 
ekphanestaton). Thus, the beautiful is conceptualized in Platonic terms as something to whose 
essence it belongs to appear.”  Here Gadamer remembers that, before Plato, the Pythagoreans 
had already used the word mimesis to describe a similar kind of relationship; later, Aristotle took 
this as a basis to argue that, when addressing the relation between forms and particulars, all Plato 
had done was to replace the Pythagorean mimesis with the word methexis, there being no change 
in meaning. Another interesting translation problem arises here. According to Gadamer, 
“imitation” is not a completely accurate translation of mimesis, which means “re-presentation,” 
which is still not the same as participating or sharing:  
In contrast to this, “methexis” is a wholly formal relationship of participation, based on 
mutuality. “Mimesis” always points in the direction of that which one approaches, or 
towards which one is oriented, when one represents something. “Methexis,” however, as 
the Greek meta already signifies, implies that one thing is there together with something 
                                                          
50 Eidos is the term used by Plato for the abstract Forms or ideas (Blackburn). 
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else. Participation, metalambanein, completes itself [erfüllt sich] only in genuine being-
together and belonging-together, metechein. (262) 
To participate or share in something presupposes the presence of something. In spite of 
Sherman’s previously quoted assertion that “by his middle period Plato understands such 
participation to be analogical in nature,” in the use of methexis proposed here, this presence is 
not allegorical but actual, insofar as the body feels it and reacts to it. It is a presence in the sense 
Gumbrecht uses it to define ‘production of presence’ as a purely embodied concept:  
The word “presence” does not refer (at least does not mainly refer) to a temporal but to a 
spatial relationship to the world and its objects. . . . “Production,” then, is used according 
to the meaning of its etymological root (i.e., Latin producere) that refers to the act of 
“bringing forth” an object in space. . . . Therefore, “production of presence” points to all 
kinds of events and processes in which the impact that “present” objects have on human 
bodies is being initiated or intensified. (xiii)     
The argument of this thesis is that auditory perception is one of such processes where this impact 
is initiated or intensified, on the one hand, and, on the other, it goes beyond production of 
presence by making the receiver feel that he or she is sharing in such a process or event. This is 
pure methexis. Whereas Philosophy and Religion have delved into the participation of what is or 
comes into being with God, or Wisdom, or Knowledge, or the primary Cause, or the ideal Forms, 
the purpose here is to conduct an inquiry into the methexis of human beings with their own 
creative activities, with the act of being alive manifested in a series of actions and events that are 
grouped under the term “cultural production.” This methexis does of necessity occur given that 
its products are something other than human beings or mere static things: they contain an 
inherent dynamism that comes from the fact that an embodied mind engendered them. In the case 
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of literature, the auditory system is the privileged means of perception, cognition and processing 
that makes methexis possible. Literary cultural production has traditionally been studied as a 
visually centered activity revolving around “written culture” as distinct from “oral culture” that 
was long neglected as a field of study. The increasing attention led to a discrete approach to 
orality which may have been necessary in the beginning, but has now turned into an obstacle to 
the study of literary cultural production. The conception of literature as a mimetic endeavor has 
also cast a shadow on the importance of its methexic nature. One more reason to shift the focus 
to auditory perception in order to better understand methexis. The survey of sound generation 
and perception in the previous chapter was necessary in order to pinpoint the ways in which they 
can influence cultural production. Now that there is a framework for the use of methexis as a 
particular form of participation, it is possible to explore some of the neurocognitive features of 
auditory perception that make possible the embodied methexis of humans in cultural production.  
 
The Text and the Brain 
In order to look for the bodily manifestations of methexis, it is necessary to consider the 
major stages that would encompass the process of literary cultural production and the 
neurocognitive interactions that may play a part in them. It would seem that everything starts 
with an author writing a text, either in a creative setting or otherwise. But an author does not 
simply sit and starts to write in a vacuum. There is always a previous complex experience that 
provides the raw materials necessary for the act of writing, which may include, amongst others, 
past experience, formal education, other types of training, practice, and different introspective 
creative processes. And then there is a voice. Not an actual, physically measureable voice, but an 
inner voice. It is that voice that speaks inside one’s mind when one is thinking, that reads when 
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one engages in silent reading, and that dictates when one is writing. 51 After the text is written, 
comes the satisfaction of achieving a purpose, the pleasure of having others read one’s work, or 
the disappointment generated by rejection or criticism. Either satisfaction or disappointment, or 
the many other possible emotional reactions one may experience, can become the force that 
propels one into writing again. Similarly, for a reader there is a series of expectations about 
reading a text. The reactions to the text can fall anywhere within the spectrum between complete 
obsession and radical rejection. The effect of a “page-turner” is precisely that, an inability to put 
the book down without enormous effort, because the reader is completely captivated by the text, 
anticipating the climactic moment of denouement. After such a pleasurable experience, readers 
may very well become die-hard fans of the author, and even camp all night outside a bookstore 
to get their hands on the first edition of the next book. And all throughout this cycle there are 
different perceptual and cognitive mechanisms at play.  
Whether writing or reading, perception occurs at all stages of textual production and 
consumption. Although traditionally reading and writing are conceptualized as predominantly 
visual activities, the present argument is that they are intrinsically multimodal, and that auditory 
perception has the predominant role in both activities. Reading and writing, even in the digital 
                                                          
51 Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy’s Listening: “Lacan calls the voice ‘the alterity of what is said:’ what, in 
the saying, is other than what is said, in a sense the non-said or silence, but still the saying itself, 
and even that telling silence [silence disant] like the space in which ‘I hear myself’ when I grasp 
significations, when I hear them coming from my thoughts (which is the same thing). I can hear 
them, in fact, only if I listen to them resound ‘in me.’” Later on he adds: “But ‘pure resonance’ 
(as Bernard Baas calls it) is still a  sonority – . . . a ‘sonorous materiality, vibration that animates 
the auditory apparatus as much as the phonatory apparatus, or rather: that seizes all somatic 
locations where the phenomenal voice resonates (rhythmic pulsation, muscular contraction or 
relaxation, respiratory amplification, epidermal shiver. . . or everything we used to call, more or 
less confusedly, the manifestations of the ‘speaking body [corps parlant]’” (28-9). 
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age, engage vision, hearing and touch, and may involve gustatory and olfactory sensations.52 In 
fact, the senses also play an anticipatory role in both cases, based on previous experience or lack 
thereof. Cognitive mechanisms also function in anticipation and during one’s engagement with a 
text, as well as after the interaction with it is over. Whether it is planning the outline of the new 
book an author is about to write, or it is a reader browsing a bookshelf looking for something 
appealing to read, the text is already in the person’s mind. Finally, there is the experience of the 
various somatic manifestations of reward: a tingling of curiosity or anticipation, the excitement 
of a gripping story, the pain of a sad ending, or the satisfaction of finishing the last revision of 
one’s first novel. There are specific processes corresponding to the perceptive, cognitive and 
reward mechanisms that generate the wide range of interactions just mentioned. Some of them 
are especially adequate to illustrate the ways in which methexis is realized via brain function, 
and how they may influence cultural production. Understanding some of these processes will 
help to illustrate how, even in centuries past, before the advent of modern science, cultural 
products have made present human intuitions about the way cultural production works: through 
methexis made possible by the human brain’s perception, cognition and reward systems. 
 
Rewarding Experiences 
Readers have long been acquainted with the pleasure of the unexpected: humor, mystery, 
poetic justice, the hero’s journey, David’s impossible victory over Goliath . . . whatever plot 
twists or common-place endings may exist for a story, they probably have already been exploited 
ad nauseam for the sake of profit in the ever-expanding world of the bestseller. The same can be 
                                                          
52 Think about the act of licking one’s fingers in order to turn a stubbornly attached page, or the 
particular smell of a book that has spent too long on the shelf without being opened. 
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said of all forms of commercial cultural production: there is a tendency to take any successful 
model to its ultimate consequences, until consumers become numb to its effects, to then move on 
to the next model. Radio stations, for instance, play a song repeatedly until it becomes a hit, and 
then even more regularly, but with slightly decreasing frequency as the audience begins to lose 
interest. There lies the focus of this section. What happens that makes one lose interest, and 
sometimes even feel aversion towards that song one had been constantly playing just a couple of 
weeks ago? Why do readers not experience the exact same thrill after reading a wonderful spy 
novel for the second or third time? The cause of such reactions lies in the depths of the brain, in 
the reward systems, which modulate some of the most basic vital functions and assign value to 
innumerable human experiences. This is not an attempt to advance a scientifically deterministic 
view of human cultural production, nor an intervention into any of the various debates about the 
existence of free will, or lack thereof, when it comes to what people like or dislike. The goal here 
is to show how the processes that underlie the human experience are participative, methexic, in 
nature. Methexis lies at the core of cultural production because there are brain processes that 
make people feel they are sharing in said production at different levels. Perhaps the most basic of 
these levels is the continuum between pleasure and pain, mediated by brain reward systems.  
As was the case with auditory perception and processing, current knowledge about the 
workings of brain reward systems is far from complete. Still, the insights gained by decades of 
research show some features that can help to understand how the brain rewards and incentivizes 
cultural production, and to hypothesize why it does so. The main function of reward is to mediate 
behavior, learning, affect and decision making: “Rewards are the most crucial objects for life. 
Their function is to make us eat, drink, and mate. Species with brains that allow them to get 
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better rewards will win in evolution” (Schultz 853).53 Theories about reward look at different 
types of behavior and the kinds of value the brain may assign to them in order to predict future 
actions and results (854). Although the clearest connection between the cultural production of 
written texts and reward mechanisms would seem to be in the area of learning, other brain 
processes mentioned below make it possible to see connections in the areas of behavior, emotion 
and decision making. This is important because cultural products, and specifically literature, are 
both the precursors and the results of a combination of all these areas and of the ability of the 
brain to keep actualizing human interactions with the world that surrounds them. Schultz 
proposes these main functions of reward: “learning, approach behavior and decision making, and 
pleasure” (854). Pavlov’s dog has become an almost heuristic device for learning as a reward 
function. It represents the most basic form of classical conditioning, occurring without the need 
for an individual’s actions. More sophisticated kinds of learning need the active participation of 
the subject. This is known as operant learning.54 Both kinds of learning can occur 
simultaneously. Schultz calls Pavlovian and operant learning “the building blocks of behavioral 
reactions to rewards.” It is operant conditioning, however, that best exemplifies reward functions 
as positive reinforcers (855).55 This type of learning is what keeps one coming “back for more,” 
and thus strengthens the skills that allow access to whatever one is seeking, be it stimuli, things, 
actions, events, and even products of one’s imagination. Learning also comes from attraction that 
makes people want to get close to a reward and work to obtain it. This is called approach 
                                                          
53 This section is largely based on Schultz, “Neuronal Reward and Decision Signals,” 
supplemented in relevant sections with other works. 
54 For a more detailed treatment of operant learning see Schultz, pp. 864-5. 
55 “A positive reinforcer is a stimulus that increases the frequency or likelihood of a response 
when its presentation is made contingent upon that response. Giving a child candy for cleaning 
his or her room is an example of a positive reinforcer” (Doorey).  
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behavior, and it implies not only getting close to the reward, but also preparing to get it and 
consuming it, motivating one to make decisions.56 Finally, rewards can lead to “positive 
emotions,” the most common of which is pleasure. Schultz observes that “pleasure constitutes a 
transient response that may lead to the longer lasting state of happiness.” It is not, however, the 
same as happiness, because pleasure can have many different intensities and can manifest itself 
in many different ways, as varied as human experience.  
Reward is primarily geared at supporting the two essential functions for human survival: 
nourishment and procreation. These two functions are the reason behind the evolution of brain 
reward systems and they are called primary rewards. They are homeostatic57 and reproductive: 
“To ensure gene propagation, the primary rewards mediate the survival of the individual gene 
carrier and her reproduction” (857). While food and drink support homeostasis, sexual drive is 
both dependent on hormonal activity and on the experience of pleasure. This does not mean, 
however, that only those things directly involved in primary functions are important. There are 
secondary functions that support them to go beyond identifying potential sources of reward and 
working to procure them. These other rewards indirectly support primary ones, and they can be 
tangible or affective, sensory or intellectual. From everyday objects to artworks, from images to 
sounds, smells and textures, the senses help to identify rewards, but more than that is needed to 
                                                          
56 For more on approach behavior and choice see Schultz, pp. 887-90. 
57 Homeostasis is “the maintenance of a dynamically stable state within a system by means of 
internal regulatory processes that tend to counteract any disturbance of the stability by external 
forces or influences; the state of stability so maintained; spec. in Physiol., the maintenance of 
relatively constant conditions in the body (e.g. as regards blood temperature) by physiological 
processes that act to counter any departure from the normal” (OED). The body needs to regulate 
the amount of specific substances and their derivatives that make possible our optimal 
physiologic functioning, given the highly fine-tuned nature of body chemistry (Schultz 859). 
Sensations such as hunger and thirst are examples of ways in which reward systems support this 
balance by motivating us to seek the necessary nourishment to maintain our bodies.  
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discover “their motivating or pleasing properties” (858). The sensory component is the first of 
three types that maximize the possibilities of obtaining the best rewards with the least effort. The 
other two are geared at catching the eye and motivating action (856). Salience is the component 
that helps to attract attention, and it can be physical, motivational, or related to novelty and 
surprise. Motivation, on the other hand, depends on value, which depends on subjective 
preferences. Some of these components reflect external reality, while others come from internal 
reactions and processes of assessment. Value is perhaps the most difficult component to study, 
because it is subjective and does not necessarily correspond to measurable physical qualities.58 It 
also interacts with learning and memory of external events, and with the novelty and surprise that 
comes from the difference between previous and current experiences (857).  
All these components share common neural substrates responsible for reward processing, 
which, despite the ongoing research, are still only partially understood. One aspect where there is 
agreement among the theories thus far advanced on the question of reward, is the important role 
of dopamine. Recent research has shed light on the complexity of the brain systems that regulate 
dopamine and their different functions, as well as the brain regions that may be involved.59 
Although a detailed account of this system falls outside of the scope of this thesis, there are 
relevant features that merit, however briefly, a comment. One important feature is the existence 
of two distinct networks related to attentional control: dorsal and ventral (Brunia et al. 866). 
While the dorsal network processes actual stimuli, the ventral is concerned with anticipation of 
                                                          
58 For a detailed treatment of reward value see Schultz, pp. 890-912. 
59 Aside from Brunia et al, for recent knowledge on specific types of dopamine and their reward 
function see Berridge and Kringelbach, pp. 469-72. A more scientific explanation of specific 
dopamine roles, including phasic dopamine responses in learning and prediction can be found in 
Schultz, pp. 869-87. For specific studies involving auditory perception, see Kraus and White-
Schwoch, Brodal et al., Asutay and Västfjäll, and Salimpoor et al.  
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future stimuli. The importance of these networks lies in what some theories call dopaminergic 
teaching signals, which are relative to the outcome of an action as compared to previous 
expectation, and are handled depending on whether they are “motivationally versus perceptually 
relevant” (867). This could help explain, for example, the way the body influences choice: 
“when a person imagines the consequences of an action he or she might make, a ‘gut feeling’ is 
generated that helps guide decision making” (866). It may also inform future research into the 
way humans respond to manifestations of cultural production that focus precisely on unexpected 
outcomes or unmet expectations, like humor, mystery, and drama, as well as musical and plastic 
works that manipulate or reject expected normative frameworks.  
At this point it is possible to see the connection among reward systems and auditory 
perception and processing in the context of cultural production. There is a large portion of 
cultural production that relies on the interplay between expectations and outcomes. That is the 
reason why it has been necessary to propose a concept like auditory expectation.60 Prior auditory 
experiences are the basis for what one expects to hear. Instrumental music exemplifies this in its 
most pure form because there are no additional factors other than the sound; even the most basic 
compositions have structures based on the creation of tension and resolution, most notably in 
western tonal harmonic works based on chord progressions. But other cultural products with an 
auditory dimension also create and are affected by auditory expectation, with an enhanced 
complexity that comes from the presence of other layers of meaning that are also subject to 
anticipation and outcome prediction. When the role of reward systems in turning interaction with 
a cultural product into a pleasurable experience is factored in, one is entering into the embodied, 
methexic area of cultural production. The experience of pleasure leads to desire. Having had this 
                                                          
60 For the definition of auditory expectation see p. 12. 
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experience, one will seek to replicate it or to gain access to those things that will bring 
gratification; as a result, one will form an expectation: “Desire requires a prediction, or at least a 
representation, of reward and constitutes an active process that is intentional” (Schultz 855). 
Desire leads to certain kinds of behavior depending on what reward one is trying to obtain or 
achieve. While pleasure is not an action, but something that results from the expectation or 
achievement of a reward, desire propels the individual into action with the goal of getting such a 
reward. Pleasure and desire are closely interconnected, and they are the two most important 
results of rewards. They are also important for behavior regulation. Given that most research on 
reward systems comes from the study of addiction, pleasure and desire are usually referred to 
with terms devised for that field: liking and wanting, respectively. For instance, Berridge and 
Kringelbach define reward systems as the sum of liking, wanting, and learning (458). But current 
research has expanded the concept of reward beyond this formula, for it has come to include a 
wider range of areas that are more subjective and cannot be measured directly in experiments, 
like assigned value and emotional responses. It is precisely in this gray area that cultural 
production intersects with brain reward systems, via methexis. Participation is made possible by 
the expectation of reward, but will also inform anticipation of future rewards.  
Literature as a cultural product may fall into more than one reward category. According 
to Schultz, the “nonphysical, nonmaterial rewards, such as novelty, gambling, jokes, suspense, 
poems, or relaxation, are attractive but less tangible than primary rewards” (858). It is evident 
that more than one of these rewards is present in various literary genres. Schultz also talks about 
activities that generate pleasure independently of the nonprimary function of supporting 
homeostatic or reproductive needs. He calls them “intrinsic rewards,” and among his examples 
he includes reading. A look at today’s best-seller phenomenon proves the high reward value 
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accorded to literature. It would be otherwise impossible to understand the willingness of some 
hardcore readers to camp outside a bookstore through the night in order to get their hands on the 
next installment of Harry Potter, or to get their copy autographed by the author, or the exorbitant 
amounts some collectors will pay for a first edition or an autograph manuscript. Some authors 
become celebrities, and adoring fans will go to incredible lengths to get a glimpse of them at a 
public appearance or to find out details of their personal lives. Although many of these 
phenomena are mediated by sophisticated, relentless media campaigns, no amount of 
commercial advertisement would convince reasonable individuals to behave in such a manner if 
they did not enjoy it. The same is true of the numerous subcultures arising from the notoriety of a 
popular book or series, or around a charismatic writer, which expand the rewarding experience 
beyond the text and its material manifestations into a wider spectrum of objects, activities and 
even lifestyles. Authors also derive all kinds of rewards from their work. Fame and fortune can 
be powerful motivators in the drive to continue writing. All these examples have one underlying 
common principle: methexis. They are instances of the way in which individuals share in cultural 
production, whether as producers or consumers, motivated by the anticipation and achievement 
of pleasure that manifests itself in a variety of ways. 
There are, however, other kinds of motivations for action that can also have an impact on 
the way people participate in cultural production and engage with cultural products. Pleasure and 
reward have a negative counterpart in fear, pain and punishment, and the need to avoid them and 
other potentially negative events and emotions is linked to negative reinforcement and learning 
(Schultz 855). Just as feeding and mating are essential for survival, it is crucial to have 
appropriate ways to detect and avoid danger. One of the primordial roles of the auditory system 
is helping to detect, classify and respond to threats in the immediate environment. The 
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predominant paradigm used to study this function is known as fear conditioning.61 Through 
learning and experience the brain develops appropriate responses to relevant auditory stimuli that 
might signal the presence of danger (Armony and LeDoux 2). This means that there is an 
individual aspect that depends on specific temporal and spatial circumstances (1). This kind of 
learning is extremely efficient; it only needs a couple of occurrences for one to develop a 
conditioned response to specific sounds that characterize a perceived threat. There are many 
measurable physical signs of this type of reaction: “muscle tension, pupil dilation, changes in 
heart rate, blood pressure, respiration and, most often, electrodermal or skin conductance 
responses, which are mediated by the sympathetic nervous system” (2).62 Fear conditioning is 
common across all mammals, and its main neural substrate, the amygdala, seems to have 
remained structurally and functionally stable throughout evolution (3). The amygdala responds to 
affective value and it does so more strongly when faced with the first occurrence as opposed to 
repetitive stimuli (7). Recent research has shown it plays an integrative function across 
modalities, and especially with auditory and visual stimuli. The speed with which this system 
works is made possible by neural plasticity, which will be discussed below. 
                                                          
61 Studies that follow this paradigm use conditioned and unconditioned stimuli simultaneously in 
order to measure the unconditioned initial reaction and subsequent learning by association: 
“through conditioning, new stimuli that become warning signals for impending threat can gain 
access to evolutionary shaped defensive responses, allowing the individual to rapidly respond to, 
or even avoid, the dangerous situation” (Armony and LeDoux 2).  
62 “The sympathetic nervous system normally functions to produce localized adjustments (such 
as sweating as a response to an increase in temperature) and reflex adjustments of the 
cardiovascular system. Under conditions of stress, however the entire sympathetic nervous 
system is activated, producing an immediate, widespread response called the fight-or-flight 
response. This response is characterized by the release of large quantities of epinephrine from the 
adrenal gland, an increase in heart rate, an increase in cardiac output, skeletal muscle 
vasodilation, cutaneous and gastrointestinal vasoconstriction, pupillary dilation, bronchial 
dilation, and piloerection. The overall effect is to prepare the individual for imminent danger” 
(Rogers 76).  
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Another important aspect is the way the brain anticipates pain and uses bodily reactions 
as alerts. Brunia et al., as previously mentioned, identify two attentional control networks, dorsal 
and ventral (866). While the dorsal network “implements top-down, goal-driven control of 
perceptual resources,” the ventral network “mediates the involuntary capture of attention by 
intense, novel, motivationally relevant or otherwise salient stimuli” (862). One of the brain 
structures of this network, the right anterior insula, is involved in “awareness of visceral 
sensations.” This would be the basis for that “gut feeling” discussed above, which is crucial for 
anticipation of unpleasant events and immediate decision making (866).63 The right anterior 
insula has also been connected to attention and task control. This is important because it points to 
an embodied experience of expectation fulfillment where negative results also lead to bodily 
reactions, but instead of the pleasurable release of dopamine, there is, at the very least, 
discomfort. Those who have had the experience of falling prey to a page-turner know all too well 
the rollercoaster ride that the body experiences as the process of reading progresses through an 
emotionally-charged plot. Such experiences are akin to interactions with every other form of 
cultural product: music, cinema, sculpture, performance, and even intellectual activities like 
attending a lecture or writing an academic article. There are a variety of common-place phrases 
to describe them, in addition to gut feeling, like butterflies in one’s stomach, the hairs on one’s 
neck standing on end, feeling shivers down the spine, lumps in one’s throat, or goosebumps, just 
                                                          
63 See p. 60. Brunia et al. see this as representative of Bechara and Damasio’s somatic marker 
hypothesis, a game theory approach that posits a learning relation between emotions and somatic 
reactions, where experience increases the anticipation of outcomes based on such reactions. For 
instance, if a certain olfactory stimulus produces nausea in a person, after a number of similar 
events take place, over time, the possibility of a future similar scenario will create an anticipation 
of nausea as a somatic reaction, and this will impact the subject’s decision making regarding that 
particular stimulus, especially in situations where there is little time for a cognitive evaluation of 
the situation or the decision-making process would be too complex. For a full account of this 
hypothesis see Bechara and Damasio. 
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to name a few. These are all embodied forms of methexis made possible by brain reward 
systems. Anticipation not only of pleasure but also of pain or discomfort lies at the core of 
human affective reactions to cultural products. One could even venture to affirm that, in the case 
of literature, the classification of genres usually rests on premises of fulfillment of expectations, 
or the lack thereof: happy endings, the excitement of unpredictable denouements, sad stories, 
miscarriages of justice, punishment of evil, saving the hero or allowing his needless demise, or 
Elizabeth finally saying yes to Mr. Darcy after months of misunderstandings.  
To establish a link between the brain reward system and auditory perception it is 
necessary to look at another cultural product where the ear plays a more prominent role: music. 
This is in part necessary due to the lack of research geared at studying auditory perception in 
textual contexts, but it is also convenient because it highlights the main features of auditory 
reward without having to introduce the text as an additional factor subject to brain processing. 
Another advantage that will prove valuable later on in this thesis is that music and literature, 
from Antiquity to well after the Middle Ages, used to be a lot closer to each other than they are 
now. The artificial separation that is now assumed to be the norm was not always true throughout 
recorded history. Contrary to what happens with literature, the last two decades have seen a 
considerable increase in research about music, auditory perception and the brain. Recent studies 
have shown that within a complex auditory environment, where several auditory stimuli compete 
for attention, those associated to high rewards will receive more attention, especially if such 
rewards are believed to depend on the perceiver’s performance of a determined task (Asutay and 
Västfjäll 1). This is an example of the motivational salience discussed above. Attentional 
selection is also connected to the orienting function of auditory perception, and it alerts the brain 
to the presence of relevant stimuli in the surrounding environment (2). In the case of music, this 
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spatial dimension interacts with the temporal dimension of developing sound patterns and with 
the predictive function of the reward system (Salimpoor et al. 86). Musical pleasure, according to 
recent studies, may be the result of “interactions between the sensory, cognitive, and emotional 
systems with reinforcement circuits.” Following Schultz and Berridge, Salimpoor et al. state that 
midbrain dopamine neurons are responsible for signaling possible rewards and fine-tuning future 
error predictions by encoding how much an actual outcome corresponds to an anticipated result 
(86-7). The interaction of dopamine networks with the opioid system is thought to help regulate 
affective responses to music, as well as predictive and learning functions (89). Listening to 
unfolding sound patterns over time enhances the pleasure of listening due to a “continuous 
generation of expectations and predictions.” These may derive from actual knowledge of the 
work of music in question or of the particular rules governing specific styles. Such knowledge 
need not necessarily come from formal training; it can be a result of cultural practices or 
statistical learning.64 Such regularities are much more evident in music than in written texts, 
where, besides poetry, they are manifested in more nuanced stylistic and prosodic characteristics, 
many of which only become apparent through oral performance. Still, in both music and 
literature, repetition and regularity play a role in learning, and the violation of expectations of 
regularity, in turn, plays a role in the pleasure these cultural products afford to the listener. 
Dopamine, however, is not the only reason why listening to music is pleasurable. There is a 
cognitive component mediated by the cortical areas responsible for auditory, temporal and 
emotional processing (Salimpoor et al. 88-9).   
                                                          
64 Statistical learning is a concept that originated in psychological studies of language acquisition 
and is now applied to a wider range of sensory perception studies: “Statistical learning is 
computational in nature, and reflects implicit rather than explicit learning. It relies on the ability 
to automatically pick up and learn from the statistical regularities that exist in the stream of 
sensory information we process. . .” (Kuhl). 
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Patel and Iversen have argued that “music perception is a form of ‘predictive listening’ in 
which listeners have expectations about upcoming events and the confirmation or denial of these 
expectations arouses emotion” (5). In order to support this, they study musical beat perception in 
the context of what they call “action simulation for auditory prediction,” a hypothesis that 
establishes a link between the motor areas of the cerebral cortex and the auditory system (1). 
They believe that the predictive nature of beat perception rests on this connection via the dorsal 
pathway. They also observe that there is accumulating evidence that points to rhythm as essential 
for brain organization. Their study is valuable for the present thesis for two reasons. First, 
rhythm is one of the main features common to music and language. Second, it may be one of the 
most ancient neural mechanisms that developed in human evolution. In fact, recent 
anthropological research has found strong evidence that human linguistic and musical abilities, 
and maybe even human intelligence, are the result of anatomical changes caused by the rise of 
bipedalism (Mithen 146). Walking on two feet led to drastic changes not only in human bones 
and muscles, but also in the nervous system, chest cavity and vocal tract (147). It also made 
rhythm necessary, therefore leading to “the evolution of mental mechanisms to maintain the 
rhythmic coordination of muscle groups” (150). This perspective adds credence to a link between 
the motor and auditory systems, and it is directly related to the topic of reward and auditory 
perception. The involvement of motor systems has important consequences for the types of 
rewards that can come from listening to rhythmically structured sounds. The natural human 
tendency to move to the rhythm of music, many times involuntarily, is just one of the many ways 
in which this link is realized in embodied experience. From foot tapping all the way to 
professional dance, rhythmic movement is one of the quintessential pleasurable activities for 
humans. But even without music, many physical activities integrate rhythm as a way of 
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organizing tasks and maximizing efficiency. This ability was developed by our earliest bipedal 
ancestors in their first manual labors (152). Walking, running, swimming, hammering, and even 
sweeping the floor, are all examples of the natural tendency to fall into rhythmic patterns during 
daily physical activities. In fact, humans purposely use rhythmic music to accompany many of 
these activities; for example, exercise facilities and other commercial fitness providers offer 
dance and music based classes, and maintain specific types of music continuously playing in the 
background to enhance the experience of their clientele. At the very end of the spectrum, there 
are the dance club and live concert experiences, where moving to the rhythm is less about 
organization and more about expression of affect. Very recently, Brodal et al. found evidence of 
this in a reduction of functional connectivity but a stronger activation of reward systems when 
listening to rhythmic music (6). This means that the experience of the listener is less constrained 
in terms of dopaminergic reward and more rewarding affectively due to this reduced control (1). 
Returning to the link with bipedalism, it is also supported by recent research that shows how 
non-bipedal primates do not exhibit the same ability as humans to synchronize to rhythmic 
stimuli; on the other hand, non-primate animals with vocal abilities, like parrots and Asian 
elephants, have demonstrated an ability to synchronize to musical beats, pointing to a link 
between vocal learning and beat perception (Patel and Iversen 10).   
The previous discussion about rhythm illustrates the complexity and the wide range of 
possible rewards that auditory perception offers, thanks in great part to the same predictive 
function that enables auditory expectation. Zald and Zatorre observe: “‘Prediction confirmation’ 
is rewarding to the brain” (Patel and Iversen 5). Brain reward systems help evince the predictive 
nature of perception in general.65 Given that beat perception, and music perception in general, 
                                                          
65 See Sloos and McKeown for more on top-down processing and anticipation of stimuli. 
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are predictive, they fall within this assertion. Brain rewards also shed light on human activities 
that are not indispensable for the immediate survival of the human species, yet provide support 
for higher-order functions favored by evolution. In the case of cultural products that involve the 
ear, and in this case literature, this opens the door to countless experiences that integrate sound 
into an intricate landscape that also includes vision, touch, movement, cognition, affect and 
creativity. The recent findings mentioned above also point to a complex, embodied auditory 
experience facilitated by the interaction of brain reward systems with sensory and cognitive 
processes, where individual experience will provide the raw material for auditory expectation by 
continuously actualizing the interplay between predictions and outcomes. Such actualization also 
has a neural basis manifested in the ability of the brain to make temporary or permanent 
structural adjustments based on everyday experiences and their outcomes. These complex 
interactions lead to continuous changes in responses to reward, which constitute an embodied 
manifestation of methexis insofar as they make the subject feel actively involved in said 
interactions not only at an abstract level but also at a somatic, material level. In order to 
understand how this occurs, it is necessary look at the brain mechanisms that allow such 
adaptability: it is necessary to get acquainted with neural plasticity.  
 
Life is Flux 
Heraclitus’ famous words were not predicated on anything that would now be called 
scientific; they were based on the Presocratics’ view of change as the guiding principle of 
existence, not only for the outside environment but also for the human body.66 Yet, from 
                                                          
66 Heraclitus of Ephesus (6th century BC), was a Presocratic philosopher. Fragments of his work 
survive quoted in the work of important philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. He is mostly 
known for his doctrine of universal flux (Graham).  
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Antiquity to the present, one of the goals of natural philosophy and medicine has been to reveal 
the inherent stability of the human body, especially the brain, as material manifestations of 
metaphysical eternal truths. These two seemingly opposite approaches have intersected 
throughout history, and, as will become apparent in the following pages, both have proven 
partially correct. For the purposes of this thesis, the analysis will focus on change as present in 
the most fundamental brain functions. Adaptability is a key component of life experience and, 
therefore, of cultural production. It may manifest as a skill that allows one to thrive in a changing 
environment, or as circumstantial conditions that force one to seek transformation and variety. 
The fact that people eventually get bored of things they used to enjoy makes them look for 
variations of them, or for entirely new objects or experiences. That is why this chapter started by 
affirming that participation is the engine of cultural production. If people derived the same level 
of reward or aversion from the same object or experience, there would be little incentive for 
them to improve and diversify their cultural products. But just as the desire for gratification that 
comes from cultural products is a byproduct of brain mechanisms primarily geared at 
guaranteeing the survival of a species, so is the ability to adapt to change. Methexis is not only 
comprised of a search for rewards. It is also manifested in the experience of constant 
transformation and the thirst for innovation, which are also byproducts of brain mechanisms that 
evolved primarily to allow human survival in a changing environment. These mechanisms reveal 
the participative nature of brain processes and they are collectively known as neural plasticity 
(Irvine 4). As it was the case in reward systems, not all changes are beneficial and positive, and 
plastic changes can also be maladaptive (Hickok 52; Irvine 35).67 The study of plasticity in the 
                                                          
67 This section is based primarily on Irvine, and Weinberger, complemented when appropriate by 
other sources.  
 
 71 
human brain has met similar challenges as other areas of neurocognitive research. Current 
theories rely greatly on the findings of animal studies due to the limitations on the kinds of 
methods that can be used in humans, and on the resolution of neuroimaging technologies 
(Hickok 251).68 The study of plasticity also relies heavily on research into modalities other than 
hearing, like vision and somatosensory systems. All of these circumstances add uncertainty to 
the interpretation of recent findings. However, they are still useful for the study of cultural 
production because they consistently point to an embodied experience characterized by 
adaptability and the constant drive to improve and diversify human interactions with the 
surrounding environment.  
In the case of the auditory pathway, plasticity is even more of a gray area than the reward 
system. The traditional view of neural plasticity, which has come under extensive scrutiny in the 
last decades, held that it was limited to critical developmental periods of the human lifespan, 
during childhood and adolescence, and that it did not occur in the adult brain (Irvine 3; 
Weinberger 1).69 In the case of auditory perception, this led to the long-standing belief that the 
primary auditory cortical areas of the adult brain were unmodifiable. However, in the last couple 
of decades evidence to the contrary has accumulated, and adult plasticity is currently a 
burgeoning research field. Plasticity refers to a series of processes connected to learning and 
experience that occur in different places in the brain; they may be temporary or may lead to long 
term or even permanent structural and functional changes in neurons, which alter an individual’s 
behavior (Herholz and Zatorre 486). Such alterations in neurons happen “in response to changes 
                                                          
68 See p. 27, note 26. 
69 The rationale behind this idea is that in order to rely on sensory input there needs to be 
stability in its underlying neural substrates, leading to what Irvine calls the “stability/plasticity 
dilemma” (3-4). For more on developmental plasticity see West-Eberhard.  
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in the nature or significance of their input” (Irvine 4).  It is key to emphasize that there are other 
types of neural changes that do not constitute plasticity, like those produced by lesions that alter 
sensory inputs or by variations in the state of an organism. Another concern is how to determine 
the location of plastic changes, either in the auditory system or in areas of the brain considered to 
carry out higher order processes of attention and cognition. This is due in part to the other 
traditional view that has been challenged recently; namely, that the auditory cortex only analyzes 
acoustic stimuli but it does not perform any cognitive functions (Weinberger 1-2).   
It important to elaborate on this, because it establishes a link with the ancient and 
medieval theories of sound generation and perception that provide the context for the specific 
case study that will be used to support this thesis regarding participation and cultural production. 
Weinberger sees these traditional views as “the logical product of the long-stablished assumption 
that sensory processes and higher cognitive processes are separable within the cerebral cortex. 
Indeed, they are assumed to be ‘in series.’ In other words, the products of sensory analysis are 
supposed to be ‘passed on’ to ‘higher’ cortical areas, where cognition takes place” (2). The 
traditional conception of an inalterable adult brain, as will be shown later on, spans all the way 
back to ancient medical theories that were still very much alive during the Middle Ages. Those 
theories not only conceived the brain as a stable organ that could only be altered by lesion or 
illness, but also proposed sensory processing and cognition as separate and sequential, and the 
brain as neatly divided into discrete areas according to supposed stages of processing. What is 
most astonishing is that remnants of such views were still influential in the 20th century, in spite 
of considerable advances in the study of the human brain. In light of mounting evidence against 
an unchangeable adult brain with discrete parts and sequential processes, researchers have 
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proposed various paradigms to paint a more accurate picture of brain structures, as well as the 
ways in which they can adapt either temporarily or permanently to different types of change. 
The discovery of developmental plasticity during the second half of the twentieth century 
brought into focus the importance of perception for the development of the human brain, but it 
took several decades more for researchers to study learning and memory formation as indicative 
of continuing plasticity in the adult brain (Irvine 3). The evidence that led to this switch in 
paradigms came from studies that found changes in the topography of primary cortical areas in 
response to the interruption of input from somatosensory receptors caused by lesion. Similar 
findings were soon made in the visual and auditory primary cortices. Such changes are examples 
of injury-induced plasticity. As pointed out earlier, the auditory pathway that starts in the cochlea 
is arranged tonotopically.70 This organization is maintained in the primary auditory cortex, 
forming a frequency map (Irvine 5). Recent studies have found contralateral reorganization of 
this map in response to mechanical lesions in the cochlea.71 Perhaps the most common example 
of such changes is the increased aural acuity of individuals who suffer visual impairments, most 
dramatically manifested in an increased ability to localize sounds in the surrounding space 
(Elbert et al. 329).72 The earliest sources of evidence of adult plasticity, however, were the 
behavioral conditioning studies of auditory perception and processing. Unfortunately, they were 
largely ignored until evidence of lesion-induced plasticity gained attention, in part because they 
lacked the specific control methods to ascertain the kind of change that they represented. As 
discussed in the context of brain reward systems, the two most important types of learning are 
                                                          
70 See pp. 24 and 28.  
71 For a definition of contralaterality see note 29. For injury-induced plasticity see Irvine, pp. 5-9. 
72 Elbert et al. also reference several studies of crossmodal plasticity where the visual cortex of 
blind subjects assumes the processing of auditory and tactile stimuli. 
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classical conditioning and instrumental or operant learning.73 The effects of either kind of 
training are not only the procurement or prediction of reward or aversion; they can also lead to 
temporary or permanent plastic changes, depending on the tasks and learning methods 
employed.74 In opposition to their use in the study of reward systems, both types of learning are 
considered to involve plasticity when the changes in behavior validate neurophysiological 
measurements.75 In the first auditory classical conditioning studies, subjects were exposed to 
contrasting tones that generate reward or aversion, referred to respectively as conditioned 
stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS) (Irvine 9). The results consistently led to an 
increased cluster response to the CS frequency and a decreased response to the UCS.76 This is 
known as receptive field plasticity, and it occurs in the primary auditory cortex and in other parts 
of the auditory pathway (Asutay and Västfjäll 4). Later studies expanded to include other tasks 
and testing procedures, which showed that the occurrence of plasticity is linked to the specific 
requirements of each task, and that the occurrence of learning is not direct evidence of plasticity.  
Another important difference is that plastic changes may or may not involve the 
formation of memory traces, or associative memory, which constitutes “the substrate of 
information storage” (Weinberger 3-4). The link between learning and memory is extremely 
                                                          
73 See p. 57, and Weinberger, pp. 3-4. 
74 Regarding this topic, Irvine remarks: “All learning undoubtedly involves plasticity in some 
part of the CNS [Central Nervous System]. In many cases it is unclear, however, whether the 
neural changes underlying learning have taken place in the auditory system or in ‘higher order’ 
attentional or cognitive processing areas” (4). Even if the location of a plastic change is 
uncertain, for the purposes of formulating an embodied theory of cultural production this is still 
representative of the kind of brain mechanisms that enable methexis.  
75 Depending on the technology used, these may include electroencephalographic readings, 
evoked potentials, metabolic changes, oxygen concentration levels, etc. See Weinberger, p. 3 and 
Hickok, pp. 249-53. 
76 Cluster response is linked to the lack of individual neuron recordings on human conditioning 
studies (Weinberger 6-7). 
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important, because both have traditionally been considered as higher order cognitive process that 
would only happen after the perceptive processing is complete.  Plasticity, however, is only a 
part of these processes, but it is not equal to them, as illustrated by another type of learning 
called perceptual learning, which is “the increased ability to discriminate stimuli within a trained 
dimension, usually due to increasingly difficult discrimination training” (4).77 There is a 
tendency to conflate perceptual with all associative learning, but perceptual learning does not 
lead to the formation of memory traces, that is, one does not remember the process of training in 
detail, with the countless repetitions that lead to the mastery of a certain auditory skill. One gets 
better at performing a certain task, but one does not recall every trial or training session that it 
took to get there (5). This is the kind of auditory training that humans undergo in their early 
years of learning how to speak, read and write. It is also one of the main components of musical 
education, where there is evidence of cortical reorganization and increased user-dependent 
responses (Elbert et al. 329).78 What is important is that there need not be a formal training 
program in order for plasticity to occur. Many learning experiences take place in informal 
contexts. While plasticity in learning may manifest itself in increased acuity, predictive behavior 
or conditioned reactions, it may also be revealed in the effect described at the beginning of this 
section: habituation. Initial studies on this phenomenon date from the 1950’s, and their findings 
showed that repetition of the same sound resulted in decreased responses in both evoked 
potentials and neural discharges. These plastic changes were mostly temporary and responses 
went back to normal levels in the presence of different sounds or after a period of silence. 
                                                          
77 See also pp. 33-4 and note 36. 
78 These are responses related to specialized and prolonged training of specific musical skills or 
instruments. User-dependent responses in musicians are also present in the somatosensory cortex 
in response to long-term instrument practice. 
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Modern listeners who live in populated areas very often experience the effects of habituation 
from experiences like riding public transportation or walking on a busy commercial street, to 
sometimes extreme experiences like attending a live rock concert or being close to an explosion 
or some other abnormally loud sound. In the second case, an extreme auditory experience can 
lead from habituation to a conditioned response consistent with operant learning. Consequently, 
life experiences may involve more than one type of learning, they may result in the creation of 
memory traces, and also in temporary or long-term plasticity.  
The same flexibility described when reviewing what is known about brain reward 
systems can also be evinced in neural plasticity. Recent research methods have expanded their 
criteria to include non-measurable, psychological aspects of plasticity through behavioral 
analysis in order to better account for this flexibility. A good example comes from the study of 
fear conditioning, where recent findings have revealed the complexities of the neural circuits 
involved in conditioning-induced plasticity.79 The most familiar example of this type of 
plasticity presents in aversive classical conditioning, involving stress and defensive responses to 
sound stimuli interpreted as warning signals (Armony and LeDoux 2). This includes plastic 
changes to the human auditory cortex (18). A conditioned fear response can develop extremely 
fast; even after one occurrence “new stimuli that become warning signals for impending threat 
can gain access to evolutionary shaped defensive responses,” which may include measurable 
sympathetic nervous system responses.80 In humans, stimuli can also be emotional and fear 
conditioning has been recently used to study maladaptive disorders like phobias and post-
                                                          
79 The most important pathway involves the hippocampus, amygdala and prefrontal cortex, and 
presents chemical reactions proven to affect neural synapses in the long term. For a detailed 
account of this process see Depperman et al., and Armony and LeDoux, pp. 2-15. 




traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (3). This emotional component is one of the most important 
areas where there is a connection between cultural production and methexis as manifested in 
neurocognitive processes. Extreme cases like PTSD also expand this connection to include 
auditory memory and emotional trauma, two fundamental components of literature throughout 
history. This is also the case with plasticity related to emotional vocalizations, which has been 
recently found in both animals and humans, and, for the latter, is a crucial component of 
communication, social interaction and cohesion. Both verbal and non-verbal vocalizations have 
been studied, but results have been difficult to interpret due to the wide range of emotions that 
compose the human experience and the added complexity of the crossmodal character of most 
emotional expressions, especially the integration of facial and vocal reactions.  
The foregoing examples do not constitute a complete survey of all the forms of plasticity 
that show the participatory nature of perceptive brain processes. Nonetheless, they do illustrate 
some of the areas where the connection with familiar topics and aspects of cultural production is 
present. Emotional responses and conditioning-induced plasticity are particularly interesting 
because of their direct relation to everyday human experience as well as to the genres and 
technical implications of literary cultural production. Emotional reactions to verbal vocalizations 
bear particular importance in the area of oral cultural production and literature originated in oral 
contexts. Experience is also responsible for long-term changes achieved through learning and 
training, which may indirectly benefit the development of common abilities, as is the case of the 
enhancement of language processing due to musical training, an ability which strengthens 
“relationships between cognitive and perceptual abilities” (Strait et al. 27). Such changes are also 
related to the type of top-down fine-tuning discussed above regarding the dorsal network and its 
relation to the reward system and dopamine networks. Specific evidence from studies on the 
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dorsal pathway have found “evidence that white matter connectivity in this pathway is associated 
with the ability to learn new syntactic structures in the auditory domain” (Salimpoor et al. 88). 
This means the very building blocks of literary cultural production are constantly being 
remodeled via plastic changes produced by the complex interaction between experience and 
memory, and therefore, through methexis. Studies on music perception have shown similar 
connections which help to fine-tune auditory expectation through the storage of “auditory 
templates, which can then induce emotional arousal and feelings of pleasure” and support the 
learning of basic elements of sound organization (89).  It is important to keep in mind that 
language and music have some of these elements in common, like rhythm, timbre and prosody, 
with various degrees of importance in accordance with different literary genres. For instance, 
rhythm is paramount in poetry, and part of the pleasure derived from poems rests on the interplay 
of predictions and outcomes present in its patterns; the other part has to do with the fact that beat 
perception aids memorization and its flexibility allows for individual interpretations of accent 
patterns, periodicity, and changes in speed (Patel and Iversen 3). Thus, the ability to adapt to 
experience and change has a direct influence in cultural production, not only because it supports 
learning and memory, but because it provides both the long and short-term flexibility that are 
indispensable for sharing in processes of creation and innovation.  
 
Through the Looking Glass 
The foregoing discussions about the reward system and neural plasticity offer a glimpse 
into brain mechanisms that allow participation in a vast spectrum of human activities, from the 
most basic for survival to the most abstract and creative. This does not constitute an attempt to 
constrain and reduce human cultural production to a set of biological realities. On the contrary, it 
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is but a door that opens into the complexity that underlies those activities and an invitation to 
explore the limits of the myriad issues yet to be resolved. The general nature of the two 
aforementioned brain mechanisms is one of such issues. These systems are so pervasive that, one 
could argue, they may potentially influence every conceivable human activity and therefore turn 
out to be too general to be considered unambiguously methexic. There is need for more specific 
examples of how a participatory brain mechanism might present. That is why the discussion 
must now turn to a relatively recent discovery that offers a more focused illustration of the 
embodied nature of methexis. Relatively recent refers to the past three decades, as opposed to the 
much longer span of time since the inception of studies related to the reward system and of 
neural plasticity. The discovery in question dates from 1988. The reason the date can be pointed 
out with such certainty is that it came as an unintended consequence of a research study focused 
on the motor neurons that control grasping movements in macaque monkeys (Hickok 9).81 The 
original intent was to find evidence of neurons in the monkey premotor cortex that mediated 
action selection by coding information connecting the size and shape of an object with the 
appropriate grip necessary to grab it (10). The group, led by Giacomo Rizzolatti, placed 
microelectrodes to measure a group of these motor neurons during several trials of specific tasks.  
The unintended discovery came when, during the intervals between trials, the microelectrodes, 
which were still connected, recorded activity in response to reaching and grasping movements 
that were not performed by the monkey but by a researcher as he was preparing the following 
                                                          
81 For a complete account of the study and its repercussions see Hickok, pp. 9-26. For a complete 
bibliography of studies published by Rizzolati and other members of his team, both jointly and 
separately, see Ferrari and Rizzolati. See also the bibliography in the Mirror Neuron page of the 





trial (12). Out of a total of 184 neurons, 87 fired not only when the monkey was making the 
movements, but also in response to various visual stimuli, whereas 39 responded to observed 
actions. Such neural activity was known to happen in sensory neurons, but this was the first time 
it was recorded in motor neurons. The greater impact of this accidental discovery came from a 
subgroup of 12 neurons which not only showed this novel behavior, but also a “correspondence 
between the actions they preferred in observation and execution” (13). In subsequent years, this 
group of researchers reported their findings in several publications, where they proposed 
connections between these neurons and several important areas of neuroscientific study. In 1996, 
they referred to them with the name that would make them famous to the point of becoming a 
topic even in mainstream media: Mirror Neurons (15).  
Over the following decade, members of the original research team, together with other 
scientists, continued to expand their original research, aiming to prove that there was indeed a 
mirror neuron system (MNS) present not only in macaque monkeys but also in the human brain. 
The initial report, published in 1992, included a hypothesis regarding the 12 cells that fired when 
the action observed closely resembled those already executed. The group argued that these cells 
could offer evidentiary support for “motor theories of perception” (Hickok 14). In lay terms, 
these theories contend that people are able to understand the perceived actions of others because 
they can perform them themselves.82 They pointed specifically to the motor theory of speech 
perception as a valid candidate, given that the F5 area of the macaque brain, where the mirror 
neurons had been recorded, corresponded in part to Broca’s area, the part of the human brain 
long believed to be involved in motor speech processing. This theory posited that speech 
                                                          
82 One of the obvious counterarguments to this position is that humans are able to understand a 
lot of actions they cannot perform, like flying or echolocation (Hickok 43-6). 
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perception did not rest on the perception of sound alone but on “reconstructing the motor 
gestures that generated those sounds.” Even though the motor theory of speech perception had 
been abandoned decades earlier for reasons that fall outside the scope of this thesis, the discovery 
of mirror neurons brought it back into the fore, opening the door to a conception of the MNS as 
the evolutionary basis for speech (17). The theory was then expanded beyond speech into a 
motor theory of action understanding, which, in a nutshell, posited that people are able to 
understand the actions of others because their brains simulate those actions via the MNS 
(Rizzolati and Craighero 172). Several studies led to conclusions that supported the existence of 
a human MNS and connected it with visual sensory processing (169). By 2002, this connection 
also included auditory processing and the existence of audio-visual mirror neurons that “code 
actions independently of whether these actions are performed, heard, or seen” (Kohler et al. 846).  
In the two decades after their discovery, mirror neurons went from the limited significance of 12 
neurons in the premotor cortex of the brains of macaque monkeys to being heralded as the neural 
basis of a long list of neurocognitive areas, like language development, theory of mind, emotion, 
empathy, imitation, gestural communication, and even specific phenomena like phantom limbs, 
stuttering, addiction, and obesity, to name only a few.83 
                                                          
83 Perhaps the most popular example is Vilayanur Ramachandran's 2009 TED Talk, “The 
neurons that shaped civilization,” still widely shared in social media platforms like YouTube and 
Facebook (https://www.ted.com/talks/vs_ramachandran_the_neurons_that_shaped_civilization). 
For a detailed account of the discovery and rise of mirror neurons, and their current status in 
neuroscientific debates see Hickok, chapters 1-3. For a survey of the MNS see Rizzolati and 
Craighero. For the theory connecting the MNS with sense perception, simulation, emotion, and 
theory of mind see Keysers and Gazzola. For a critical assessment of the connection between the 
MNS and the evolution of speech see Hurford. For the connection between the auditory MNS 
and empathy, see Gazzola et al. For the connection between the auditory MNS and action 
understanding, see Kohler et al. For the possible connection between mirror neurons and the 
evolution of the ear and the cochlea, see Mithen, pp. 126-31. For the connection between the 
auditory MNS and emotions, see Warren et al.  
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The story of mirror neurons broadly summarized in the last two paragraphs is essential in 
providing a context for problems and opportunities that an embodied approach to cultural 
production entails. Mirror neurons have had a prominent role in Embodied Cognition and its 
application to Philosophy and the Humanities, due in part to their seemingly overriding influence 
in so many aspects of human experience. As will be discussed later in this section, their influence 
led to a confusing terminology that has obfuscated whatever common ground there is among the 
Embodied Cognition paradigm and current neuroscientific approaches. It started as a new 
paradigm in Psychology, and was quickly adopted, and mostly confused, with some 
philosophical approaches to perception.84 Mirror neurons seemed like the perfect example to 
support the idea of an embodied brain and debunk traditional behaviorist views of the human 
mind.85 This is not surprising, given the fact that Mirror Neurons would provide a simple 
solution to a series of very complex problems: a system that allows putting oneself in someone 
else’s shoes, understanding what they are feeling and thinking, anticipating their behavior, 
sharing in the emotions of a collective happening or event; in short, to explain the mystery of 
human social existence (Hickok 188). I, for one, saw mirror neurons as the Holy Grail of cultural 
production for many years, based in part on my belief that they had been proven to be the neural 
substrate of shared human experience, since they allowed people to understand the actions of 
others at an embodied level.  
The last decade has seen new evidence emerging that has called into question many of 
the assumptions that helped mirror neurons become the science phenomenon of the new 
                                                          
84 For instance, the work of Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists. For a history of the term 
and its ties to Philosophy, see Wilson and Foglia.  
85 Behaviorism argues that the mind works through associations of increased complexity, from 
basic reflexive behaviors to complex processes (Hickok 111). These processes follow the 
conditioning models previously discussed: classical and operant conditioning. See p. 57.  
 
 83 
millennium. Some important concerns touch on the very foundations of a theory of action 
understanding based on mirror neurons: namely, speech perception, lesion-induced changes in 
brain function, maladaptive plasticity, cerebral cortex mapping and goal-oriented motor 
function.86 An overriding point of contention seems to be redundancy: many of the supposed 
mechanisms that mirror neurons are thought to enable are already performed by other, well-
known and amply proven brain mechanisms.87 Many, in fact, see redundancy, from an 
evolutionary standpoint, as a waste of resources better employed elsewhere; even those who do 
not, see it as a warning sign of the need to revise a theory. The good news is that no one denies 
that mirror neurons exist in the human brain, or that they have specific functions somehow 
connected to important high-level mechanisms that control action, emotion and perception. 
Hickok, for instance, on the basis of current research, has argued compellingly that mirror 
neurons provide “sensorimotor association for the purpose of action selection” (226). An 
important factor supporting his position is that mirror neurons do not fire in response to all 
actions (227). For Hickok, they “are part of a highly plastic sensorimotor association circuit” 
(195). Hurford has effectively challenged the notion that mirror neurons are the substrate of 
speech perception, highlighting in the process important areas where mirror neurons may play a 
role, like speech articulation, concept representation, and automatic behaviors (3-9). They share 
with others a common concern, specifically, that most of what is known about mirror neurons 
comes from the study of macaque brains and not from the human brain, whose MNS clearly has 
different functions. Nonetheless, it is still in essence a brain mechanism that is participative, 
                                                          
86 See Hickok, pp. 41-76, for a detailed discussion of these and other anomalies that contradict 
the tenets of mirror neuron theory. 
87 For an example, see Hickok, p. 44.  
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indeed methexic. As such, it provides a concrete example of a particular kind of functioning: a 
mirror-like behavior that may be present in many other brain mechanisms.88  
While this is neither the place nor the context for a detailed survey of what these 
methexic mechanisms would be or look like, it is certainly the place to explore the ways in which 
cultural production may point to areas where they could be found. This would allow, further 
ahead, the use of a medieval case study in order to provide examples of products that derived 
from the operation of such mechanisms, as well as the impact such cultural products may have in 
said mechanisms, given their high degree of plasticity. First, it is necessary to address the 
overarching claim that mirror neurons are, in Ramachandran’s words, the basis of human 
civilization.89 In 2004, Rizzolatti and Craighero published a comprehensive description of the 
human MNS. In the abstract of the article, they described how pervasive the influence of the 
MNS system could be:   
A category of great importance for primates, humans in particular, is that formed by 
actions done by other individuals. If we want to survive, we must understand the actions 
of others. Furthermore, without action understanding, social organization is impossible. 
In the case of humans, there is another faculty that depends on the observation of others' 
actions: imitation learning. Unlike most species, we are able to learn by imitation, and 
this faculty is at the basis of human culture. (169)  
Without prior knowledge regarding the nature of this research, this introduction would probably 
create confusion. It could be part of a study having to do with Psychology, Anthropology or 
Philosophy. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is important to observe that such wide-
                                                          
88 See Hurford, pp. 5-9, for a discussion of possible examples of mirror-like brain mechanisms.  
89 See note 82. 
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ranging assertions have important consequences for any interdisciplinary effort that attempts to 
explore scientific knowledge in connection with the Humanities. Here is the first problem: 
learning by imitation has been conflated with cultural production, but the latter is participative, 
not imitative per se, methexic, not mimetic. Mirror neurons, when seen as the basis of action 
understanding and imitation are mimetic, but they are methexic when seen as precursors of 
action selection (as Hickok proposes) or as the substrate of concept representation (as suggested 
by Hurford).  There is a second problem: mirroring is not really imitating, because neurons are 
repeating a previous experience one has lived in response to a current experience being lived by 
someone else. This is of fundamental importance within the context of theory of mind. There is 
no absolute certainty of knowing whether another person is experiencing the same set of 
sensations one is experiencing. These questions are by no means new to the Humanities; they are 
the very prime matter of fields like Aesthetics, Phenomenology, and Literary Criticism.  
Another area of concern important for a theory of literary cultural production based on 
the methexic nature of auditory perception is discussed in Rizzolatti and Craighero's work, 
namely, the existence of an auditory mirror neuron system (185-7). Their argument assumes that 
the system evolved from an audiovisual MNS originally dealing with ingestion and, at a later 
stage, with the coding of object related actions. Other scholars have also supported the existence 
of an auditory MNS that responds specifically to the sounds of actions without a visual 
component. Gazzola et al. found areas in the human brain corresponding to those in macaque 
monkeys that showed a kind of response they consider somatotopic, given that different areas on 
the left premotor cortex activate according to whether an action is performed with the hands or 
the mouth (1824). They also measured their test subjects on an empathy scale, and found that 
those with higher scores on that scales also showed stronger activations in their auditory MNS, 
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leading them to hypothesize a possible link between the two. Other authors have found that this 
system reacts in response to affective prosody (Warren et al. 13067). After a study focusing on 
affective non-verbal vocalizations, Warren et al. concluded that specific parts of the auditory 
MNS respond to emotional valence and arousal level, arguing that these responses signal the 
“preparation of responsive orofacial gestures.” They found that such responses were particularly 
high in the case of positive emotions. These findings, although impressive, met with many of the 
objections mentioned previously. Still, they show that emotional responses to auditory stimuli 
have a motor component that merits further study, if only because daily life is full of auditory 
experiences that elicit mirror-like responses that make one feel like an active participant of 
events that are happening to others. Furthermore, the experience of this type of response can 
occur even when no actual perceptible event is taking place, by just merely reading about it or 
listening to a fictional version of it. That is the kind of methexic interaction that underlies literary 
cultural production and that hopefully will be better understood as the neurocognitive 
mechanisms that underlie it are studied in greater depth. 
Returning to Rizzolatti and Craighero’s argument in favor of an auditory MNS, their 
position draws on the motor theory of speech perception, quoting a very interesting passage from 
Paget's Human Speech, written in 1930. In this study, the author connects the observation of the 
“universally recognized” oro-facial movements characteristic of eating with the perception of the 
sound produced by such movements: “mnyam-mnyam” (185). The conclusion he reaches will 
sound oddly familiar to anyone who has studied linguistics, the history of language, or any of the 
critical or philosophical theories about meaning: “Thus through such an association mechanism, 
the meaning of an action, naturally understood, is transferred to sound.” In general, this is clearly 
a very inconspicuous function when compared to the whole phenomenon of human language. In 
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particular, it hearkens back to the debates that led to Saussure’s groundbreaking theories 
regarding the relation between signifier and signified, between linguistic signs and meaning 
(Hurford 2). The relation is completely arbitrary, even accepting Paget’s contention that these 
gestures and sounds are “universally recognized.” There is nothing in the sound itself that can 
represent the concept, if only because the word “mnyam” may visually seem to be one, but may 
sound in millions of different ways. It also brings forth the matter on meaning itself: does 
participation require meaning?90 This is by no means a settled matter. In this regard, it is useful 
to refer again to the work of Gumbrecht: not everything can be conveyed by meaning.91 What 
takes place at the sensory level, even though there is no categorical definition yet, is already 
methexis, which intensifies with every cognitive refinement and level of abstraction. This 
implies finding what is general amongst an infinite variety of experiences in order to form 
categories. At this level, there is not one sensory modality that is superior to others, nor one 
motor ability: “core meaning is abstracted across sensory and motor experiences” (Hickok 163).  
 
A unified framework 
The scientific fields that delve into the matter just surveyed need to focus on finding the 
neural substrates of the processes that lead to the formation of meaning, thus “grounding” their 
work in actual, measureable phenomena: “We need to develop a theory that transcends sensory 
and motor systems” because “some sensorimotor details clearly impact how we understand and 
reason about the world, so we need a theory that is at least partly ‘grounded’” (Hickok 160). 
Methexis, on the other hand, is more like production of presence, it does not require meaning, it 
                                                          
90 Cf. Hickok, pp. 159: “one might be tempted to infer that meaning arises in sensory systems.” 
91 See p. 52 and note 12. 
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provides from experience what meaning cannot; thus, it probably corresponds to a middle point 
between lower-level sensory processes and higher-level cognitive processes, getting close 
enough to meaning, but no too far from sheer feeling. Cultural production most likely oscillates 
between these two points of brain processing. It finds scientific support in something previously 
discussed in the context of the reward system, considered by Hickok as a pervasive, dual brain 
architecture: the dorsal and ventral, how and what streams (162).92 Such architecture, as well as 
the discrete modal processing areas of the brain, are not completely separate. They feed 
information needed for higher order processes of conceptual knowledge to large areas of the 
cerebral cortex not related to any particular modality (168). The study of these areas has shown 
that they function on what are considered as “resting” states (171). The brain is not resting in 
such states, but engaging in higher order functions of information processing. Current research is 
beginning to focus on these areas and what they might entail. They have been shown to be active 
in processes of autobiographical memory, imagining the future, evaluating the opinions of other 
individuals, daydreaming, semantics, and, in general, thinking.  
I propose that methexis is somewhere in between lower and higher-level brain processes 
precisely because these processes, as mentioned earlier, are not sequential or unidirectional, but 
simultaneous and based on continuous feedback enabled by the combination of top-down and 
bottom-up processing. Human cultural production is neither a purely intellectual, higher-order 
process, nor a basic sensorimotor experience; it is the product of everything in between, and also 
a factor in the constant adaptation and change that characterize brain mechanisms. There is a 
continuum between these processes and the activities that come from them as well as lead to 
them, like writing, singing, oral debate, or poetic improvisation. Cultural production is, in part, a 
                                                          
92 See pp. 59-60, and 64. 
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continuum. It cannot have a sequential structure, because creative activities are dynamic. Purely 
intellectual processes are constantly overlapping and interacting with perceptive and 
sensorimotor activities and with all the intermediate stages in between; they affect and modify 
each other with constant impetus. This is the material, embodied manifestation of methexis 
proposed earlier, as one end of the spectrum, with mimesis, imitation, occupying the opposite 
end.93 The prior section showed that imitation learning is one of the areas where mirror neurons 
were proposed as neural substrate and thus as being the very foundation of the human social 
experience. Although in recent centuries cultural production has been increasingly tied to notions 
of creativity and originality, it is necessary to remember that this is something relatively new. In 
the context of the Middle Ages that will be addressed further ahead, imitation was the preferred 
standard since the inception of written culture, and that fact remained unchanged for most of 
previous recorded history. This was also methexis, manifested as sharing in inherited knowledge, 
because methexis has no causal relation to any notion of originality or innovation. This is not to 
say that innovation did not occur, but that it was not the object of cultural production, nor was it 
encouraged or celebrated. It was the thorough knowledge and skillful imitation of the ancient 
authorities that constituted true genius, and although in reality it was always accompanied by 
innovation, the latter was not conceptualized as such. And how could it be otherwise, when 
human social development, from its most fundamental stages, is marked by imitation learning, 
and most social cohesion strategies and marketing trends rest on imitating given models, even 
when such models are supposedly original, rebellious or iconoclastic.  
Developmental psychologists have discussed for decades the fundamental role of 
imitation, not only for learning, but also for the development of a whole host of cognitive 
                                                          
93 See pp. 48-9, and 51. 
 
 90 
abilities that eventually enable the individual to interpret and interact with the world (Hickok 
185). They have also argued that imitation is the basis of cultural transmission, theory of mind 
and empathy, all fundamental areas of human social existence. Obviously cultural transmission is 
of primary interest in this thesis, given that it antecedes the advent of writing and even of 
philosophical speculation. It hearkens back to the very origins of humanity (186). It allowed 
knowledge to be passed on between generations, so that it could be gathered and improved upon, 
thus enhancing human chances of survival compared to other species. It also led to the actual 
production of culture that was not tied to practices necessary for survival, but that was 
complementary to social existence. It further led to its transmission in visual representations and 
oral traditions, which continued after the advent of writing and other recent technologies for 
recording and storing knowledge and culture. It is evident that imitation and methexis are deeply 
intertwined in the phenomenon of learning that makes cultural transmission possible.   
There is no contradiction between a methexic theory of cultural production and the 
traditional mimetic discourse because they are both part of the same human experience. The 
purpose of emphasizing methexis in this thesis is not to try to present it as a better candidate than 
mimesis but as the missing part of the current understanding of cultural production, the part 
where the body, brain included, is taken into account. That this is the case is clear from the fact 
that the imitative learning that has been discussed is not strictly mimetic: it is based on 
association and emulation (Hickok 192-3). In humans, this kind of learning can lead to a 
complete rejection of certain behaviors, reflecting the adaptability characteristic of all brain 
processes (200). Imitation is also tied to complex processes of social interaction, like the 
chameleon effect, where people unconsciously imitate the social behaviors that help them fit into 
a certain group and increase their likability among its members (203). Many cultural products are 
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reflective or complementary to such interactions, like drama, fashion, music, visual arts, local 
accents and social variations of speech. The existence of cultural products that make present the 
complex reality of cognitive processes further supports the contention that models of behaviorist 
association and reinforcement alone are insufficient because they erase the mediating role of the 
mind (228). As mentioned in the discussions about reward, plasticity and mirror neurons, this 
mediating role is complex and adaptable. It uses previous experience to refine models of 
prediction and error detection in real time through constant feedback at all levels of the cerebral 
pathways. The mind is not immune to the effects of experience. On the contrary, it is modified 
by its impact, and cultural products are part of that experience. Thus, when it comes to methexis, 
there is ample common ground between the science and the different theoretical approaches in 
the Humanities. Standing on that common ground, with a unified framework, it is possible to 
return to the concept that underpins the theory proposed in this thesis. 
Coming back to the concept of methexis, the starting point is Plato’s definition of it as 
participation, which is placed at the opposite end of the spectrum from mimesis. It will be useful 
to qualify the previous remark with Nancy’s insight: “Mímesis y Méthexis, una dentro de otra, 
de modo que no pueden darse por separado. No hay mímesis, pues, si no es en la resonancia con 
un cierto tono, en la participación distante de lo que viene a la forma” [“Mimesis and Methexis, 
one within the other, so that they cannot occur separately. Thus, there is no mimesis but in the 
resonance of a tone, in sharing from a distance into what comes from the form”] (my trans.; “La 
imagen” 7). Nancy’s contribution lends support to a conception of mimesis and methexis at 
opposite ends of a spectrum in which participation or sharing is the condition sine qua non for 
imitation to take place. At the same time, imitation allows the emergence of new forms of 
participation, establishing between the two a permanent feedback cycle that underlies human 
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creativity. Aurality is where the methexic aspect of literary cultural production is best revealed, 
and where the complex relationship between mimesis and methexis is more evident. When 
addressing the medieval literature this is a key component, given that a vast majority of a text’s 
receivers were completely or partially illiterate, making their experience of the text 
predominantly aural. A good way of beginning to explore this context of aural methexis is taking 
Brian Stock’s concept of “textual communities” as the starting point:  
These textual communities were not entirely composed of literates. The minimal 
requirement was just one literate, the interpres, who understood a set of texts and was 
able to pass his message on verbally to others. By a process of absorption and reflection 
the behavioral norms of the group’s other members were eventually altered. . . . The 
unlettered and semilettered members thereby conceptualized a link between textuality, as 
the script for the enactment of behavioral norms, and rationality, as the alleged 
reasonableness of those norms. (23) 
This communal process of adaptation is not limited to imitation. It is a process of methexis even 
before it has started, because it draws on what the receiver anticipates he or she will hear, that is, 
on auditory expectation. And auditory expectation is both created and creative, because it is a 
process of feedback and interaction, due to its dependence on the specific context of perceptual 
acts, and on the fact that they are simultaneous. Auditory expectation is created when the 
material circumstances where it takes place modify in some way, in part or in total, what up to 
that moment had been the accepted and expected sound; it is creative when its manifestation 
modifies the material circumstances that generate that sound.  
It is not simply a cycle of imitation or repetition of what has been heard before in order to 
make things sound familiar or adapt them for reading aloud. There is also an interaction between 
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the aural and other aspects that informs writing practices; the mutual impact they have on each 
other enables the production of presence of the text. In the case of a legal text, the power of the 
law to penetrate even to the last crevice of the life of an individual comes from the auditory 
perception of the voice of power and authority; this voice is processed and stored in the brain of 
the receiver, hence becoming part of the subject’s auditory expectation and actualizing it 
constantly. This type of sensory state allows the transmitter of a text to generate in the receiver 
the feeling of being actively present, living the experience narrated, or the sensation that what is 
being said is an unquestionable truth. This aural and sensory authority is what the first authors of 
literature written in Castilian wanted to achieve, not as a conscious objective, but driven by that 
same sensation, the feeling of there being no other option but to hold on to it. This aural and 
sensory authority has fostered in generation after generation of readers the desire to have the 
experience that Cervantes masterfully embodied in the Quijote with the episode of reading aloud 
El curioso impertinente;94 the experience of a group of people that feels part of the story they are 
hearing, just as if it was their own, commenting it and transmitting it because it has now become 






                                                          
94 El curioso impertinente unfortunately has no set English title, which varies in the different 
translations. It is one of the short narratives inserted in the first part of Don Quijote (book 4, 
chapters 33-35). A group of people that include Don Quijote and Sancho are staying at an inn, 
and they gather around to listen to the curate read the short story aloud, the manuscript 





























My ears have not yet drunk a hundred words 
 Of that tongue's utterance, yet I know the sound. 




























The structure and workings of the auditory system have long been the subject of 
extensive research, much of which has led to important advances in a variety of fields, like 
architecture, defense, digital audio, computer science, linguistics, music and psychology. Perhaps 
the main motivation for focusing on the ear as a window into the development of a centuries-old 
cultural product is the fact that one can be certain there has been no significant change in the 
structure and function of the auditory system from what they were in the Middle Ages, or even 
before the advent of written history. Although, as discussed previously, the auditory system has a 
particular adaptability that is manifest in the various mechanisms of neural plasticity, its overall 
structure is remarkably stable, and its anatomy and functions have remained the same for 
millennia. Such changes have indeed happened throughout human evolution, but they require 
much longer spans of time, hundreds of millennia as opposed to hundreds of years, to be 
noticeable. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that while utterances, whether linguistic or 
otherwise, have undergone dramatic changes throughout history, hearing, and the other senses, 
work exactly as they did thousands of years ago. This is important because it allows this thesis to 
focus on that which makes us similar to our medieval counterparts, contrary to the more popular 
tendency of studying that which makes us different, “better” or “more advanced.” This, however, 
does not entail a need ignore the evident adaptability and plasticity of human perceptual organs 
and processes, nor the external differences in which such systems operated: a changing 
environment, the difference in architectural techniques and building materials, the advancements 
in the manufacture of a multiplicity of artifacts, from musical instruments to weapons, or the 
increasing tendency of populations to concentrate in what became the first cities in Western 
Europe. In fact, this is the main reason for the use of the term aurality, broadly understood as 
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“the quality, degree or condition of being aural” (Collins English Dictionary), where aural is 
understood as everything “relating to the ear or the sense of hearing” (Merriam-Webster).95 It 
allows the present discussion to encompass both the structure and function of the auditory system 
and the external circumstances in which it operates. Thus, the use of the term is consistent with 
an embodied approach to cultural production. Still, it is important, before becoming comfortable 
with it, to understand its origins and acknowledge the several different ways in which it is used 
in order to appreciate its breath and complexity.   
Aside from the very broad and vague dictionary definitions presented above, aurality 
seems to be more often addressed not in terms of what it is, but in terms of what it is not, or as 
one of the components of a binary opposition. The most popular of these binaries, albeit not the 
only ones, seem to be orality/aurality and visual/aural; they are clearly the modern heirs of the 
much older and prevalent hear/see, hear/read, speak/hear, emitter/receiver, observe/listen, and 
orality/literacy, just to name a few. There is a broad spectrum of topics and problems related to 
both approaches to aurality. Perhaps the most eloquent example is Ana Maria Ochoa Gautier’s 
very recent work, Aurality, where oral tradition is discussed as part a complex cultural analysis 
of the processes of identity formation and nation construction in nineteenth-century Colombia. 
Remarkably, Ochoa Gautier never offers a precise definition of aurality, yet it is the guiding 
thread of her discussion, which shows it is precisely the general nature of the term that makes it 
ideal to frame an analysis related to cultural theory. Another recent example where aurality is 
presented by reference to what it is not, is Veit Erlmann’s Reason and Resonance, an insightful 
                                                          
95 Burnett et al. offer the following definitions, not included in this discussion because they date 
from 1991, but they are interesting for comparison: “According to the Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary ‘hearing’ is (1) ‘the faculty or sense by which sound is perceived’ and (2) ‘the action 
of listening to a lecture, music, etc.’ In the process of hearing an attempt is made to order and 
synthesize masses of sounds into meaningful units” (1).  
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investigation into the complex yet indivisible relationship between Philosophy and aurality 
starting in the 17th century. Erlmann uses aurality as an umbrella term under which coexist a 
variety of specialized and specific terms, the central of them being resonance, which allow him 
to explore the intricacies of a shared history of philosophical and scientific inquiry focused on 
the ear. His analysis relies on the aforementioned strategy of highlighting what aurality is not, in 
order to expose some of the historical rejections of the term in Philosophy as little more than lip 
service that could barely disguise a much more unstable dynamics between the two. Erlmann’s 
analysis also uses this negative logic in historical terms, elaborating a theory of modern aurality 
that in itself highlights what ancient or previous concepts of aurality were not: they were not 
founded on a Cartesian conception of the mind, nor were they based on empirical research, they 
were still dependent on religious ideology, amongst other concerns.  
In The Audible Past, Jonathan Sterne offers a short but revealing account of the history of 
this word: 
The term aural began its history in 1847 meaning “of or pertaining to the organ of 
hearing”; it did not appear in print denoting something “received or perceived by the ear” 
until 1860. Prior to that period, the term auricular was used to describe something “of or 
pertaining to the ear” or perceived by the ear. This was not a mere semantic difference: 
auricular carried with it connotations of oral tradition and hearsay as well as the external 
features of the ear visible to the naked eye (the folded mass of skin that is often 
synecdochally referred to as the ear is technically either the auricle, the pinna, or the 
outer ear). Aural, meanwhile, carried with it no connotations of oral tradition and 
referred specifically to the middle ear, the inner ear, and the nerves that turn vibrations 
into what the brain perceives as sound. . . .  (10) 
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That the differences in meaning between both terms, aural and auricular, are no longer as 
relevant becomes evident after an initial look at some of the most recent publications, where the 
use of ‘aural’ and ‘aurality’ seems to be preferred in works outside of the field of medicine and 
of philosophical accounts of auditory perception.96 It is clear that this occurs because there is a 
need for detailed accounts of either the physiology, physics, or metaphysics of sound and its 
perception, as opposed to the more general and inclusive approaches of Cultural Studies and the 
Humanities in general. Where the field of inquiry can be quite varied and large in scope, as is the 
case with the latter, even the sometimes unfortunate homophony inherent to the binary 
opposition oral/aural becomes rather fortunate insofar as it encompasses the universe of the 
spoken word as part of, not as opposite to, aurality. Perhaps one can posit that part of this 
binary’s power resides in how pleasant it is for the ear, allowing one to enjoy confusing the 
listener and even the inattentive reader, while still addressing serious matters. 
In her introduction to the recent article “Sound Matters,” musicologist Susan Boynton 
offers, rather than a strict definition, an encompassing view of aurality that incorporates cultural 
and historical perspectives, and reflects the general approach just discussed: “One of the central 
concepts in historical sound studies is the notion of aurality, encompassing both auditory culture 
(including the production and reproduction of sound) and the history of audition (habits of 
hearing and listening)” (998). Although it is stimulating to find a reference to the production of 
sound that does not privilege the spoken word, and thus orality, this view of aurality would be 
more productive without the separation between auditory culture and the history of audition, 
because the production and reproduction of sound are definitely worthy subjects of such a 
                                                          




history, while habits of hearing and listening are an indispensable part of auditory culture. 
Mainly adhering to the general dictionary definition of aurality in the context of radio, Siobhán 
McHugh offers an interesting addition which is also quite rare when it comes to establishing a 
hierarchy of the binary oral/aural. After remarking on the prevalent confusion when referring to 
‘aurality’ and ‘orality,’ and referring to the dictionary definition of the former, McHugh states: 
“Thus orality is a subset of aurality…” (491). McHugh’s position is in stark contrast with the 
more popular view of aurality as a neglected aspect of orality. Of course, one would expect such 
a position from theoretical approaches that focus on the utterance as, for instance, Pragmatics. 
One example is the appearance of aurality in the Concise Encyclopedia of Pragmatics, which 
happens only twice, both under the entry “Orality” (Fox 686). It almost seems surprising that the 
entry makes passing mention of aurality as part of an embodiment of culture “that does not 
reduce to production (‘orality’) or reception (‘aurality’).” However, it is undeniably a reduction 
to equate aurality with reception, precisely because one of its important characteristics is the 
influence of past experience in future auditory events, as discussed above. The perception and 
processing of speech is much more than a simple capture and storage operation, and the act of 
uttering speech is in itself an auditory event. Aurality seems to be currently the subject of a 
struggle to be free from the yoke of orality, and the rise of novel ways to study sound and its 
perception show that to be the case.  
Another refreshing approach that uses the term aurality is that of archaeoacoustics and 
auditory archaeology, where the focus on sound has been reinforced by the fortunate 
circumstance of the unavoidable absence of utterances and other audible phenomena: “The 
ecologically constructed and dynamic sensoria essential to daily life in the past no longer 
remain” (Mills 20). The original inhabitants and users of archaeological sites are no longer 
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present, and even when attempting to simulate how their presence at the sites would have 
unfolded, researchers have to place a greater importance on the ear and how it perceives, as well 
as its adaptability and plasticity, and attempt to explain how the organ and its faculties would 
have developed. The advantage resides in that they can do this without being plagued by the 
uncertainty that surrounds the utterances of long ago, or, more precisely, what little of them we 
may still possess combined with everything that has been added to them throughout the 
centuries. In this context, Mills offers an interesting compromise: “Auditory: Of or relating to 
hearing or the sense of hearing. Aural: A listener’s experience of sound” (243). Mills assigns the 
traditional dictionary definition for the term ‘auditory,’ and uses an embodied definition for 
‘aural.’ This is consistent with the approach of auditory archaeology, which places a greater 
emphasis on the experiences of the people that lived in the places under investigation. These 
innovative fields of study provide an invaluable framework to study the power of auditory 
perception in the conceptualization of space and place, which are essential for the 
implementation of the law and the concept of jurisdiction, and for shaping the ability of an 
individual to navigate the surrounding environment.  
Orality’s shadow has been a powerful one in recent decades, and as important as it was in 
dissipating some of the exaggerated importance given to written culture and the visual text as the 
preferred objects of study, it also had the probably unintended effect of creating the illusion that 
somehow the utterance alone has an intrinsic value. This illusion rests in part on long-standing 
yet erroneous assumptions about what a sound is, how it is perceived, and how this influences 
future sound events and perceptions. It is also a consequence of the predominant role that, until 
very recently, Linguistics has occupied in monopolizing the study of speech production and 
perception. In this regard, the argument of this thesis is that the importance of the utterance rests 
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entirely on it being heard. If it is not heard, it never completely becomes an utterance. Otherwise, 
it cannot be studied or theorized. The aforementioned tendency to avoid the use of ‘aural’ and 
‘aurality’ in philosophical and scientific discourses regarding auditory perception has an 
advantage: it makes it possible to consider definitions of sound and auditory perception based on 
a detailed analysis of their ontological status or their physical characteristics. Philosopher Casey 
O’Callaghan has recently argued for a need to move away from what he calls “visuocentrism,” 
and from traditional philosophical and scientific accounts of sound and audition (“Constructing” 
1). He rightly questions the long-standing practice, which he claims started in the Early Modern 
period, of ascribing the characteristics of the eye and of visual perception to the other senses, 
assuming that all perceptual processes are modeled identically and that vision is at the top of the 
senses’ hierarchy. In fact, as will become apparent further ahead, this was the case long before 
the Early Modern period, for medieval scholars also used the visual model to attempt to explain 
the workings of the other senses. O’Callaghan also rejects the traditional philosophical 
classification of sounds as secondary qualities,97  and uses current research to argue that sounds 
are better understood as particulars,98 and specifically as events.99  
                                                          
97 “The division is especially associated with the 17th-century rise of modern science, with its 
recognition that the fundamental explanatory properties of things are not the qualities that 
perception most immediately concerns. These latter are the secondary qualities, or immediate 
sensory qualities, including colour, taste, smell, felt warmth or texture, and sound. The primary 
properties are less tied to the deliverance of one particular sense, and include the size, shape, and 
motion of objects” (“primary/secondary qualities”). 
98 “A particular is a single thing, thought of in contrast to qualities or universals, or in contrast to 
an aggregate of things. Universals themselves can be regarded as particulars, themselves having 
higher order properties and relations. However, a universal can be instanced by particular things, 
whereas a genuine particular cannot” (“particulars”). 
99 “A change or happening. The central debate in the philosophy of events is whether they are to 
be thought of as individuals, like objects, capable of date and place and capable of being 
described in different ways, or whether they are more like propositions or facts, whose identity 
depends essentially on the concepts in which they are framed. On the former model, it may prove 
easier to understand how events can cause things, and how one event (e.g. a commotion in the 
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Regarding scientific discourses of auditory perception, O’Callaghan argues against the 
model that equates sound with waves propagating in an elastic medium because some of their 
features, like standing in causal relations, having spatial boundaries, depending on the medium 
and surviving changes to their properties, are distinctive of dependent particulars (“Constructing” 
7-8). For O’Callaghan “Sounds are events located in the environment near their sources” (1). He 
explains that, contrary to the objects of vision, sounds “are essentially temporal” and “bearers of 
audible qualities” (21). This definition rests on the need to ascertain more than just a defined 
ontological category, as it is necessary to take into account that sounds have duration and 
location, and after proper auditory perception they are “as they seem to be” (22). This last 
assertion addresses the fact that both duration and location are not perceived for what they really 
are. What is perceived as the lifetime of a sound is not the actual physical duration of the 
propagating waves, which “may continue to exist long after the sound has seemed to cease” (14). 
Sounds undergo temporal changes to their properties, like changes in pitch and level, without 
that leading one to conclude that they are different sounds, as is the case with words (4). 
Although the pressure waves that are perceived as sound travel through a medium, listeners do 
not hear a sound as something moving from the source towards them, but as located somewhere 
at a distance from them (11).    
As Steve Mills has remarked, the value of O’Callaghan’s insights lies in his ability to 
incorporate the scientific discourse without falling into the trap of equating sounds with waves: 
                                                          
brain) may be identical with another (e.g. being struck by a thought). The latter model 
assimilates events to facts, so that just as it can be a fact that the admiral did not arrive, his non-
arrival can be a significant event (not at all a non-event) which may have its own causes and 
effects. Similarly, there can exist disjunctive events (John’s going to India or China) or 




“Philosophically the waves do not really matter; it is the sound events themselves that matter to 
us” (Mills 44). I partially agree with O’Callaghan on the importance of leaving behind old 
philosophical conceptions that equate vision and hearing. I also agree that the scientific model of 
sounds as waves fails to serve as a comprehensive framework to understand auditory perception, 
especially in the context of cultural production, which is the aim of this thesis. O’Callaghan, 
however, in considering the sound to be an event that takes place near the source and 
independently of the waves, enacts a separation between the sounds and the actual process of 
auditory perception, because for him “sounds cause waves” (16). Thus, the act of creating the 
disturbance in the medium is the sound, not the disturbance itself, which is the wave propagating 
through a medium. The sounds defined thus, are “the proper objects of auditory perception” (20). 
From this point of view, the act of perception, in many respects illusory, is the consequence of 
the encounter between the wave and the perceiver, and this encounter does not involve the 
sound. I do not agree with separating the sound as event from the act of perception. 
As mentioned above, current notions of aurality come in part from ideas about what 
sound is and what place it occupies in the world. Although in partial agreement with 
O’Callaghan’s rejection of traditional theories of sound, this thesis, contrary to what he proposes, 
posits that sounds are not yet sounds unless they have been perceived and processed in the brain. 
Sound is not the object of auditory perception but its result.100 As seen in the previous chapters, a 
sound is certainly not just a wave, which clearly does not depend on the presence of a perceiver 
to exist. A wave is just one of many kinds of physical phenomena of vibrations and oscillations, 
and it can and does take place when there is an appropriate elastic medium to allow its 
                                                          
100 Plomp uses the word sound in both senses: “in a physical sense as air vibrations originating 
from a source, and in a perceptual sense referring to how these vibrations are heard” (1). Baldwin 
has a similar approach (247). My definition is consistent with the second meaning.  
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propagation. Human beings are not equipped to perceive all the oscillations and vibrations that 
are constantly happening around them. This claim is not an attempt to get into the centuries-old 
‘if a tree falls in the forest’ philosophical question.101 This thesis posits that in order to study the 
role of auditory perception as an enabler of methexis in cultural production, it is necessary to 
consider sounds from the moment of their production to the moment they become part of future 
perceptual experiences. This includes everything that happens after the wave reaches the ears. 
The prior overview about sound and auditory perception summarized the most important aspects 
and current knowledge of these subjects, and allowed the exploration of some of the brain 
mechanisms connected to cultural production. It pointed out some of the main differences 
between the traditional view of auditory perception and current knowledge on the subject. 
Perhaps the most important is the fact that perceptual and rational processes do not occur one 
after the other in a sequential manner, at least not in spans of time that are even detectable to a 
human observer. In addition, both processes are constantly modified by continuous feedback.  
It was mentioned earlier that, throughout history, perception, processing and cognition 
were thought to be separate and sequential stages located in separate anatomical areas of the 
body and the brain. This led to what Hickok calls the “classical sandwich,” where “cognition is 
distinct from, and sandwiched between, sensory and motor processes,” with perception 
                                                          
101 There is no clear reference of where this question originated. The general outline of the 
question asks: if a tree falls in the forest and there is no one there to hear it, can we say that it 
made a sound? The problem has become a general one for the philosophy of perception, as well 
as for the study of sound and its perception, and it is directly related to the problem of primary 
and secondary qualities (“sound”). A simple Google search reveals a plethora of articles, blog 
posts, videos and other types of content related to this question. Wikipedia, in all its un-academic 
greatness, has traced it back to a newspaper article from 1883, while referencing the more 
academic fact that the precedent for the question is the subjective idealism of George Berkeley 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/If_a_tree_falls_in_a_forest). For more on Berkeley’s philosophy 
see Warnock.  
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conceptualized as mere input and action as output (121). One of the terminological quagmires 
that currently hinder the interdisciplinary study of the mind in the context of the humanities 
comes from this confusion. While Philosophy has continued embracing the classical sandwich 
model and considering embodied conceptions as revolutionary, scientific approaches like the 
cognitive and neurologic sciences have long abandoned this model. The publication of Ulrich 
Neisser’s Cognitive Psychology in 1967 marked the beginning of this shift, offering a more 
encompassing definition of cognition, not limited to higher-order processes.102 So, while 
movements like Embodied Cognition and Enactivism have claimed to be revolutionizing 
scientific thought, what they are really doing is forcing the Humanities to finally catch up to 
scientific thought on the matter. This is not a value judgement on the status of these problems to 
argue that science is better or more advanced. But it is necessary to provide a background to the 
discussion that will follow, where it will become evident that the “classical sandwich” is perhaps 
one of the oldest conceptions of the mind, rooted in ancient philosophy, and its pervasiveness 
was a defining characteristic of medieval models of perception and cognition.  
As previously stated, the purpose of this thesis is to study the impact of auditory 
perception on cultural production by exploring the distance between past and present theories of 
aurality in the context of the emergence of Castilian literature, using the Siete Partidas as a case 
study. This distance is the place where one can delve into the ways in which perception impacts 
cultural products and how it allows individuals to have experiences of participation even when 
they are not the ones creating those products. This is where one can find discontinuities and 
                                                          
102 Neisser defines it as “all the processes by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, 
elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. . . . Such terms as sensation, perception, imagery, 
retention, recall, problem-solving, and thinking, among many others, refer to hypothetical stages 
or aspects of cognition” (Hickok 119). 
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discrepancies between the actual phenomena of auditory perception and the different medieval 
theories on the subject. Faced with a reality of perception that was different from the accepted 
theories of the time, medieval cultural producers of legal texts had to find practical solutions in 
order to write a legislation consistent with the experience of everyday life and accessible to an 
overwhelmingly illiterate audience for whom theoretical concerns were completely foreign. 
Exploring this gray area between theory and everyday life can give new insights into the 
dynamics of literary cultural production. In order to do this, it is necessary to have a general 
understanding of the origins and development of medieval theories of sound and its perception.  
 
Medieval Ears 
The previous chapters outlined the more general aspects of sound and its perception and 
processing, and now it is time to listen to a different period in time, arguably a period with a very 
different soundscape, much closer to the barely perceptible levels of sound that are currently 
conceptualized as silence, and yet deeply dependent on the power of auditory perception to 
navigate the complexities of daily life. Thirteenth century Europe had several bustling cultural 
centers, and amongst the many scientific endeavors of European scholars at the time, the study of 
sensory perception, and in particular of vision and optics, was one of the most active.103 Alfonso 
the Wise’s court was a hub of scholarship that gathered some of the most brilliant minds of the 
era. There is no doubt that the scholars of Alfonso’s court were aware of the different theories of 
perception that circulated at the time, and of many of their ancient sources. As will be discussed 
in detail further ahead, there are echoes of some of them present in the Siete Partidas, and sound 
and its perception are used in different ways in this legal code. But before addressing them, it is 
                                                          
103 For a comprehensive study of medieval theories of vision and optics see Meyering.  
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necessary to look at the origins and development of the most important theories of auditory 
perception in the broader context of perception and cognitive studies in the Middle Ages.  
The dominant discourse regarding the history of the study of sound and its perception 
states that it is no possible to understand their medieval manifestations without going back to 
Aristotle.104 Although it is true that the study of many disciplines begins with Aristotle, I will 
side in this instance with a less dominant discourse that acknowledges the fact that, even though 
most of Aristotle’s ideas regarding cognition and perception were the main foundation on which 
medieval scholars built their own accounts on these subjects, some of Plato’s ideas also remained 
highly influential in the Middle Ages, mainly through the presence of Neoplatonism in the work 
prominent intellectuals like Augustine, Boethius, Avicenna and others. An important caveat in 
this regard is that the ideas of Plato and Aristotle did not remain intact throughout the centuries, 
and that the need to reconcile them with Christian doctrine and Theology was the force behind 
their transmission via commentaries and scholarly debates. Different from the Islamic kingdoms 
and the Eastern part of the Holy Roman Empire, which inherited the wealth of knowledge of 
Greek antiquity, only a very limited amount of the original works of Aristotle, and barely any of 
Plato’s, survived in the Medieval West. Most of what was known were excerpts found in the 
work and the commentaries of important figures like Avicenna, Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, 
William of Auvergne, Roger Bacon, Robert Grosseteste, Petrus Hispanus, and Albertus Magnus 
(Kemp 7). Certainly, as Kemp observes, the rediscovery and translation of Aristotle and his 
commentators brought about an intellectual revolution in Western Europe (1). Aristotle became 
The Philosopher, and his ideas became paradigmatic in many areas of inquiry, including the 
generation and perception of sound. But it is important to remember that Aristotle was in a 
                                                          
104 Cf. Burnett, p. 43. 
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constant dialogue with Plato’s ideas, whether to confirm or deny them, and, in fact, one of the 
primary interests of Neoplatonism was to reconcile the ideas of both philosophers. Plato’s 
thought regarding sound perception can help to better understand some of the medieval debates 
on the subject, which were still about many of the same concerns prevalent in antiquity. 
 
Listening to Plato 
Plato not only included the production and perception of sound as an individual topic in 
his works, but he also used sound and sense perception in general as a metaphor to explain a 
wide range of concepts, which shows his general interest in the human experience of sound. This 
interest had been pursued by his predecessors: “considerable interest was shown in the physics 
and physiology of sound and hearing from the Presocratics onwards. The subject is discussed 
within larger texts – on the soul, on physics, on aesthetics – in medical and theological works, 
and in encyclopedias” (Burnett et al. 2). In fact, Plato acknowledges one of his predecessors, 
Anaxagoras, in the Phaedo, and he sarcastically criticizes his lack of interest in the mind, and his 
focus on external phenomena, like sound and hearing (98 B-D).  As with many other topics, 
Plato’s passages about this matter are succinct, but taken within the wider context of his writing 
they present a specific theory of perception that is consistent with his understanding of what is 
currently called cognitive psychology (Kemp 1). One of the main objections to seriously 
considering Plato’s views regarding sound is that they are mostly about music, and that he was 
not interested as much in the actual phenomena of sound as in the relation between music and 
philosophy. As Kemp explains, one of the main concerns of Greek philosophy was the soul, 
conceived as that which gave life to all living beings, animals and plants included, and controlled 
their bodies. In the case of human bodies, this includes perceptive and cognitive functions. The 
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body was considered as subject to the soul, which for Plato shared the same composition as the 
soul of the world.105 Pelosi has beautifully expressed the importance of both concepts in Plato: 
“In Platonic reflection the authentic interlocutor of music is the soul” (6). Still, Plato’s ideas 
about sound and its perception are embedded into a wider conception of physics and the nature 
of creation, while at the same time there is a clear separation between material reality and the 
dimension of the soul and the intelligible, where higher cognitive processes occur. This 
framework had a lasting influence well into the Middle Ages.  
Plato’s most specific explanations about sound production and perception appear in the 
Timaeus, but they would seem rather short and obscure unless considered in conjunction with his 
conception of the cosmos and his conception of the mind.106 This is precisely what Francis 
MacDonald Cornford did in his classic study Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato. 
Cornford’s commentary on the Timaeus puts the short passages of this dialogue about sound and 
hearing not only into the context of Plato’s opus, but also of the philosophical debates of his time 
regarding perception and acoustic phenomena. In true erudite fashion, Cornford includes in the 
dissection of these passages an important warning: “In reconstructing the acoustic theory here 
implied we must avoid attributing to Plato modern theories of the transmission of sound by 
vibrations or wave motions” (320). This thesis has been insisting on the idea of exploring the 
distance between the modern conception of aurality and medieval ideas about sound and its 
perception, and now it will become apparent that this distance is not that different from the one 
that separates the current understanding from that of the philosophers of ancient Greece. Still, the 
limited availability of translation options for specific concepts, or the fact that such concepts 
                                                          
105 This belief continued in Stoic philosophy, associated with the concept of “pneuma” (see note 
142). 
106 Regarding the relation between philosophy of mind and music see Pelosi, p. 3. 
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have radically changed over the centuries, increase the dangers of assuming that the modern idea 
of a wave, for instance, is closer to Plato’s or Aristotle’s than it really is. It is also important to 
remember that Plato was drawing from the Pythagorean tradition, where the central concept is 
harmony as the organizing principle of the cosmos after which everything else is modeled.107 
This kind of cosmology was not exclusive of the Greeks. Other ancient cultures formulated their 
accounts of the origins and order of the cosmos in terms of sounds, vibrations and numerical 
proportions, although there was no “cross-cultural” agreement or dominant theory about them.108  
Pythagorean harmony is expressed in numerical ratios that form musical intervals, and this very 
model is the foundation of Plato’s cosmology. In the Timaeus, Plato uses a series of numbers and 
the intervals they form as the basic model for the fabric of the soul of the cosmos (34A-36B). 
This series of intervals do not form any actual musical scale, nor are they intended to do so, as 
the harmony they express is not formulated as part of a theory of music (Cornford 66-72).  
It is necessary wait until much later in the Timaeus to learn something about how actual 
musical sound is generated, and I say musical sound because for Plato, as will also later be the 
                                                          
107 The Pythagorean concept of harmony is based on a mathematical conception of a universe 
were the number is the controlling principle (Barker 28). This universe was ordered in divine 
harmony expressed in mathematical ratios between the orbits of celestial bodies. Major traditions 
traced the origins of this belief to Pythagoras’ discovery of the ratios underlying the relation 
between a musical tone and its overtones or harmonics. The most basic, the octave, corresponds 
to a 2:1 ratio. A 3:2 corresponds to the interval of a fifth, a 4:3, ratio to a fourth, etc. These 
intervals were the basis of the first musical scales. Thus, Pythagoras is also traditionally 
considered the founder of musical theory. These ratios, when manifested in the movements of 
celestial bodies, generated a “harmony of the spheres” and the numbers that compose them are 
those of the tetraktys, the basic numerical structure of Pythagorean cosmology. As we will see, 
Plato’s cosmology draws heavily from the Pythagorean concept. This universal structure and the 
concept of a “music of the spheres” continued to exert an influence not only in Philosophy, but 
also in musical theory beyond the Middle Ages, and survives even today, albeit in a very 
commercialized and simplified form, in the New Age movement. It also lived on in scientific 
thought well beyond the Middle Ages, as attested by Johannes Kepler’s Harmonices Mundi. For 
more on Pythagorean cosmology and musical theory see Barker, pp. 28-52. 
108 For a synopsis of ancient ideas about sound see Tobey. 
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case for Aristotle, noise did not have a significant place in the discussion of sound and its 
perception (Cornford 321; Burnett 46-7). Sound was either the product of the human voice, or of 
an object, vessel or string, which would generate a specific pitch when struck or plucked.109 With 
very few exceptions, this will continue to be the case throughout the Middle Ages (Burnett 48-9). 
In the Timaeus, Plato addresses sound in two different passages. In the first one, 67B-C, he 
provides both a definition of sound and a description of its main qualities. Though short, the 
passage presents many difficulties. First, the very definition of sound is given in the context of a 
description of the sense organs and their function, so it includes the perception of sound as part 
of its definition, while hearing is defined as what happens after sound is perceived:  
A third kind of perception that we want to consider is hearing. We must describe the 
causes that produce the properties connected with this perception. In general, let us take it 
that sound is the percussion of air by way of the ears upon the brain and the blood and 
transmitted to the soul, and that hearing is the motion caused by the percussion that 
begins in the head and ends in the place where the liver is situated. (67B) 
This succinct description does not include any anatomical details, like the existence of the 
eardrums, and simply provides a rather unclear path for a percussion or stroke to reach the 
soul.110 Similarly, hearing, the movement from head to liver, is not explained further, and this 
should come as no surprise, given that Plato was not writing a medical treatise, and that his 
                                                          
109 Book XI of the Aristotelian Problemata, entitled “Problems Concerning Voice,” the term 
voice indistinctly to describe the sounds made by either the human voice or any other object:  
“. . . language, which is a kind of voice. . .” (898b29-30). See also De Audibilibus, 800a23ss. See 
below for Aristotle’s definition of sound as something only “ensouled” things can produce.  
110 Here I am taking into account Cornford’s translation: “stroke” and “movement.” 
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general outline is consistent with the accepted medical discourse of his time.111 He follows with 
a short but much clearer description of what we now call pitch, loudness and timbre: 
And let us take it that whenever the percussion is rapid, the sound is high-pitched, and 
that the slower the percussion, the lower the pitch. A regular percussion produces a 
uniform, smooth sound, while a contrary one produces one that is rough. A forceful 
percussion produces a loud sound, while a contrary one produces one that is soft.   
This passage shows that Plato was indeed only interested in sounds closer to what could be 
considered musical than to everyday sounds coming from nature or animals, or any others that 
could be classified as noise. It also shows the inherited knowledge about the qualities of sound 
and their relation to the transmission of vibrations.  
The second passage of the Timaeus where Plato addresses sound is a continuation of 67B-
C. At the end of it, he had announced that he would reserve the matter of “harmonization in 
sounds” for later in his discussion. In 80A-B, he fulfills this promise. The reason he waited to do 
so is interesting, given that this second passage is part of a section about human physiology. 
Right before it, there are lengthy passages about blood circulation and respiration, aimed at 
explaining what causes the movement of the blood and the air. Understanding such movement 
was paramount because both processes were responsible for transmitting the breath of life or 
animal spirit to all body parts, and this included what was perceived through the senses. That is 
                                                          
111 Alcmaeon and Empedocles were the most prominent medical scholars whose ideas influenced 
Plato (Finger 108). Their theories covered both sound production and perception, and the 
anatomy and function of the ear. Their work only survives as quoted in later sources. Aristotle 
mentions them as predecessors and presents some of their ideas in De Anima. Hippocrates, 
though a contemporary of Plato, does not seem to have treated topics of auditory anatomy, in his 
work, nor of the other senses, except for his descriptions of the anatomy of the eye (Siegel 42-
50).  The Corpus Hippocraticum, however, deals with the general concerns of the soul or psykhé, 
the internal cognitive processes it supports, and its interactions with the soma (Laín 85).  
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why in 67B Plato talks about the percussion striking the brain and the blood, and defines hearing 
as the movement that culminates in the area of the liver. This particular kind of movement, 
which Cornford calls the “circular thrust,” occurs not only in bodily air and blood circulation, but 
in other types of movement like swallowing and projectile motion (319). This should not be 
interpreted, however, as a literal mass of air traveling from one place to the other. In fact, when 
Plato explains this kind of movement during respiration, he speaks of the air that comes out of 
the body “displacing its neighbors successively,” which is different from a projectile displacing 
the air around it (316). Still, his theory may sound strange to the modern reader, because it would 
seem to suggest that the air that is set in motion travels as a block, instead of striking the 
neighboring air, until it reaches the ear, and that it does so at different speeds depending on pitch: 
We should also investigate all sounds, whether fast or slow – sounds that appear to us as 
high pitched or low. Sometimes, when the motion they produce in us as they move 
towards us lacks conformity, these sounds are inharmonious; at other times, when the 
motion does have conformity, the sounds are harmonious. The slower sounds catch up 
with the motions of the earlier and quicker sounds as these are already dying away and 
have come to a point of conformity with the motions produced by the slower sounds that 
travel later. In catching up with them, the slower sounds do not upset them, even though 
they introduce another motion. On the contrary, they graft onto the quicker movement, 
now dying away, the beginning of a slower one that conforms to it, and so they produce a 
single effect, a mixture of high and low. Hence the pleasure they bring to fools and the 
delight they afford – by their expression of divine harmony in mortal movement – to the 
wise. (80A-B)  
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The presence or lack of conformity between slow and fast-moving sounds, corresponding to low 
and high pitch, is what would currently be called consonance or dissonance. Again, Plato is 
interested in musical sounds, but this time he uses a phenomenon familiar to the average listener. 
Of course, in acoustical terms the explanation is even more obscure than the one given in 67B-C, 
but it is clear that Plato is only interested in it insofar as it illustrates his cosmology by way of 
everyday experience. The context provided in this section illustrates one of his main concerns 
regarding sense-perception and cognition that will remain influential well into the Middle Ages 
thanks to Neoplatonism: the harmonious concordance of sounds echoes that of the entire cosmos, 
but in order to understand it beyond mere sensual pleasure it is necessary to have wisdom. The 
idea that reason is a precondition for the ability to recognize this “expression of divine harmony 
in mortal movement,” is one of the most recurrent leit motifs medieval scholars inherited from 
antiquity. As Socrates concludes in the Thaetetus, “knowledge is to be found not in the 
experiences but in the process of reasoning about them; it is here, seemingly, not in the 
experiences, that it is possible to grasp being and truth” (186D).112  
The idea of overcoming the temptation of merely enjoying the pleasure caused by 
aesthetic experiences in order to gain access to the truth greatly influenced the way in which 
cognitive processes were accounted for and cemented the already prevalent notion that the senses 
are unreliable.113 These ideas pervade many of the Platonic dialogues, and sometimes use sound 
                                                          
112 Earlier in the same dialogue, Socrates addresses the products of perception in relation to the 
principle that everything must be in motion and this generates two different forms, active and 
passive: “an offspring infinite in multitude but always twin births, on the one hand what is 
perceived, on the other, the perception of it. . . . For the perceptions we have such names as sight, 
hearing. . . . And on the other side there is the race of things perceived, for each of these 
perceptions perceived things born of the same parentage, for all kinds of visions all kinds of 
colors, for all kinds of hearings all kinds of sounds. . . .” (156A-C). 




perception as an example, and to inform discussions about many important topics.114 In the 
Phaedo, the senses are presented as obstacles for the soul in its search for the truth: “do men find 
any truth in sight or hearing. . . . When then, he asked, does the soul grasp the truth? For 
whenever it attempts to examine anything with the body, it is clearly deceived by it” (65B).115 
The answer to this question is that “the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it” 
(65C). These statements are made in the context of a discussion regarding the nature of learning 
where Plato argues through Socrates that “learning is no other than recollection” (72E).116 This 
argument is also the subject of the famous geometrical problem that Socrates poses to the slave 
boy in the Meno. It is one of the main tenets of Plato’s cognitive psychology and his treatment of 
the nature of the soul. This idea was prominent in Augustine and Boethius, and it influenced 
medieval debates regarding perception, learning and memory. In this context, the theory of sound 
and its perception in the two passages of the Timaeus is consistent with a view of the processes 
in the human body and the mind as mirroring those of the cosmos, and therefore in harmony with 
all that exists. Taken in isolation they seem rather obscure and insufficient if one fails to take into 
                                                          
114 In Crito, for instance, Socrates makes reference to the sound of the inner voice: “these are the 
words I seem to hear, as the Corybants seem to hear the music of their flutes, and the echo of 
these words resounds in me, and makes it impossible for me to hear anything else” (54D). 
Another reference to the inner voice appears in the Sophist 263E-264B.  In his discourse about 
the philosophy of language in Cratylus, Socrates contends: “So mustn’t a rule-setter also know 
how to embody in sounds and syllables the name naturally suited to each thing?” (389D). And 
later on in the same dialogue he criticizes the ornamental treatment of words: “letters were added 
or subtracted to make them sound good in the mouth, resulting in distortions and ornamentation 
of every kind. . . this sort of thing is the work of people who think nothing of the truth, but only 
of the sounds their mouths make” (414C-D). Another famous example is the simile Socrates uses 
in his debate in Protagoras questioning if virtue can be taught (Socrates, obviously, thinks it 
cannot). Socrates uses sound to highlight the emptiness of the discourse of the sophists: 
“Question the least little thing in their speeches and they will go on like bronze bowls that keep 
ringing for a long time after they have been struck and prolong the sound indefinitely unless you 
dampen them” (329A). See also the exchange about voice and music in Philebus 17A-18D. 
115 See pp. 49-50 for an analysis of this section of the Phaedo in the context of Platonic methexis. 
116 See pp. 50-1 for more on anamnesis and how Gadamer connects it to methexis. 
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account the tradition that they follow, compared to which they take the further step of connecting 
the acoustic aspect of sound production with the act of perception as part of the physiology of the 
body. They also had an impact in the way Aristotle formulated his own accounts of the 
generation and perception of sound, and of cognition and memory in general. 
 
Aristotle, the Soul and the Ear 
Now that Plato’s relevant ideas about sound and its perception have been presented, it is 
time to consider Aristotle’s ideas on the subject with a background that will make it possible to 
avoid the temptation of taking his as the only ideas that survived into the Middle Ages, and also 
as independent from the tradition that preceded them. Aristotle was keenly aware of that tradition 
and had a constant dialogue with it whether it was to reject it or adopt it.117 While, as mentioned 
above, Plato’s works were practically unknown in the Middle Ages, many of Aristotle’s major 
works had been translated in the twelfth century, and quickly became required reading in some 
medieval universities (Kemp 29). Even before then, Aristotle was known via the commentaries 
of Arab philosophers like Avicenna and Averroes, which were also translated during the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries. Avicenna’s commentary was translated in the 1160s by Dominicus 
Gundissalinus, who also translated Algazel’s commentary of Avicenna’s work, and Averroes’ 
Long Commentary on the De Anima was translated at the beginning of the thirteenth century 
(Burnett 44). In fact, these commentaries were circulating widely long before the direct 
translations of Aristotle’s work, and thus were more important as sources even in the thirteenth 
century. Burnett observes that, even though Robert Grosseteste and Albertus Magnus had access 
to the translation of Aristotle’s De Anima, they “relied more heavily on Avicenna.” One of the 
                                                          
117 See De Anima 1.2.403b24-1.3.405b30. 
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reasons for this preference was that “Aristotle was generally reckoned to be difficult to read and 
difficult to comprehend” (Kemp 30). In any event, by the thirteenth century, Aristotle had 
become The Philosopher, and was quoted as such in the Siete Partidas as well as in a wide 
variety of texts by the most important minds of Western Europe.  
Aristotle’s writings about perception and cognition, although lengthier and more detailed 
than Plato’s, and covering a broader range of topics, are still rather succinct, and the lack of 
examples and details make them obscure and subject to multiple interpretations (Kemp 30). 
There are also problems with the differences between various translations and misattributed 
texts. Lastly, Aristotle, just like Plato before him, was developing his theories building on the 
information that was available during his time, and he seems to have assumed prior knowledge 
and availability of texts that are no longer extant.118 The majority of relevant passages about 
sound and its perception appear in the second book of Aristotle’s De Anima (DA) and in De 
sensu et sensato, which is part of the Parva Naturalia (Johnstone 1; Burnett 43). While the 
second book of De Anima contains an entire chapter on the subject, De sensu treats it in a 
fragmented fashion, in passages interspersed across the text. There are additional discussions 
regarding sound and its perception in two sources that are now believed to be from different 
authors who were probably either Aristotle’s disciples or authors that frequented the Lyceum: the 
Problemata and De Audibilibus (Burnett 43).119 Although there were translations of sections of 
the Problemata in the early Middle Ages, the full work was not translated until the middle of the 
thirteenth century. De Audubilibus survived incomplete in the form of long quotations in 
Porphyry’s In Ptolemaei Harmonica commentarium (Mathiessen, 517; Barker 98). Although not 
                                                          
118 For instance, the work of Alcmaeon of Croton on the anatomy of the ear. See p. 134.  
119 Regarding problems with authorship see Minor Works p. 49 and Problems pp. 345-7.  
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written by the Philosopher, these works provide valuable information about the concerns and 
topics of discussion in the circles Aristotle and his disciples frequented. They also show the 
presence in such discussions of Platonic ideas about sound and its perception, as well as the 
increasing interest in the psychological aspects of sound perception and sensory integration. 
The first book of DA illustrates how, as pointed above, Aristotle acknowledged the 
existence of a tradition in order to formulate his own account of sense perception or any other 
topic related to the soul. His stated purpose for the first book was to “collect the views of our 
predecessors who had anything to say on the subject, in order that we may adopt what is right in 
their conclusions and guard against their mistakes” (1.2.403b20-22).120 Maybe the idea that 
Aristotle rejected tradition in regard to sound perception stems from his assertion at the 
beginning of the second book: “So much for the theories of the soul handed down by our 
predecessors. Let us then, make a fresh start and try to determine what soul is and what will be 
its most comprehensive definition” (2.1.412a1-6). At first glance, there does not seem to be a 
radical rejection of the tradition implied in the idea of making “a fresh start.” However, this is 
just one possibility of translation, from the 1907 version translated by R.D. Hicks. Although a 
detailed analysis of all existing translations would lead too far from the subject at hand, a 
contrasting example can illustrate the wide range of possible interpretations of this text. For 
instance, this is a more recent translation of the same passage by J.A. Smith: “Let the foregoing 
suffice as our account of the views concerning the soul which have been handed on by our 
predecessors; let us now dismiss them and make as it were a completely fresh start, endeavoring 
to give a precise answer to the question, What is soul?” It is evident that readers of DA 
throughout the centuries must have pondered and chosen more or less radical interpretations of 
                                                          
120 All quotes from DA come from Hicks’ translation and spelling has been modernized. 
 
 120 
this passage and, thus, of Aristotle’s relation with tradition regarding the matter of the soul. This 
is just an example of the obscurity that was discussed above, which explains the rich tradition of 
commentary in the centuries that intervened between Antiquity and the Middle Ages, as well as 
the numerous current debates regarding Aristotle’s views on perception and cognition. But it is 
necessary to remember that in this particular text Aristotle is referring to the matter of the soul in 
general (Gendlin II.2). It would be short-sighted to assume that such a broad statement would 
equally apply to each individual aspect of the entire text of DA. Even if Aristotle meant to start 
from scratch to formulate a theory of the soul, he would have probably reached a number of 
conclusions that coincided with those of his predecessors. In fact, there are such overlaps in his 
ideas about sound and its perception, and in some areas where he had nothing to say, it is more 
reasonable to think that he had no conflict with the tradition handed down by those before him, 
and therefore saw no need to restate what they had already said.  
Chapter eight of the second book of DA addresses both the physics of sound generation 
and the specific attributes of voice. In order to understand the context of this discussion, it is first 
necessary to highlight the topics covered in the first seven chapters of this book. Aristotle begins 
with a series of definitions and subdivisions of substance in order to properly classify those 
natural bodies that are ensouled, which in turn allows him to present a definition of the soul as 
“the first actuality of a body having in it the capacity for life” (2.1.412a25-41). From this he can 
undertake a description of the powers of living things, from plants to humans: “Thus there is 
intellect, sensation, motion from place to place and rest, the motion concerned with nutrition and, 
further, decay and growth” (2.2.413a22-25). The power of nutrition is common to all living 
things, and is the only power plants possess, while “it is sensation primarily which constitutes the 
animal” (2.2.413b1-3). Having established these distinctive categories, Aristotle can now classify 
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animals based on the senses they possess: at a minimum, all animals have the sense of touch 
(2.2.413b7-10). There are different varieties of soul, depending on what powers and senses a 
living thing possesses. Aristotle argues that those who have sensation must have imagination and 
appetency: “For, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain: and, where these are, 
desire also must of necessity be present” (2.2.413b21-24). Contrary to this clear classification, 
the possession of intellect and thinking presents a challenge for the Philosopher. He hypothesizes 
that it may be a distinct kind of soul, which can stand alone in the absence of the body 
(2.2.413b24-27). These considerations allow Aristotle to adjust his definition of soul as “a 
certain actuality, a notion or form, of that which has the capacity to be endowed with soul” 
(2.2.413b25-28). From this postulate follows a more detailed discussion of the vital functions 
and the different living things that possess them, connecting each faculty to the different senses. 
These connections were fundamental for the development of the medieval theory of the inner 
senses, which pervaded all the scholarly debates about sensory perception and cognition.121 It is 
important to keep in mind that Aristotle’s theory of the powers of the soul is not the origin of the 
theory of the inner senses, although the Philosopher’s commentators went to great lengths to 
reconcile his psychology with their own theories (Kemp 59).  
The general discussion about the senses begins in chapter five of DA. According to 
Aristotle “sensation consists of being moved and acted upon, for it is held to be a species of 
qualitative change. Some add that like is in fact acted upon by like” (2.5.416b33-35). Each sense 
has a dedicated organ, a specific medium, and its own proper objects, which are qualifications of 
external objects (Cohen 1). In the case of auditory perception, the organ is the ear, the medium 
can be air or water, and the proper objects are sounds. Perception is a “causal process” beginning 
                                                          
121 See p. 140, note 146. 
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in the external object, via the medium, to the organ, and ending in the heart, which Aristotle 
considered the center of cognitive processing (Kemp 32). Perception is the transmission of a 
sensible quality of the external object to the sense organ (Cohen 1).122 Key to understanding his 
account of sense perception is the clear differentiation between potentiality and actuality, which 
to this day continues to be a source of disagreement among scholars who seek to establish 
exactly what Aristotle meant when he described sound production and its perception. Aristotle 
presents two kinds of potentiality (DA 2.5.417a21-417b1). The first consists in the ability to 
acquire some kind of knowledge, while the second one resides in having that knowledge but not 
making use of it. The difference is that, in the first instance, to gain knowledge there needs to be 
a “qualitative change through instruction,” and such transition will destroy the previous 
condition of ignorance. In the second instance, there is a transition from simply having the 
knowledge to using it. Potential knowledge is actualized when it is exercised (2.5.417b2-7). This 
is important because one of the processes is destructive, while the process of perception, which 
corresponds to the second example, preserves what was potential in what is actualized (Cohen 2). 
Aristotle’s explanation, in the case of perception, clearly means that the transition from 
potentiality to actuality is not an alteration of the sense organ (Cohen 2; DA 2.5.417a21-417b2). 
Thus, there are two different scenarios: 
The reason is that actual sensation is always of particulars, while knowledge is of 
universals: and these universals are in a manner in the soul itself. Hence it is in our power 
to think whenever we please, but sensation is not in our power: for the presence of the 
sensible object is necessary. It is much the same with the sciences that deal with sensible 
                                                          
122 Aristotle’s actual definition of perception at the end of the second book: “that which is 
receptive of sensible forms apart from their matter” (2.7.418b26-27). 
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objects; and for the same reason, namely, that sensibles are particulars and are external. . .  
Now, as has been explained, the sensible faculty is potentially such as the sensible object 
is in actuality. While it is being acted upon, it is not yet similar, but, when once it has 
been acted upon, it is assimilated and has the same character as the sensible object. (DA 
2.5.417b18-6.418a3-6) 
This distinction allows Aristotle to differentiate the proper objects for each sense from the 
common sensibles. While the proper object of hearing is sound, common sensibles like “motion, 
rest, number, figure, size,” can be perceived by more than one sense (2.6.418a11-18).  
Aristotle’s account of perception begins to turn increasingly obscure when he addresses 
the subject of the medium, in part because it is developed at the same time as his explanation of 
visual perception. From this point, the explanations of what happens regarding the medium and 
the organ of perception are given separately for each sense. This is of course necessary because 
both the medium and the organ are specific to every one of the senses. The problem is that the 
only complete account given is the one for sight, and in the case of the remaining four the reader 
is asked to apply the explanations given for sight to the other senses. For instance, in chapter 
seven, Aristotle engages on a lengthy description of sight, where the proper object is color and 
the medium is transparent, like air or water, and actualized by light (2.7.418b4-6). The medium 
cannot possess in itself the attribute of the proper object: “It is that which is colorless which is 
receptive of color, as it is that which is soundless which is receptive of sound” (2.7.418b4-6). 
The medium is necessary for perception because proper objects cannot be perceived directly. 
Perception takes place when there is “an affection of the sensitive faculty,” which can only be 
affected “by the intervening medium” (2.7.419a17-19). Aristotle then expands this definition to 
hearing and smell: “For no sound or scent produces sensation by contact with the sense-organ: it 
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is the intervening medium which is excited by sound and odor, and the respective sense-organs 
by the medium. But when the body which emits the sound or odor is placed on the sense organ 
itself, it will not produce any sensation” (2.7.418b25-29). This assertion is rather strange, given 
that it would be very difficult to actually place a sounding object over the tympanic membrane, 
and Aristotle was aware of its existence, but this allows him to present a unified description of 
sense perception, with air as the intervening medium for sound, and to transition into chapter 
eight, where the specific discussion of sound and hearing takes place (2.7.419a32).  
It was previously argued that the understanding of actuality and potentiality would be 
fundamental for the topic of sense perception. The discussion about sound and hearing illustrates 
this very fact, as Aristotle begins by pointing to this distinction (2.8.419b4-5). This is necessary 
because he has to define which objects are able to produce sound: “For some things we say have 
no sound, as sponge, wool; others, for example, bronze and all things solid and smooth, we say 
have sound, because they can emit sound, that is, they can produce actual sound between the 
sonorous body and the organ of hearing” (2.8.419b6-9). Actual sound is the result of two solid 
and smooth objects colliding with each other and with the air. Objects that are not smooth and 
solid, like wool, are not able to produce sound. Hollow objects are said to produce further 
collisions because the air cannot escape, thus causing reverberation. When there is no hollow 
object, the air must be “struck quickly and forcibly” to avoid its dispersion (II.8, 419b10-25). 
Next, Aristotle dedicates considerable space to the echo. This phenomenon attracted wide 
attention in Aristotle’s time, as evidenced by how prominently it features in the Problemata.123 
The air, according to the Philosopher, “is made to rebound backwards like a ball from some other 
air which has become a single mass owing to its being within a cavity which confines it and 
                                                          
123 Problemata 11.7-9, 23, 51; 19.11, 42. 
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prevents its dispersion” (2.8.419b25-27). This description calls to mind the kind of movement 
Plato presented in the Timaeus, which could be applied to things as different as respiration and 
projectile motion.124 Here it could also be tempting to misinterpret the image of the bouncing 
ball as an affirmation that there is an actual mass of air that travels, when in reality both accounts 
are describing the successive displacement of neighboring air. In Aristotle’s explanation of the 
echo, however, the air is trapped in an enclosed space, so the successive displacement of 
neighboring air is so strong as to produce the effect of the sound being replicated. This is one of 
those instances where one can appreciate that Aristotle was not necessarily rejecting everything 
that Plato had proposed regarding sound production and perception, but in reality, he was 
elaborating and expanding on the tradition he inherited.  
In both cases just described, smooth bodies and enclosed spaces, what is important is that 
there is a unified surface that sets the air in motion without dispersing it (2.8.419b34-420a2). 
This is the necessary precondition in the medium for sound to reach the ear: “That, then, is 
resonant which is capable of exciting motion in a mass of air continuously one as far as the ear.” 
(2.8.420a3-4). This allows Aristotle to transition into the area of sound perception, starting with 
how sound is captured by the ear, in a passage that is a perfect example of the aforesaid difficulty 
that led to the writing of many commentaries over the centuries and well into the Middle Ages:  
There is air naturally attached to the ear.  And because the ear is in air, when the external 
air is set in motion, the air within the ear moves. . . .  Of itself, then, the air is a soundless 
thing because it is easily broken up. But whenever it is prevented from breaking up, its 
movement is sound.  But the air within the ear has been lodged fast within walls to make 
it immoveable, in order that it may perceive exactly all the varieties of auditory 
                                                          
124 See p. 114 and Cornford, p. 316. 
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movement.  This is why we hear in water also, because the water does not pass right up to 
the air attached to the ear, nor even into the ear at all, because of its convolutions.  Should 
this happen, hearing is destroyed, as it is by an injury to the membrane of the tympanum  
. . . . (2.8.420a4-14) 
The main cause for the obscurity of this passage is that Aristotle engages in an explanation that 
hints at an anatomy of the ear without ever actually describing the anatomy of the ear. There is 
mention of an enclosed space where air cannot move, of the existence of a membrane that is 
presumably the eardrum and of a convoluted structure that prevents contact with the inner part of 
the ear. It is stated that as the external air moves, this causes the internal air to also move. But the 
location of the internal air and the distribution of the internal structure is never established. On 
the one hand, it would seem like the internal air is obviously trapped behind the eardrum, in the 
middle ear, but then the reference to water not being able to even get into the ear due to the 
convolutions of its structure is quite perplexing, because it is easily contradicted by mere 
experience, even without knowledge of the structure of the outer ear. Such a convoluted structure 
is found in the inner ear, and could refer to either the entire labyrinth or to the cochlea, which are 
filled with liquid, not with air. The structures of the channels in both the outer ear, the external 
acoustic meatus, and the middle ear, the Eustachian tube, do not present anything close to 
convolutions. In the Historia Animalium, Aristotle mentions a passage from the ear to the palate 
but does not give specific details about the section of the ear where it is located (492a20). 
According to Siegel, however, Aristotle was not aware it led to the Middle Ear, and considered 
its only function was draining “superfluous matter from the inner ear into the oral cavity” (137). 
If water cannot get inside the outer ear and reach the eardrum, anyway, how can the external air 
do so, and how exactly is its movement then passed on to the inner air? The alternative would be 
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to think there is an internal air attached to both sides of the eardrum, and that in the case of 
water, external air mediates the transmission of sound to this internal air. But then how can the 
internal air be trapped? This dilemma will be revisited below with examples of the way in which 
it was addressed by the Philosopher’s commentators. 
In the following section of DA 2.8 Aristotle turns his attention to sound again, and 
addresses one important topic mentioned at beginning of this thesis, namely, that sounds give 
clues as to the kind of source that generates them: “The varieties of resonant bodies are clearly 
distinguished by the sound they actually emit” (2.8.420a26-27). He presents pitch as the main 
identifying feature of sound, and echoes Plato in ambiguously speaking of high and low pitch in 
reference to frequency, stating that the sensation comes from the rapidity or slowness of the 
movement (2.8.420a30-33). After this, the treatment of sound is cut abruptly in order to pass to a 
section dedicated specifically to voice, defined as “a sound made by an animate being,” that is, a 
being with a soul.125 Aristotle clarifies that when it is said that a musical instrument, like a flute 
or a lyre, has a voice, this is only an analogy (2.8.420b5-8). He also clarifies that not all animals 
have a voice. In those who do, there needs to be respiration in order to provide the medium 
(2.8.420b13-15). In the case of the generation of voice, the thing that strikes and the thing struck 
are the air breathed and the windpipe; the impact between the two is voice if the cause of it is 
“the soul which animates the vocal organs” (2.8.420b27-29). Aristotle clarifies that this is 
necessary to distinguish the noises made by animals from voice, because the vocal organs can 
produce many noises (2.8.420b30-31). In order to have voice it is necessary to have the presence 
of soul and of “some mental image,” because “voice is certainly a sound which has significance” 
(2.8.420b31-32). The proof that this is so, according to Aristotle, is that humans cannot speak 
                                                          
125 As mentioned in pp. 120-1, there are different degrees to which a being can have a soul.  
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while they are breathing in or out, but only when holding in the air (2.8.421a1-3). Thus, different 
from the sound generated by the collision of inanimate objects, the production of voice requires 
at least a partial cognitive process that yields a mental image, which then leads the soul to 
generate movement in the vocal organs. Aristotle does not elaborate further on the mechanisms 
that generate speech or the rest of the cognitive process that takes place in this section of DA, 
indicating that this is no longer related to the realm of sense perception and belongs to a separate, 
cognitive process. Just as no clear explanation was given regarding the internal air and its 
location in relation to the eardrum, the reader is also left with a very short and obscure 
description of the process of speech production.  
These questions were equally perplexing for the commentators and intellectuals who 
wrote extensively about the De Anima from Antiquity to the Middle Ages, not only attempting to 
clarify Aristotle’s views, but also contributing their own opinions and supplementing them with 
the current medical and philosophical discourse of their time. One could interpret the ambiguities 
of the passages analyzed above as Aristotle again engaging in what he has been doing throughout 
the entire text of De Anima: assuming prior knowledge of a body of works that are no longer 
extant. But even this is difficult to confirm because of the presence of fundamental differences 
between translations of this text. Some of these discrepancies are relevant because they may 
potentially lead to very different conclusions regarding the particularities of auditory perception. 
It is worthwhile, therefore, to take a close look at them.  
 
The Commentary Tradition 
In an early example, the commentary by Christian theologian and Neoplatonic 
commentator Philoponus (490 AD- 570 AD), there is both an attempt at providing a detailed 
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anatomy and to elaborate it further with an account of what happens after sound is perceived, 
which goes far beyond Aristotle’s original explanation.126 Philoponus’ text provides some 
insights regarding the accepted theories of his time. He shared Aristotle’s view of the production 
and propagation of sound, and added to it further details in keeping with the elaborations made 
by the Philosopher’s successors. He clearly interpreted the propagation of sound not as a single 
mass but as a wave, using the example of a cup filled with water: “If one fills a cup with water 
one can see how ripples are produced in the water when the finger moves around the rim” 
(Sambursky 100).127  Philoponus clarifies that when in DA 2.8.420a3-4 air is said to be “one in 
continuity up to hearing,” this refers specifically to what he calls “heard sound,” because “sound 
can move beyond hearing, but no longer as heard [sound]” (50). This points to a proximal 
conception of auditory perception and allows him to elaborate on the internal air problem. 128 The 
translation he uses characterizes air as “inborn in hearing,” and he explains that this is said to 
show that the external air never actually reaches the eardrum. Thus, for Philoponus this inborn 
air actually surrounds the eardrum. It receives the information about sounds from the external air 
and passes it on to be perceived by the “acoustic pneuma that resides in the eardrum itself.” The 
introduction of the acoustic pneuma is followed by summary description of how sensory 
perception works: “For the senses, starting from the brain, proceed through the nerves as far as 
the sense-organs. The power to hear, then, proceeds to the roots of the ears, which are called the 
‘eardrums’. There is a nerve proceeding from the brain which is equipped with a channel, and the 
                                                          
126 Little is known about Philophonus’ life, except for the criticism and debates related to his 
Christian views (Blumenthal 61). There are problems with the attributions of his commentaries, 
especially book 3 of his DA (45-51). 
127 See note 137 for the origins of this description in Zeno of Citium. 
128 Regarding proximal and distal philosophical conceptions of sound and auditory experiences 
see Pasnau, “Sensible Qualities,” and Casey O’Callaghan. 
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acoustic pneuma is in that channel.” Philoponus observes that the inner air around the eardrum is 
not always the same but it is generated by the body as a kind of protection, and if it disappears, 
damage to the ears ensues. Charlton explains that the pneuma was “a kind of gaseous substance” 
thought to possess the sensory capacities, and the nerves were its channels; its function would be 
close to that of the electric impulses in modern physiology (147, note 181).129 Philoponus also 
justified the presence of internal air by positing that, although Aristotle said it was possible to 
hear in air and in water, water was not sound-conveying, thus needing the mediation of the air to 
transmit the sounds to the eardrum (51). Protecting the eardrum was also the reason for the 
“tortuous layout” of the ear (53).  
Philoponus struggled with exactly what kind of movement would occur in transmitting 
sounds, given that Aristotle described the internal air as unmoving, yet it is the continuous 
movement of the external air that it is supposed to transmit to the eardrum. He ventured that 
perhaps this is not a movement of place but only a “change,” and he proposed a simple empirical 
test, that of blocking one ear with a finger. Doing this makes one notice “a sort of sound and 
change in the air inside” which causes the internal air to rebound and produce sound, thereby 
also proving that the ear is healthy (52). This is one example of the empirical approach of 
Philoponus regarding perception, which is consistent with a Greek tradition of empiricism dating 
back to the 4th century BC, with Aristoxenus’ study of musical sound (Barker 5).130 Philoponus, 
just as Aristoxenus, albeit with a different focus, grounds his arguments with an analysis 
                                                          
129 For more about the concept of pneuma see below in the section about Galen, p. 136, note 142. 
130 Aristoxenus of Tarentum, a pupil of Aristotle, wrote one of the first surviving collections of 
writings on music and acoustical theory, the Elementa Harmonica. Aside from it and a fragment 
from his book on rhythmics, the rest of his monumental work on philosophy, biography, 
education, and politics, only survives as quoted in other sources.  It was so influential it is 
considered as the beginner of a tradition that ran parallel to the Pythagorean. For a biography of 
Aristoxenus and a detailed analysis of the Elementa Harmonica, see Barker, pp. 119-89. 
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controlled by human experience. He tries to complement Aristotle’s obscure statements about the 
anatomy and function of the ear with examples derived from everyday life and also with parallels 
between visual and sound perception and their respective sense organs.131 However, there are 
specific areas where this empirical approach cannot shed light on the issue, and where he can 
only follow what the text says; for instance, the assertion that the convoluted structure of the ear 
prevents water from entering. In this case, Philoponus can only add that this is the reason why 
nature made the ear with such a structure, which seems to indicate, quite misleadingly in light of 
the relevant medical tradition, that in the intervening centuries between The Philosopher and his 
commentator no significant advances had been made regarding the internal anatomy of the ear 
(54). Returning to the matter of the internal air, the main problem is determining why Aristotle 
seems to contradict himself in one part saying it is unmovable, then describing it later on in DA 
2.8.420a16-18 as “moving with its own movement” (55). Philoponus takes this as only meaning 
that the air never leaves the inside of the ear, something suggested empirically by comparing it to 
“the air of hollow horns.” Thus, he argues that this particular movement may be understood as 
happening “not in respect of place, but in a vital way, and he [Aristotle] means by ‘movement’ 
the transmission of sounds to the sense.” Up to this point, the empiricist approach that 
Philoponus applies to this passage seemed to cast a shadow on his Neoplatonism. Here, however, 
one sees a glimpse of it in the form of a transmission that does not really depend on the bodily 
organ or the internal air, that is, in the materiality of the process of perception.132  
                                                          
131 For example, in his commentary on the passage about the echo, DA 2.8.419b27-30, where 
Aristotle uses the reflection of sunlight to illustrate the way sound reflects from solid and smooth 
bodies, Philoponus adds specific examples and hypothetical scenarios where light and shadow 
are generated (362.19-363.14).    




Although a dissection of Philoponus’ observations regarding voice falls outside the scope 
of this thesis, the interested reader will find in them much more evidence of the advances in 
medical knowledge during the centuries that separated the commentator from Aristotle. 
Philoponus offers detailed anatomical descriptions of the vocal and breathing organs, and also 
spends considerable time explaining the way voice is generated and how it differs from noise, 
again offering numerous examples to support his arguments. One particularly exhaustive 
explanation merits special attention: the passages regarding the difference between voice and 
noise (DA 2.8.420b5-8). Whereas this section of DA merely states what voice is and who can 
produce it, clarifying that musical instruments do not really have a voice because they have no 
soul, and describing the qualities of sound that characterize it, Philoponus uses it as an 
opportunity to start a long digression. While voice is the result of an organized and voluntary 
process that renders euphonious sound, noise is involuntary and, absent a process, “the breath is 
moved in a manner contrary to nature,” causing it to strike the vocal organs “in a disorderly way” 
(379.20-5). This already establishes that in order to convey meaning, the utterance has to be 
produced by an orderly process that yields a harmonious result. The commentator compares the 
vocal organs with the acoustic properties of musical instruments, to then enter into a lengthy 
description of the qualities of sound from a rhetorical perspective, in which the attendant medical 
and philosophical considerations are framed by the act of communication that is the function of 
voice, and which can be verbal or non-verbal. Philoponus underscores the role of prosody, 
rhythm, affect, and eloquence, in the Aristotelian concept of voice, and highlights the links 
between its acoustic and anatomical properties and the products of their use. He does this 
especially with speech, a uniquely human ability, and the only system of production of sound 
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that clearly encompasses perception and cognition. In doing so, he presents what is probably the 
earliest example of an embodied approach to the study of sound perception and cognition. 
In the twelfth century, Averroes (1126-1198 AD) faces the same problems of 
interpretation in his Long Commentary on the De Anima. His analysis is extremely close to 
Philoponus’ in the interpretation of the text, but he does not elaborate extensively on the 
cognitive aspects, nor does he rely as heavily on an empirical approach. Averroes shares 
Philoponus’ interpretation of DA 2.8.420a3-4 as a description of continuous motion rather than a 
single moving block of air, and complements his argument with recourse to the example of the 
wave produced by a rock thrown in water, the same one Galen had also espoused.133 He also 
shares a similar outlook on the internal structure of the ear: “And for this reason we also hear in 
water. . . since it does not enter in the ear also on account of the twist [of the tube of the ear]” 
(DA II.8.420a7-10). The translator’s addition in brackets is accompanied by a note stating that 
this is the Eustachian tube (199, n. 204). This assumption is not supported by Averroes’ analysis 
of this passage: “. . . we hear in water when water has not entered upon the air which is in the ear 
and has not corrupted it, on account of the spiral which is in the created nature of the ear” (200). 
Averroes does not offer any additional details in this passage to warrant the assumption that he 
even knew about the existence of the Eustachian tube, which does not have twists; however, he 
describes the structure as a spiral, not simply as windings or convolutions. The only convoluted 
or spiraled structure in the ear is the labyrinth, which encompasses the cochlea and the vestibular 
system, and which is located in the inner ear.134 Whether this is just a coincidence or Averroes 
was in fact describing this structure based on knowledge or following another medical or 
                                                          
133 See p. 136, note 141.  
134 See Chapter 1, Figure 6, p. 23. 
 
 134 
philosophical tradition is not discernable from the text of the Long Commentary, but the fact that 
he wrote a commentary on Avicenna’s Cantica, and also on the works of Galen, clearly shows 
that he is referring to the inner ear structure.135 In order to appreciate some of the implications of 
these different interpretations, it is necessary to open a short parenthesis to look at the medical 
tradition regarding the anatomy and function of the ear. 
 
Medical Tradition: from Antiquity to Avicenna 
Knowledge of the Eustachian tube precedes Galen, and can be traced back to the pre-
Socratic era. Alcmaeon of Croton (5th century BC) is credited with its discovery, and although 
Aristotle does not mention him specifically in regard to this particular matter, he includes him in 
the number of his predecessors in the first book of De Anima, and briefly discusses his views on 
the immortality of the soul (405a29-b1).136 Alcmaeon is believed to have practiced anatomic 
dissection and maybe even vivisection (Laín 72).137 According to Cornford, Diogenes of 
Apollonia and Anaxagoras thought the ear was just a “channel for sound” (276). Diogenes said 
that the motion was transmitted from the outside to the inside air and from there to the brain, 
while for Anaxagoras the sound penetrated the brain due to it rebounding from the skull. The On 
Flesh of the Corpus Hippocraticum argued against this view that the brain could not resonate 
                                                          
135 For a complete list of Averroes’ works, including his medical treatises and commentaries, see 
the “Averroes’ Works” section of DARE: The Digital Averroes Research Environment. 
http://dare.uni-koeln.de/dare-cgi/vaporlinks.pas?darevurl=leftBoxContent%3A%3D%2Fdare-
cgi%2Ftexts_all.pas%3A%3DonLoadedTableOfTexts. 
136Although Alcmaeon’s name does not appear in Averroes’ Long Commentary, it appears in his 
Middle Commentary (Long Commentary, p. 39, note 137). 
137 Alcamaeon, just like Empedocles, approached the study of medicine holistically, so anatomy, 
physiology and psychology were not seen as separate disciplines. This was in part due to the 
general view of the human body as a microcosm, just as reality was seen as a reflection of 
cosmic harmony (Laín 72). 
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because it was moist and soft; it also included a description of the tympanic membrane (Laín 73). 
The brief description Plato offers in the Timaeus was discussed above.138 As previously stated, 
Aristotle mentions a passage that connects to “the roof of the mouth,” which corresponds to the 
Eustachian tube, in his Historia Animalium (Cornford 275).139 Certainly, knowledge of the ear’s 
anatomy was not the same in the entire medical tradition, and different parts seem to have 
survived in various texts at different times, not necessarily following any kind of incremental 
teleology. Still, although there is no surviving text from the intervening centuries before Galen 
dealing specifically with the ear, it is evident that there were advances in this area, especially in 
regard to cognitive processing, probably in great part due to the influence of the medical school 
that flourished in Alexandria in the third century BC, and where Galen studied centuries later 
(Serageldin).140  
Galen, writing in the second century AD, even though heavily influenced by Aristotle, 
did not refer to any structure identifiable as the Eustachian tube nor did he describe the particular 
anatomy of the middle ear (Siegel 136; Lain 77-8). Nonetheless, he offered detailed descriptions 
of the outer and inner ear, and the connection of the cranial nerve with a spiraled structure he 
named helix, that is, the cochlea (Siegel 127-31).141 He also believed that the ear was filled with 
                                                          
138 See p. 112. 
139 See p. 126. 
140 The medical school in Alexandria, which followed the teachings of Hippocrates, also 
benefited from the influence of ancient Egyptian medicine. Its oldest written example, the Edwin 
Smith papyrus, dates back to 1600 BCE, and may reflect knowledge as old as 3000 BCE 
(Serageldin). It is the first medical text to pinpoint the brain as the control center of the body, and 
to describe surgical procedures, including the use of techniques like trepanation, as well as the 
use of dissection and vivisection. See also Laín, pp. 75-6.  
141 It is believed that Galen used the anatomy of the ear of a large animal, probably an ox, for his 
description of the inner ear (Siegel 127). The human inner ear is microscopic, which made it 
impossible to use it directly for anatomical study, and there is no concrete evidence of the use on 
magnifying lenses in Galen’s time.  
 
 136 
air and he followed Zeno’s view regarding the propagation of sound as waves spreading 
spherically (134).142 Contrary to other natural philosophers, Galen did not interpret the internal 
air as being different from the external one (136). He spoke of a cerebral pneuma in ambiguous 
terms, as that which filled the nerves and the cerebral ventricles.143  Galen thought that the 
sensory nerves were directly connected to the front ventricle, while the motor nerves were 
connected to the rear ventricle (Kemp 46). His views differed radically from the Greek tradition 
                                                          
142 Zeno of Citium (circa 300 BCE) was the founder of the Stoic school of philosophy. 
Regarding wave propagation, he stated: “We hear when the air between the sonant body and the 
organ of hearing suffers a concussion, a vibration, which spreads spherically and then forms 
waves and strikes upon the ears, just as water in a reservoir forms circles when a stone is thrown 
into it” (Diogenes Laertius VII.1; quoted in Siegel, p. 134, note 12). 
143 Kemp explains that this pneuma or spirit was “extracted by the liver. This spirit, called 
“natural” spirit, is mixed with the blood and conveyed around the body. Some goes to the heart, 
where it is refined to produce “vital” spirit. Some of the vital spirit, in tur, is further refined to 
produce “animal” spirit. . . . The refined animal spirit fills the ventricles of the brain. It also fill 
the sensory and motor nerves, which, in Galen’s account, are connected to the ventricles” (45-6). 
The term “pneuma” was used with varying meanings throughout the history of medicine, and 
different authors disagreed about its function, composition and location in the human body. For 
example, Diogenes of Apolonia (5th century BCE), considered that the main element in the 
composition of the human body was air, which became pneuma after entering a living body 
(Laín 79). His views and those of his followers initiated the medical doctrine known as 
“pneumatism.” In the context of the Corpus Hippocraticum, the notion of pneuma gives way to 
the new concept of “humor,” which will be fundamental in medieval medicine. It was believed to 
enter the body through the nose, mouth and skin, and then pass first to the brain to enable 
intelligence, and then to the other major organs (85). It was also described as part of the process 
of embryonic development during pregnancy (82). Aristotle combined both notions in his 
descriptions of the human body, and gave the pneuma the important status of life-giving agent 
(80). Greek physician Herophilos (3rd century BCE), thought that the pneuma circulated in the 
arteries, together with blood, but no in the veins, while his contemporary Erasistratus argued that 
arteries contained only pneuma and veins only blood (75). By the time of Zeno of Citium, 
pneumatism is the dominant doctrine, and there are various classifications of “pneumata” (81). 
Galen gave a more stable classification to these pneumata, and also to the humors, leading to the 
famous identification of individuals as sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric and melancholic. But 
Galen distinguished between soul (psyché, following the Platonic model) and pneuma (spirit). 
For Galen, the pneumata are subtle material substances which actualize the potentiality of the 
bodily organs, including the brain (89-90). To add to the confusion, the word “spirit” (spiritus) 
had also multiple interpretations, from Aristotle’s use of it to mean “breath,” to the aforesaid 
meaning of “soul” as a physical bodily attribute, to its later medieval uses as the intermediary 
between the body and the soul, or as the liquid in the ventricles of the brain (Kemp 45). 
 
 137 
when it came to perception and cognitive processing, which he considered to be ultimately 
seated in the brain, not in the heart like Aristotle, or in the liver like Plato, or in the ventricles, as 
later believed by most medieval scholars as part of the theory of the inner senses. Galen was not 
very successful in advancing his theory that sound was ultimately processed in the brain mainly 
because he did not provide a satisfactory explanation about how the air vibrations were 
transmitted to the acoustic nerve and the brain, in part because he did not discover the function of 
the ossicles in the middle ear, nor did he know that the inner ear was filled with fluid instead of 
air (135-6). Still, throughout the rest of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Galen was the main 
source of medical knowledge, both as transmitted through Arabic sources and as developed in 
medieval European universities. 
 Whereas the conservation and transmission in Byzantium of Greek and Roman 
knowledge, and of Galen’s works specifically, was almost unknown in the West until the end of 
the Middle Ages, the Arab medical tradition reached Europe centuries earlier via the translations 
and commentaries of eminent Arab scholars.144 But the contributions of these scholars went 
beyond translation and transmission, as they helped to shape the medical theories and the 
conception of cognitive psychology that were predominant until the end of the Renaissance. 
After the initial centuries of gathering and translating the works of the Classical past into Arabic, 
in the ninth century starts to flourish in Baghdad a new approach to medicine that combines the 
refashioning of the inherited tradition with the development of new medical knowledge (Laín 
159). From this new source will emerge an educational compilation of Galenic medicine that 
circulated in Medieval Europe, as well as treatises on subjects as varied as pharmacology and 
blood circulation. The splendor of Arab medicine spans the tenth and eleventh centuries, the 
                                                          
144 Regarding the Byzantine medical tradition, see Laín, pp. 144-156. 
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second of which will see its rise in Western Europe, centered on the Caliphate of Cordoba. It 
incorporated the Hippocratic and Galenic traditions and the wealth of Aristotelian, Neoplatonic 
and Atomistic knowledge. Some of the medical texts produced during these two centuries by 
Islamic and Jewish scholars were still in use in Europe in the eighteenth century (160).  
Avicenna embodies the pinnacle of Islamic thought and his influence in the Medieval 
West went far beyond medicine. As mentioned above, he was one of the main sources of 
Aristotelian philosophy before the rediscovery and translation of The Philosopher’s works. 
Avicenna’s opus encompassed medicine, astronomy, philosophy and theology (161). His most 
important medical work, the Canon of Medicine (al-Qānūn fī l-ṭibb), is a monumental 
encyclopedic work in five volumes and it was translated into Latin in the twelfth century. The 
Canon was one of the principal textbooks in universities across medieval Europe and it 
circulated up until the seventeenth century (Kemp 6). Its third volume contains a fifteen-chapter 
treatise on the ear that covers anatomy, hygiene, hearing loss, illnesses and trauma, as well as 
references to the knowledge inherited from Persian and Greek sources (Elhendi, “La Audiología” 
68).145 It contains a description of the anatomy of the ear clearly based on the tradition, including 
some of the same difficulties for interpretation, but lengthier and more detailed. It also includes 
some elaboration on the probable causes of the spiraled shape of the hard bone structure of the 
ear, which is said to force the air to travel a longer distance, protecting the organ from sudden 
bursts of heat, cold or excessive strength of the incoming air (Elhendi, “Anatomía del oído” 7). 
There is also a more detailed description of the auditory and vestibular nerves, a depiction of the 
tympanic membrane as responsive to sound vibrations and what appears to be a description of 
                                                          
145 Avicenna included concrete affections like ringing in the ears (Canon §202), ear infections     
(§511-2) and a minute description of the veins around the ear (§1023). 
 
 139 
the middle ear (8). Avicenna also offers an explanation of sound as the result sound waves that 
strike the tympanic membrane, which is connected with the endings of each pair of nerves at the 
end of the ear canal. He compared the mechanisms of auditory nerve function to those of the 
optic nerve and offered a detailed discussion of the cranial nerves and their connection to the 
brain. Even though in the Canon there is no discussion of the specifics of sound perception in the 
brain, Avicenna attributed hearing loss to problems in the brain and its adjacent structures. 
 The discussion of sensory processing is part of Avicenna’s psychology, of which three 
treatises contain specific sections about perception: the Compendium on the Soul (Kitāb fī l-Nafs’ 
alā sunnat al-iḫtiṣār), the De Anima, part of The Cure (al-Shifā’), and The Salvation (Kitāb al-
Najāt). Of the three, the discussion of the De Anima is the only one that does not reinstate the 
Aristotelian theory of sound production and perception, or any of the other senses, and instead 
concentrates in a discussion of the internal senses and the way they process the information 
gathered by the five external senses. Still, it contains interesting insights on auditory phenomena 
that give a glimpse into how medieval intellectuals attempted to explain them in the context of 
their views regarding cognition.146 As mentioned above, the theory of the inner senses was 
extremely important in the Middle Ages. It assigned particular cognitive functions to specific 
                                                          
146 I.e. The discussion about the need for the imaginative faculty for non-rational animals to live: 
“Si autem non esset in animalibus virtus in qua coniungerentur formae sesatorum, difficilis esset 
eis vita. . . et si sonus non ostendere saporem. . .” (Avicenna Latinus IV.I.23-5). See also the 
discussion about auditory hallucinations and how to the ill mind they appear completely real as if 
perceived by the external senses due to the impairment to the action of the cogitative and 
intellective faculties: “. . . et formae quae sunt in formali  praesentantur  in sensu communi et 
videntur quasi habeant esse extrinsecus. . . . Si autem cognitio et intellectus subvenerint ei in 
aliquot istorum et revocaverint ad se virtutem imaginativam excitando eam, delebuntur formae 
illae et imaginationes” (IV.II.34-45). Finally, the discussion on how extreme stimuli may alter or 
damage the sensory organs: “sicut est disposition sensus, quem sensibilia difficilia et assidua 
debilitant et aliquando destruunt, sicut splendor visum et tonitruum maximum auditum, ita ut 
sensus postquam apprehenderit difficile, nequeat apprehendere debile” (IV.II.18-21). 
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parts of the ventricles of the brain (Kemp 32).147 Avicenna contributed greatly to the 
development of this theory, suggesting five different cognitive processes, and he had enormous 
influence in its later medieval elaborations.148 The al-Najāt contains a few sentences that 
summarize the Aristotelian account of sound production and perception, as well as the main 
anatomical features of the ear, adhering also to the notion of an internal, motionless air that is 
altered by the external vibration, transmitting it to the nerve (Rahman 26).  
The discussion about sense perception in the Compendium stands apart in that it 
elaborates extensively on a comparison of the Aristotelian account with other theories, and 
mainly with Plato’s theory of visual perception from the Timaeus, which Avicenna rejects in 
categorical terms (51-4). It is a very salient example of the general line of inquiry that Avicenna 
                                                          
147 Galen's theory that the spirit was housed in the ventricles of the brain was still followed in the 
Middle Ages, and Avicenna had a very important role in its transmission (Kemp 46). As 
mentioned earlier, Galen did not assign cognitive functions to the ventricles. It is not known 
where the tradition of locating cognitive functions to the ventricles stems from, but Kemp 
observes both Augustine and Aquinas thought it came from medicine, and the doctrine was 
already widespread by the time of Augustine and Nemesius. The medieval conception of the 
ventricles was based on a very schematic, simplified, and linear, anatomy of the ventricles (47). 
See Kemp 47-8 for examples of medieval illustrations of the anatomy of the brain. This 
inaccurate representation, however, supported the existence of the inner senses and the general 
conception of cognitive processes as successive rather than simultaneous. Kemp observes that 
the theory of the inner sense was problematic from a theological standpoint, because it placed 
cognitive functions on bodily organs, which led to the inevitable conundrum of what happens to 
the memories stored in them after the physical body dies (48). But any theory regarding the 
nature of perception had to account for the fact that animals, although supposed to be devoid of 
an immortal soul, possessed obvious cognitive abilities, something that Aristotle had already 
established and Augustine had reaffirmed (50). What is more, there had to be a way of 
accounting for the cognitive impairments caused by illnesses and brain injuries, and the evident 
fact that damage to different areas of the head resulted in different kinds of impairments. This led 
to medieval conceptions of psychiatric disorders as related to damage or malfunction of each 
specific ventricle (51). 
148 Avicenna’s account of the inner senses is comprised of five cognitive processes. Fantasy was 
subdivided into common sense and image store, and was located in the front ventricle. Cogitative 
power and estimation were located in the middle ventricle. Lastly, memory was located in the 
rear ventricle (Kemp 51).  
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followed, and that also led to his adoption of many Platonic concepts within his primarily 
Aristotelian framework. The Compendium also reinstates the Aristotelian account, elaborating on 
specific topics like the inner air, the required physical qualities of sounding bodies and the 
particular circumstances of the generation of the echo (55). Sense perception is further developed 
in the Compendium in regards to the topic of the sensibles, of which Avicenna offers a specific 
classification into eight different pairs (57).149 In the case of hearing, the pair of primary 
sensibles is heavy and sharp sound, regarding which he makes a distinction as to mode of 
perception: “Moreover all sensibles are felt wholly and solely through a sort of gathering and 
sundering, shrinking and spreading; except sounds, which are felt only through sundering”. 
Avicenna also reasserts the characteristics of the medium, stating that air is absolutely void and 
free of form (58). Another area which was not addressed in any of the other discussions on 
perception is that of how hearing perceives general characteristics like shape, number, size, 
motion and rest (59). Avicenna acknowledges that, in contrast with the other senses, it is not 
obvious in which way the ear would perceive them. Number, for instance, is perceived through 
the differentiation of various sounds, while loudness allows the estimation of the size of the 
objects striking each other, as well as if they are solid or hollow. The “change and fixedness of 
the sounds” allow the perception of motion and rest. These are very important assertions that 
show a more sophisticated conception of sound as a phenomenon in the time of Avicenna. This 
is the first presentation I have encountered of a psychoacoustic theory of auditory perception 
founded on the medical and philosophical theories of an author. Such an advanced account could 
only come from a scholar who was at the forefront of both disciplines and its importance cannot 
                                                          
149 For a detailed analysis of the problem of the sensibles in the case of auditory perception in the 
Aristotelian tradition, see Pasnau, “Sensible Qualities,” pp. 27-31.  
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be overstated, as it attests to the awareness of the interrelation of both aspects of auditory 
perception at a level not only of intuition but also of intellectual inquiry. 
 
After Avicenna: Reconciling Aristotle and Religion 
We had opened this parenthesis to inquire into the medical knowledge that Averroes 
might have derived from the sources available to him regarding sound and its perception. This is 
the tradition that Averroes inherits and further develops in the twelfth century, a tradition which, 
aside from Avicenna, also includes important Arabic scholars like al-Fārābī, al-Kindī and al-
Ghazālī. To the wealth of philosophical, theological and medical tradition, Averroes adds 
another important component: his work as a legal scholar. Even though all the scholars and 
intellectuals surveyed here, from antiquity to the Middle Ages, showed varying degrees of 
interest in the law, wrote about it and theorized about it, Averroes was both a scholar and an 
actual jurist, serving as qâḍî of Seville for many years (Long Commentary xv).150 He was also at 
odds with the more conservative legal and theological schools that were dominant in the 
Caliphate of Cordoba, and because of this he had to live in exile for a short time (xviii). Taylor 
defines Averroes’ view as an “Aristotelian rationalism” very critical of traditional theology, 
which may have been one of the reasons for his falling into disfavor (xvii). This prosecution 
included an order to have his works burned, in spite of which many of them survived, some in 
translation from Hebrew and Latin sources (xix). In regards to psychology, Averroes, just as his 
predecessors, was mainly interested in the nature of the intellect and in the question of how it 
could operate without reference to the sense organs and what they perceived: “What is at issue 
here is simply the most important and fundamental epistemological question of the Aristotelian 
                                                          
150 Regarding Averroes’ career as a jurist and philosopher see Kukkonen, pp. 495-7. 
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and Platonic tradition: Is it possible for human beings while existing in extended physical bodies 
to think intelligible objects which are separate from physical conditions?” (xxi-xxii). This is a 
question which Plato and Aristotle never really answered, and that their successors and 
commentators, especially in the Aristotelian tradition, attempted to resolve in different ways 
(xxi). Starting with the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 AD), there is a clear drive in 
this direction in the commentary tradition, which begins with sense perception, and with its 
relation to specific bodily organs (Blumenthal 121-3). The Neoplatonists, following Alexander, 
“reduced or removed the materialistic aspects of Aristotle’s theories on perception through the 
senses” (123). The sense organs were defined as instruments and the sense impressions that they 
gathered were later translated into thoughts by the soul. Plotinus, for instance, considered that the 
soul made “judgements about affections which happened in bodies.” In sum, the tension the 
Neoplatonists were grappling with, between the seemingly materialistic nature of Aristotelian 
psychology and the fact that its most fundamental question had remained unanswered, continued 
to occupy a central place in the Arabic tradition that deeply influenced the medieval west.  
Averroes held varying views throughout his life regarding the intellect and its relation to 
the body. He reached a definitive opinion on the subject in the Long Commentary, concluding 
that there is one material intellect all humans share which is, in the words of Taylor, “a receptive 
disposition for intelligibles of things of the world while itself being separate intellect” (Long 
Commentary lii).151 There is a distinction between this kind of intellect, which can receive 
universal forms, and the perception of individual sensible forms by the agent intellect, which 
                                                          
151 For an outline of Averroes works, culminating in the commentaries, see Kukkonen, pp. 496-7. 
Even though Aristotle had specified that the material intellect could not understand without the 
use of the imaginative faculty, Averroes argued that The Philosopher was not implying that 
therefore it would be “generable and corruptible” (liii). For Averroes’ detailed treatment of the 
different intellects see Long Commentary, pp. 292-401 (cf. DA 3.4.429a10-3.8.431b19). 
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Averroes defines as “the actuality of the material intellect” (lviii-lix).152 Averroes was grappling 
with the complex relationship between sensing and understanding: “That is, because the things 
which move the rational power are inside the soul and possessed by us always in act, for this 
reason a human being can contemplate them when he wishes and this is called ‘to conceptualize,’ 
and he cannot sense when he wishes because he necessarily needs sensibles which are outside 
the soul” (Long Commentary 172).153 Contrary to the material intellect, the agent intellect is not 
receptive and it has no ability to understand (lxii). Given that the agent intellect is the one that 
participates in perception, this means that understanding is not possible when perception is 
occurring, and it only takes place after the perceived forms are processed by the internal powers 
of imagination, cogitation and memory (lvii).154 An important aspect of Averroes’ theory of the 
material intellect for the subject of perception in the context this thesis has set out to investigate 
is that it follows Aristotle in rejecting Plato’s “opinion that learning and recollection are the 
                                                          
152 The material intellect of Averroes’ account is still only one and it is separate from the human 
mind. In order to establish a connection between the individual and the agent and material 
intellects, Averroes develops a process where the material intellect is viewed as an apprehensive 
power itself devoid of any material or intelligible form. Just like the medium in perception 
processes cannot have form in order to receive all the forms, the material intellect is pure 
potentiality so it can be receptive of the intentions processed in the individual mind. The 
connection with the individual mind is possible through prime matter, which is “a potency for the 
actual material reception” of those intentions. Whereas the material intellect apprehends 
universal forms, the prime matter does not. But this does not answer the question of how, if there 
is only one material intellect, individual human beings can come to know things in different 
ways. In order to explain this, Averroes posits what is known as his two-subject theory, where 
intelligibles have two different subjects, one external and one that actualizes the form. For a 
detailed analysis of these theories, see Long Commentary, pp. lvi-lxxvi.  
153 Cf. DA 2.5.417b22-29. 
154 The agent intellect’s function is to transfer intelligibles in potency into the realm of the 
intellect. They become intelligibles in act in the material intellect. The agent intellect has no 
potency. Aristotle says, “in its substance it is activity,” so it cannot be potentially receptive. 
Averroes concludes that for Aristotle “the agent intelligence understands nothing of the things 
which are there” (Long Commentary lxviii). For an overview of the concept of conjoining that 




same” (169).155 As mentioned previously, this theory of learning as recollection was important 
for intellectuals like Augustine and Boethius, and thus was very influential in medieval debates 
about cognition.156  Averroes’ account seems to have been highly regarded, but that did not 
translate into a passive acceptance of it, or of any of the other interpretations of Aristotle’s 
psychology. The order these processes followed, for instance, was a matter of contention 
throughout the Middle Ages, especially regarding abstraction and understanding (Kemp 67).  
Continuing with his commentary on Aristotle’s account of sound and its perception, 
Averroes also maintained the traditional view regarding the hierarchy of the senses presided by 
vision, something he comments at the very beginning of Aristotle’s exposition about sound 
generation in DA 2.8.419b2. To the aforementioned use of the image of a rock thrown in water to 
illustrate sound waves, Averroes adds the description of “a spherical figure or one nearly 
spherical” of sequentially displaced air, with its center in the sound source (Long Commentary 
193). The fact that one can hear the same sound if one stands at the same distance from the 
source in different directions is proof that waves propagate in a spherical fashion. This additional 
explanation evinces an awareness of the spatial pervasiveness of sound, something he attributes 
to the propagation of smells and colors. Regarding the matter of internal air in DA 2.8.420a7-8, 
Averroes conveniently sidesteps the medical debate by simply restating that there needs to be a 
continuity with the external air without ever actually discussing the location of the internal air. 
He draws the same parallels with breathing and vision to illustrate why the organ of hearing 
responds to the movement of the air (199).157 He does, however, elaborate ambiguously on the 
                                                          
155 Cf. DA 2.5.417b8-16. 
156 For Plato’s concept of anamnesis see pp. 50-1 and 116. 
157 Taylor observes that this may be the result of the original text’s omission and describes it as a 
“confused version of the Greek” (Long Commentary 198, note 201).  
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internal air as something that “surpasses the external air in stillness,” and also on the fact that it 
has to mediate the sounds transmitted to water (200). He does so, first, in order to emphasize the 
importance of air as the medium and the fact that it is receptive of sounds “because it does not 
have sound in itself, since there is no motion in it which causes sound.” This allows him to 
support his interpretation of Aristotle’s preceding general account of perception: “He meant to 
explain that the relation of the air placed in the ear is just as the relation of a member proper to 
each thing sensed, namely, [that it is that] through which the action of that sentient being is first 
actualized.” Averroes thus effectively uses sound as a means to corroborate his interpretation of 
Aristotle’s psychology, showing that the same correspondence of functions that is manifested 
between the material intellect and the intelligibles is replicated in the relation between the air as 
the medium and sound as its proper object. Secondly, Averroes uses the aforementioned 
ambiguous qualification of internal air as being of greater stillness the external air to solve the 
apparent contradiction in the following section, DA 2.8.420a16-17, when Aristotle states that the 
internal air “moves with some motion of its own.” 158  
The section about voice in the DA gives a more complete picture of the medical 
knowledge Averroes inherited, and of his critical treatment of it. In the passages regarding the 
voice organs and the way voice is produced, he focuses his analysis on the functions of 
respiration, lamenting the unavailability of Aristotle’s treatise on the subject. In light of this, 
Averroes decides to elaborate on the matter because he considers Galen’s account “is not 
sufficient” (205).159 His explanation includes additional anatomical detail, like the mention of the 
epiglottis, illustrating its function by comparing it to the way a reed works in a reed-pipe (206). 
                                                          
158 See pp. 129-31 regarding Philoponus’ inability to solve the same problem. 
159 See also Long Commentary, p. xcv. 
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He also contradicts Galen’s account of respiration in favor of Aristotle’s. This leads to an 
interesting contribution in the psychological aspect. Above, in the case of Philoponus, it was 
noted that a consequence of the presence of soul in voice production is that the speaker’s will is 
what causes the process to begin, motivated by the imaginative power. Averroes adds to this the 
contention that, given the multiple functions of respiration, there needs to be a particular mode of 
breathing, just as a flute player needs to exhale in a specific way to produce a melody (207). For 
air to strike the windpipe in the specific way that leads to the production of voice “by a voluntary 
exhalation on the part of the imaginative soul which is in those bodily parts,” two powers of the 
soul need to act: imaginative and concupiscible (208). So, for Averroes, voice is not the result of 
the physical act of air striking the windpipe, but the result of the cognitive powers, without 
which, instead of voice, one would produce involuntary noise like, for instance, a cough. Again, 
Averroes separates here the cognitive aspects of sound from those where there seems to be an 
uncomfortable closeness to the materiality of the bodily organ. 
Averroes was very much a follower of inherited classical tradition in considering that the 
ultimate realization of an individual was to achieve full knowledge of the theoretical sciences, so 
for him, the union of the soul with the intellect was not an end in itself, but the means to reach 
the understanding of philosophy. This was important because it was the essence of the law: “The 
Sharî`ah specific to the philosophers. . . is the investigation of all beings, since the Creator is not 
worshipped by a worship more noble than the knowledge of those things that He produced which 
lead to the knowledge in truth of His essence. . .” (lxxvi). As will become apparent further ahead, 
the Siete Partidas echo this posture in many ways, which also shared common ground with the 
early Christian tradition, either in relation to the epistemological status of the law or its concrete 
aims, and the consequent authority to legislate knowledge. Averroes was extremely important for 
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Christian scholars because he had managed to reconcile the teachings of Aristotle with his 
religious views; however, many of his ideas led to problematic interpretations and deep divisions 
among Christian scholars.160 But he did not merely adjust to tradition in his treatment of the soul, 
the intellect and perception. In the case of Avicenna, for example, Averroes followed some of his 
teachings regarding the agent intellect, but he differed in many areas, like the function and 
organization of the inner senses, and his interpretation of the workings of the intellect in the De 
Anima. Although both Avicenna and Averroes were fierce Aristotelians, their interpretations of 
The Philosopher and their own additions to his work were considerably different. Christian 
scholars were heavily influenced by these two philosophers in their own study of Aristotle’s 
philosophy and they made their own attempts to reconcile them with Christian doctrine, to the 
point where we still refer to the philosophical schools of Averroism and Avicennism. 
 
Contemporary Debates 
The scholars who continued the study of perception and cognition during the thirteenth 
century centered mostly in developing the traditions surveyed previously.161 The decades of the 
thirteenth century when the Siete Partidas were produced were witness to some of the most 
important philosophical and theological debates of the Middle Ages, and Averroism was perhaps 
at the center of the controversies surrounding the recent translations of Aristotle’s works and the 
interest they generated in medieval universities. Many of the translations that made possible the 
renewed study of Aristotle and his commentators were produced in Toledo (Piché 911). The 
extent to which these works were studied in the Iberian Peninsula, unfortunately, exceeds the 
                                                          
160 See p.149. 
161 For an overview of the contemporary treatises, commentaries, and the scholars who authored 
them, see Burnett. 
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scope of this thesis. What is important to recognize is that the thirteenth century was marked by 
an intellectual growth made possible by the rising importance of universities and the increased 
availability of translations and commentaries. Scholars as important as Albertus Magnus, 
Thomas Aquinas, Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, Petrus Hispanus and Pietro D’Amato, 
among others, lived in this century and participated in the debates generated by the renewed 
study of non-Christian philosophers and commentators (Kemp 69). Aristotle’s psychology 
played a key role in theories about the workings of the rational soul and the nature of intellect. 
There were various interpretations of the tradition previously discussed when cognition was 
concerned, that is, after the inner senses had processed the products of perception; for instance, 
how the soul submitted them to intellective processes and where those processes took place. The 
Aristotelian divisions between the potential and active intellects were, as seen above, difficult to 
interpret and uncomfortably materialistic. The debates surrounding cognition reached their 
highest point with the Parisian condemnations of 1270 and 1277, many of which were the 
consequence of what were perceived as heterodox philosophical teachings in the University of 
Paris, related precisely to the study of the works of Aristotle and his commentators, especially 
Averroes (Piché 912). The decades that preceded the condemnations were marked by the 
increasing encroachment of philosophers into areas traditionally under the purview of 
theologians. This led to processes of censure where many philosophical inquiries were taken out 
of context and presented in ways in which they seemed to be assertions that openly contradicted 
the very pillars of Christian doctrine, like human freedom, immortality, the Holy Trinity, the 
creation of the world, and the omnipotence and omniscience of God (913-4). Even defenders of 
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the orthodoxy of the faith, like Thomas Aquinas, were subject to this one-sided examination of 
any theses that had some connection to theological matters.162  
These debates revolved more around the processes that were believed to occur after 
perception, but, as discussed above, the study of sound perception focused primarily on voice, 
and this involved cognitive processes related to meaning and the soul. Although the importance 
of these debates might have cast a shadow over the study of aspects of perception not considered 
as pertaining to cognition, they were still discussed and improved upon. One example of such 
advances is Robert Grosseteste’s short treatise on sound production, De Generatione 
Sonorum.163  Although most of the treatise revolves around the subject of voice production, the 
first section describes in fair detail the process of transmission of sound through a medium. This 
is very important because a common feature of the accounts surveyed previously is that they 
spend little time on this area, concentrating more on the production and perception stages. Both 
Plato and Aristotle were extremely vague when describing how sound traveled through the 
medium, and their commentators elaborated only in clarifying that there was no single block of 
air but that successive blocks struck each other. Grosseteste follows the main tenets of the 
Aristotelian account, but he also focuses on the mechanical movement of the parts of the 
medium, made possible by its elasticity, generating the expansion and compression that results in 
a wave, which can be perceived visually and by touch (Sparavigna 1). This detailed description 
allows him to differentiate types of sound according to the cause of the movement of the 
medium, concluding that voice is generated by an internal cause, namely breathing (2). The rest 
of the treatise focuses on phonetics, and it is remarkable in the sophisticated analysis of the 
                                                          
162 For the background and process that led to the condemnations see Piché. For the inclusion of 
Aquinas’ thesis and his position in regard to monopsychism see Upham. 
163 For a complete translation of this treatise see Sparavigna. 
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physics of voice production, which unfortunately also fall outside of the scope of this thesis. De 
Generatione Sonorum offers a glimpse into the advances in the study of physics and mechanics 
as well as the extent of the interests of the most important scholars of the age. There was an 
evident interest in reconciling the advancements made in scientific fields with psychological 
theories, and to reconcile those, in turn, with the theological tenets of Christian doctrine.   
From the tradition represented in this survey from Antiquity to the High Middle Ages, 
emerge the prevailing theories of cognitive psychology of the thirteenth century. The application 
of such models of human cognition has very important consequences for the understanding of 
auditory perception and cognitive processing, which in turn will impact the way the law 
conceptualizes and legislates the different aspects of human experience related to sound and 
hearing. Whether learning is merely recollection or it is a sequential process that requires access 
to the material intellect in order to pass from abstraction to understanding, in both cases we are 
faced with consecutive events within the cognitive process, which could potentially be 
interrupted, altered or influenced in order to avoid incorrect interpretations of the information 
obtained. Also, there is supposed to be no difference in the way different subjects perceive the 
same thing, and the assumption that, save for illness or physical damage of the sense organ, there 
is just one possible correct outcome in the perceptive process. The products of such a process are 
considered as unrelated to intellection unless they go through a complete series of subsequent 
cognitive processes. These theories concentrate rather on errors in the processing of what has 
been perceived. They also assume some kind of universal knowledge and blame equivocations 
on the inability of the subject to correctly tap into it. Although there is an awareness of the 
importance of previous experience in the functioning of cognitive processes, the simultaneity and 
actual interpolation of past experience that it is now known to underlie perceptive and cognitive 
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processes is not part of the way experience is conceptualized as learning. These assumptions lead 
to an emphasis on corrective or punitive actions that should lead the individual to reach the right 
conclusions, which will obviously be those that the law defines as such. For instance, in the case 
under study in this thesis, problems like auditory masking or other interruptions to sound 
perception, and the interpolation of information by the brain in attempting to correct them, would 
be perplexing for anyone holding a sequential understanding of perception and cognition. They 
would probably lead to very wrong conclusions like the notion that an individual is pretending 
not to understand something or rebelling against something he or she is assumed to understand. 
In the following pages, it will become apparent that this was indeed the case, and that in many 
instances the legislation interpreted a certain expected outcome as respect for the law and the 








































Et commo quier que yo nunca ley nin aprendi ninguna 
sçiençia, [por] que so mucho ançiano et guareçi en casa de 
muchos sennores, oy departir a muchos omnes sabios. Et 
bien cred que para los legos non ha tan buena escuela en el 
mundo cuemo criar se omne et beuir en casa de los 
sennores; ca y se ayuntan muchos buenos et muchos sabios, 
et el que ha sabor de aprender cosas por que vala mas, en 
ningun lugar non las puede mejor aprender. 
[And though I never read nor learned any science, given that 
I am so old and I lived in the households of many lords, I 
heard many wise men speak. And you can be certain that for 
laymen there is no better school in the world than to be 
raised and to dwell in the households of the lords; because 
therein come together many men of high birth and many 
sages, and him who delights in learning things to increase 
his own worth, cannot learn them better in any other place] 
(my trans.). 








The case study 
In order to support a theory of methexis as the engine of cultural production, and 
specifically literary cultural production, like the one developed so far, it is necessary to use a 
case study that encompasses as many aspects of it as possible. Although it would seem that the 
best way to test the theory would be to choose the earliest example available, such an option 
would be seriously hindered by the very limited availability of surviving texts and, as a 
consequence, a scarcity of studies and editions of them. A medieval example offers not only 
more extant sources, but also the advantage of having been produced at a time where the 
technology of writing is not yet fixated by projects of normalization and standardization. It also 
benefits from the absence of print culture, which makes it unfeasible to select a later example. 
The use of a case study that supersedes the advent of printing would bring new variables and 
reflect a more controlled and rigid book culture, lacking the fluidity of medieval written culture. 
There are other advantages particular to the Siete Partidas. The most important, perhaps, is that 
this legal code is one of the first completed and systematic written products of a new language: 
Castilian. This allows a survey of the choices made by those tasked with writing in that new 
language, which they had been using orally for many generations. In the present case study, the 
text expands as a consequence of auditory expectation. This presents a unique opportunity to 
evaluate auditory expectation in action, not only as created by a text but as creator of a text, and 
to explore the ways in which auditory expectation can be used as a strategy to establish the voice 
of authority and power. Auditory expectation emerges primarily as a sensory education that 
informs the legal code, which must adopt its consequences and incorporate them into the body of 
the law. At the same time, the new version of the law impacts the process of sensory education, 
modifying auditory expectation. While this feedback process unfolds, not only is the text 
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expanded, but also the space that the text creates and occupies; with this expansion comes an 
increase in the individual sensation of being part of said space, of there not being any other 
option but to belong to it or cease existing. This ‘sensation of being part of’ is, up to a certain 
extent, the result of a process of occupation of the physical space where the law fills the entire 
area of the jurisdiction, and this has a profound effect on the process of definition and 
positioning of the subject before the law. In the context of the Siete Partidas, auditory perception 
is essential to the relative positioning of the individual in relation to the voice of power and 
authority manifested in the law, and for the creation of what I conceive as a sensory state, 
frequently referred to as the “rule of law.” 
A text like the Siete Partidas is not simply a legal text. It contains a large amount of other 
types of texts that help enhance the authority of the code and, in the process, become invested by 
that same authority. In this kind of text the process described in the previous paragraph is taken 
to the limit, by incorporating the experience of methexis into a project that aims to define and 
regulate every aspect of the human experience. The study of the Partidas from this new 
perspective helps to illustrate with a specific case how literature, as a cultural product, did not 
evolve in a vacuum. It is the result of a long process of negotiation and codification of norms, 
based on the experience of perception, organizing discourse and making it intelligible. Most of 
these norms arise in the context of oratory, which requires intelligibility, as well as a structure 
that facilitates the memorization of discourse. All these norms evolved under the direct influence 
of auditory perception phenomena that are out of human control. It is the functionality of the 
human body that determines the feasibility of normative models, not the other way around. 
Human systems of communication reflect the ability to identify, discriminate, classify, and make 
maximum use of the physiological and anatomical characteristics of the vocal and auditory 
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systems. As individuals born in a culture of writing and recording, it is easy to forget that these 
systems emerged out of negotiations with realities that are not subject to change. Human beings 
do not dictate the rules of communication to their perceptive organs; these organs dictate their 
own rules and human beings have no choice but to obey them. Today, such attempts to restrict 
and regulate perception fall under negatively charged concepts, like fettering freedom of 
expression or obstructing free interpretation. This should give an idea of how unsuccessful were 
the attempts throughout history to force perceptive systems to adapt to notions of what 
communication ought to be as part of a particular conception of society. The very existence of 
critical and theoretical constructs is founded on the innate tendency to start interpreting at the 
same time that one starts perceiving. Even though, as true heirs to the enlightened elites that 
sought to monopolize knowledge and its interpretation, it seems almost impossible to conceive 
the preexistence of perceptual acts to the normalization of discourse, scientific knowledge has 
reached a point where it makes it imperative to start an inquiry into sensory perception as the 
driving force of culture. Within the many ways in which this is taking place, undertaking a study 
of the role of auditory perception in the rise of Castilian literature is the first step towards a 
valuable contribution in the field of Medieval Studies.  
It is important to keep in mind that the case study is not being proposed here as 
chronologically the first cultural product to present the specific features of a participative theory 
of cultural production. I am not arguing that this process starts with the Siete Partidas. The 
process of cultural production clearly has been ongoing since times immemorial, probably in 
every human group, and in the case of literature in every group that developed a written system. 
But it is necessary to wait for a fairly developed written culture and the rise of a new language 
for the case study to cover as much scenarios as possible. This is the advantage of the Siete 
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Partidas. Examples from different sections will be used to illustrate the theory in four areas. 
First, some of the ways in which discourses about sound and its perception are present in this 
legal code will be examined. Second, there will be a discussion about voice, because it was the 
sound that most attracted the interest of ancient and medieval scholars, and because the Partidas 
treat it extensively. Third, affect and the way it is manifested in the aural events that the code 
contemplates will be analyzed. Lastly, there will be an examination of the way in which sound 
and its perception, and especially voice, help to establish the concept of jurisdiction and how 
they facilitate the relative positioning of the subject within said jurisdiction and before the law.  
 
Aurality 
The Siete Partidas presents the theoretical approach that was discussed throughout this 
thesis, where perception and cognition are separate and sequential.164 A literal example appears 
in Partidas 2.21.20, where the legislation argues that in times of peace knights should devote 
their time to learn about military history “by means of their hearing and understanding.”165 This 
is opposed to the actual “science of arms,”166 which they should learn “by sight and 
experience.”167 Rodriguez-Velasco has argued that in this law “the legislator describes the 
hierarchy of its pedagogical or cultural products,” of which historical narratives occupy the first 
place; when they were read aloud, they were both interpreted and cast as something akin to a 
sacred text (“Theorizing” 80). Aside from this, however, the fact that these processes are 
                                                          
164 Unless otherwise indicated, all the textual quotations of the Partidas are taken from the 
English translation by Samuel Parsons Scott. All the quotes in Castilian come from the 1555 
edition by Gregorio Lopez. 
165 . . . por oyda por entendimiento. 
166 . . . fecho de armas . . . . 
167 . . . por vista o por prueba . . . . 
 
 159 
presented vis-à-vis vision and action, and divided in two discrete parts, hearing and 
understanding, instead of presented as a unified task, shows that these were conceptualized as 
independent and consecutive. Such division has a very important consequence: no matter how 
insistently the law attempts to impose specific parameters of interpretation on human 
communication, it cannot preserve it from the impact caused by the experiences and expectations 
of its subjects. Highlighting the distance between the medieval model of sound and its perception 
and current theories does not simply mean pointing to their differences. It means acknowledging 
that, although the available theories were not sufficient to account for such discrepancies, the 
practice of the law constantly made them present, and they did not go unnoticed. From the very 
beginning of the Partidas, the legislation points to communication as the central problem of the 
law, which makes it necessary to draft laws that all subjects can understand and to appoint 
specific persons who can clarify the meaning of the laws in cases of doubt (Partidas 1.1). Given 
that people tend to form different opinions, the law has to elucidate what is the correct 
interpretation of specific situations to avoid conflicts, grievances and violent reactions, or to 
correct and punish accordingly those who do not abide by what the law mandates. It is clear that 
the legal scholars tasked with writing the Partidas were aware of this reality and developed 
codification strategies to address it. Their evident knowledge of current theories of auditory 
perception is evidenced in their approach to the cultural production of the legal text. Therefore, 
the first step is to analyze the way in which these theories are present in the code. 
The most extensive treatment of perception appears in the Segunda Partida. It is not 
presented as a theory of perception, however, but as part of an all-encompassing analogy 
describing the body of the king and the way in which it relates to his subjects. It is a clear 
example of the thorough knowledge that Alfonso the Wise’s legal scholars had of the subject and 
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it shows that they were following specific traditions. The Aristotelian account from De Anima is 
immediately recognizable in the following example, the foreword to Partidas 2.12:168  
Aristotle, and other wise men declared, that the spirits which exist naturally in living 
things, are of three kinds. One they called fruitful, and this trees, plants, and all other 
products of the earth possess. Another they said was endowed with feeling, for this all 
things have that live, and naturally move, of themselves. The third they called gifted with 
reasoning power, which itself has understanding to learn and distinguish matters by the 
power of reason. The first two above mentioned, as well as the last, belong to man and to 
no other animal whatever. . . .169 
Although here the English translator uses the word spirit, the original uses the term “alma” both 
in this law and in others where it refers strictly to the Christian concept of soul.170  
The important fact is that the analogy using the three Aristotelian spirits or souls serves to 
illustrate the way in which the people, the king’s subjects, should relate to God, to the King, and 
to their country.171 The relationship between the people and their country corresponds to the 
                                                          
168 See pp. 120-1. Aristotle’s full account of the three kinds of soul appears in the second book of 
DA 2.2.412a1-416b31. 
169 Almas, de tres maneras, dixo Aristo(teles) e los otros sabios, que son naturalmente en las 
cosas que biven. E la una dellas llamaron criadera: e a tal como esta han los arboles, e las 
plantas, e todas las otras yerbas de la tierra. E a la segunda dixero(n) sentidora, e esta han todas 
las cosas que biven, e se mueven naturalmente por si mismas. E a la tercera llamaron alma 
razonable, que ha en si ente(n)dimie(n)to, para saber conoscer, las cosas, e departirlas co(n) 
razo(n). E las otras dos sobredichas, e esta de mas, ha(n) los omes tan solame(n)te e no(n) otra 
animalia alguna. 
170 For instance, in the Primera Partida, which pertains to Canon Law, the word “alma” is used 
throughout in the Christian sense. The problems with the translation of terms like anima, spiritus, 
and pneuma, were addressed previously. See p. 136, note 138. 
171 The term country is used here not in the modern sense of the nation-state, but in the general 
sense of homeland, which was the meaning of the word in the thirteenth century. See the OED 
entry, which records its first written use circa 1250-1300. 
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“fruitful” soul, which is Aristotle’s nutritive soul.172 This is the power of the soul that enables 
nourishment, growth, and procreation (Partidas 2.20). The people’s relationship with God 
compares to the attributes of the “spirit endowed with reason,” which is Aristotle’s intellectual 
soul, and which makes it possible to know God and all celestial things, as well as His creation 
(2.12.1).173 The relationship between the people and the King is represented in the ten senses of 
the spirit “endowed with feeling” (2.13). These are the Aristotelian inner and outer senses.174 
Partidas 2.13.2 is dedicated to hearing: 
Hearing is the second sense that the perceptive spirit possesses, which is mentioned in the 
third law before this, and it God placed especially in the ears. For, as the auditory sense, 
when it is healthy and unobstructed, hears sounds and voices at a distance, and is pleased 
with those that are joyful and agreeable, and dislikes such as are loud and terrifying; on 
the other hand, in the same manner, the people should praise, and desire to hear good 
spoken of the king, and endeavor by all means to add to it.175  
The use of this analogy shows that the knowledge of theories of auditory perception was not 
exclusive of the scholars who wrote the Partidas. The analogy would only be useful if there was 
a wider awareness of at least the main tenets of such theories among the potential readers of the 
law, so that the comparison would resonate also with the illiterate members of a given textual 
                                                          
172 See DA 2.2.412b25-31. The English translator refers to it as “creative soul” in Partidas 2.20. 
173 See DA 2.2.413b24-414a3. 
174 See pp. 139-40 and DA 2.8.416b32-432a14. 
175 Oyr es el segundo sentido de q(ue) fablamos en la tercera ley ante desta, que ha el alma 
sentidora: Es este puso Dios señaladame(n)te, de(n)tro en las orejas. Ca bie(n) assi como el oydo, 
qua(n)do es sano, e desembargado, oye los sones, e las bozes de lueñe, es se paga con los q(ue) 
son plaze(n)teros, e sabrosos, e aborresce los q(ue) son fuertes, e espantables: Otrosi, a semejante 
desto, deve el pueblo loar, e querer, oyr el bien q(ue) del Rey dixere(n), e trabajar se de lo 
acrescentar, lo mas q(ue) ellos puediere(n). 
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community, harnessing the methexic potential of textual cultural production.176 It is also an 
instance where it is more useful to make the law present in a way that appeals to all its subjects, 
instead of articulating it as legal theory. This is evident in the descriptions of the correct function 
of the ear using terms that evoke sensory experiences, like “terrifying,” and “loud,” and others 
which are unfortunately lost in the English translation.177 Such words bring forth for the listener 
concrete sensations that are transformed in the context of the law into collective participative 
experiences of the social body.  
Another instance of a theory of auditory perception appears in Partidas 1.10.18, in a 
passage from St. Augustine’s sermon 293.178 The legislator quotes it to illustrate need for 
                                                          
176 See p. 92 for a discussion of Brian Stock’s concept of textual community. 
177 The original also uses terms like “pleasurable,” and “delectable.” 
178 I was not able to find a complete English translation of the sermon. Although I will provide 
translations of selected paragraphs, I provide the full Spanish translation below for reference:  
“Juan era la voz; pero el Señor era la Palabra que existía ya al comienzo de las cosas. 
Juan era una voz pasajera, Cristo la Palabra eterna desde el principio.  
Suprime la palabra, y ¿qué es la voz? Donde falta la idea no hay más que un sonido. La 
voz sin la palabra entra en el oído, pero no llega al corazón.  
Observemos el desarrollo interior de nuestras ideas. Mientras reflexiono sobre lo que voy 
a decir, la palabra está dentro de mí; pero, si quiero hablar contigo, busco el modo de hacer llegar 
a tu corazón lo que ya está en el mío.  
Al buscar cómo hacerla llegar a ti, cómo introducir en tu corazón esta palabra interior 
mía, recurro a la voz y con su ayuda te hablo. El sonido de la voz conduce a tu espíritu la 
inteligencia de una idea mía, y cuando el sonido vocal te ha llevado a la comprensión de la idea, 
se desvanece y pasa, pero la idea que te transmitió permanece en ti sin haber dejado de estar en 
mí.  
Y una vez el sonido ha servido como puente a la palabra desde mi espíritu al tuyo, ¿no 
parece decirte: Es preciso que él crezca y que yo disminuya? Y una vez que ha cumplido su 
oficio y desaparece ¿no es como si te dijera: Mi alegría ahora rebasa todo límite? 
Apoderémonos de la palabra, hagámosla entrar en lo más íntimo de nuestro corazón, no dejemos 
que se esfume.  
¿Quieres ver cómo la voz pasa y la divinidad de la Palabra permanece? ¿Dónde está 
ahora el bautismo de Juan? Él cumplió su oficio y desapareció. Pero el bautismo de Cristo 
permanece. Todos creemos en Cristo y esperamos de él la salvación; esto es lo que dijo la voz.  
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devotion to make prayer meaningful, and more than an empty sound: “As the sound of a voice, 
which has no meaning is like the cry of a bird which does not understand what it says; so a 
prayer which is not made with devotion is like the roar of an ox when he bellows” (1.10.18).179  
This sermon does more than just use auditory perception as a metaphor; it presents a theory of 
auditory perception where the separation of perception and cognition is less radical and more 
problematic than in the Aristotelian account just analyzed. As previously discussed, most modern 
portrayals of medieval theories of sound and its perception take Aristotle as the starting point and 
main source of study (Burnett 43). But this passage from St. Augustine is representative of the 
other source surveyed, which starts with Plato and reaches the Middle Ages through Neoplatonic 
currents of thought.180 The Bishop of Hippo is one of the primordial Christian sources for this 
tradition. This does not mean that he crafted a specific account of perception and cognition, but 
rather that such accounts inform many of his writings.181 He also used auditory perception as a 
metaphor to illuminate concepts more in line with the Christian tradition of the spiritual senses 
(Carruthers 58, note 4). His reflections on the process also illustrate the concerns that auditory 
perception still presented for medieval scholars centuries later.  
                                                          
Y como es difícil discernir entre la Palabra y la voz, los hombres creyeron que Juan era 
Cristo. Tomaron a la voz por la palabra. Pero Juan se reconoció como la voz para no usurparle 
los derechos a la Palabra. Dijo: No soy el Mesías, ni Elías, ni el Profeta. Le preguntaron: ¿Qué 
dices de tu persona? Y él respondió: Yo soy la voz del que clama en el desierto: «Preparad el 
camino del Señor.» La voz del que clama en el desierto, la voz que rompe el silencio. Preparad 
el camino del Señor, como si dijera: «Soy la voz cuyo sonido no hace sino introducir la Palabra 
en el corazón; pero, si no le preparáis el camino, la Palabra no vendrá a donde yo quiero que ella 
entre»” (“Sermón 293” 129-31). 
179 . . . asi como el sueno de la boz, que non ha entendimiento, es como la boz del ave que non 
entie(n)de lo que dize, otrosi la oracion que non es fecha devotamente, tal es como boz del buey 
cuando brama. 
180 See pp. 131-145.  
181 Aside from the sermons, they are found in the Confessions and Introducción al catecumenado 
(De Catechizandis Rudibus).  
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The first question St. Augustine poses in the sermon is how an idea, converted into 
sound, can travel a physical distance to reach the listener, to once again be transformed into an 
idea and stored in memory: “In searching a way to make it reach you, to instill in your heart this 
inner word of mine, I resort to voice and aided by it I speak to you. The sound of voice carries to 
your spirit the intelligence of my idea, and when vocal sound has led you to understanding the 
idea, it fades away and passes, but the idea it conveyed remains in you without ever leaving me” 
(my trans.; 130). It is important to remember that the use of the heart as a metaphor for memory 
continued throughout the Middle Ages (Carruthers 59). Augustine shares the belief that an act of 
the will is necessary for communication to occur, lest the meaning carried by the words be lost: 
“if you do not prepare the way for it, the Word shall not come to the place where I want it to 
enter” (my trans.; 130). The act of the will is humility, a voluntary submission to authority when 
listening, which leads to obedience. This idea, which appears in other works of Augustine, is 
embodied in this sermon in John the Baptist.182 It is also an idea that the Partidas emphasize 
repeatedly, including several appearances of John the Baptist himself.183 Another concern shared 
in the Partidas is the link to memory, where justice remains:  
Justice is a firmly established virtue, as the ancient sages stated, which endures in the 
minds of all just men, and gives and equally apportions his rights to every individual. 
And, though men perish, nevertheless, justice itself never dies, but, on the other hand, 
                                                          
182 See also Confessions, pp. 27 and 50. 
183 For instance, in Partidas 1.4.17 the following depiction is offered in the context of the 
sacrament of penance: “St. John the Baptist possessed in himself exceeding sanctity, and for that 
reason our Lord Jesus Christ loved him so much that he said to him that he was the greatest of all  
who had been born of man and of woman; and he loved him so perfectly that he sent him as his 
messenger, to preach before his coming and to show men the way of salvation, preaching to them 
Penance and Baptism, for by its means they obtain the kingdom of God. . . .”  
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abides forever in the hearts of living persons who are just and good. (3.1.1)184 
The legislator echoes Augustine in ascribing the ability to keep justice in memory to “just and 
good” men, while remaining silent on what would happen to those who do not fall into this 
category. This silence evinces the influence of auditory expectation, manifested in the everyday 
reality of individuals who do not hear what the legal code mandates, but, rather, what they want 
to hear. The legislator, in keeping silent, does not go as far as denying that such individuals may 
keep in their memories a certain concept of justice, but merely emphasizes that it is not the 
correct concept, the one stipulated by law. Here, the distance between the theory and practice of 
auditory perception can be clearly appreciated. Absent a theory that can account for such 
behavior, it is concluded that individuals who behave thus are willingly disobedient.  
A second question in St. Augustine’s sermon is what happens to the voice that carries 
meaning once it is perceived by the ear; how can it be both in the speaker and the listener? The 
Bishop of Hippo does not go beyond the obscure statement that the voice fades away while the 
idea remains. The survey of the medical tradition previously presented showed that the 
Aristotelian account of perception, the one more widely used and developed, established the 
clear separation of the perceptive and cognitive processes, with the soul as the functional and 
organizing principle of the human body (Carruthers 60). The production of meaning and the 
interpretation of what is perceived did not necessarily have to take place, and when they did, they 
operated based on sensory images stored in the phantasia (62). St. Augustine seems to have this 
in mind when the sermon exhorts the listener to let the word “enter into the innermost recesses of 
                                                          
184 Raygada virtud es la Justicia, segun dixeron los sabios antiguos que dura siempre en las 
voluntades de los omes justos, e da e comparte a cada uno su derecho egualmente. E como quier 
que los omes mueren, pero ella, quanto en si, nunca desfallece ante finca siempre en los 
coraçones de los omes bivos, que son derechureros e buenos. 
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our heart” so that it will not vanish (my trans.; 130). But the word is, at the same time, the result 
of a rational process. This is the most perplexing aspect: if reason can only begin acting after 
perception, how can the word be in the heart of the listener instantaneously after being spoken?  
For St. Augustine, this leads to another problem, because “it is difficult to distinguish between 
the Word and the voice” (my trans.). Keeping in mind that both the Aristotelian and Platonic 
accounts focus on voice, and that this continued to be a matter of debate up until the Middle 
Ages, it is clear that this is what is at stake when the Partidas use the Augustinian sermon. Even 
though the law where the passage appears talks about prayer, it is unlikely that the quote was 
placed there without an awareness of what it implies. This is even more relevant taking into 
account the importance that interpretation has within the systematic organization of the Siete 
Partidas. Rodriguez-Velasco has underscored this in his characterization of this legal code as “a 
text capable of controlling its own interpretation,” from the moment of its elaboration, through 
its institutional use, to the moment it reaches its subjects (“Theorizing” 64).  
Indeed, Saint Augustine’s contention that the voice is fleeting and destined to fade so that 
the word may remain, allows the legal scholars in Alfonso’s service to do more than just a 
comparison exercise. A model that conceptualizes perception as independent from reason implies 
the possibility to intervene and alter the process of interpretation of what the ear perceives by 
means of strategies of literary cultural production. If there are sensory images stored and waiting 
to be submitted to a subsequent intellective process, then an attempt can be made to regulate that 
process by only allowing the circulation of messages that meet the criteria set by the statute. In 
spite of the systematic aims of the code, however, in reality most of its subjects belong to 
illiterate or semi-lettered groups within its jurisdiction. Their interactions with the letter of the 
law occur in overwhelmingly aural contexts, whenever selected passages are read aloud, quoted 
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or paraphrased during legal proceedings. As a consequence, their experience and understanding 
of the law vary depending on their auditory expectations and the particular circumstances of the 
perceptive event. In their case, lengthy theoretical elaborations, no matter how clear, logic, and 
systematic, may not only prove insufficient, but also confusing and detrimental. The problem 
compounds because some subjects obey and some do not, forcing the legislation to respond 
using either the threat of punishment to deter them, or new codification strategies to persuade or 
educate them. The following sections will look at some of the ways in which these two options 
are implemented in the three remaining areas of concern: voice, affect, and relative positioning. 
 
Voice 
In the survey of the different traditions regarding sound and its perception voice appeared 
as their main focus. The same occurs in the Partidas, as has already become apparent in the 
previous section. But in this case the centrality of the spoken word exceeds any theoretical 
considerations to become an overriding principle of power and authority. As such, it also poses 
intrinsic dangers that must be addressed and harnessed through strategies of literary cultural 
production, for the benefit of the legislation and to protect its subjects from its potential threat. 
The scholars responsible for writing this corpus were unambiguous in highlighting such dangers. 
In Partidas 2.4 the need for legislating speech is justified by the irrevocable character of 
enunciation: “for, after it issues from his mouth, man cannot cause it to be unsaid” (2.4.1).185 A 
few laws later, the warning is more urgent: “Great injury results to the king and to other men, 
when they utter wicked and villainous words, and such as are improper, because, after they are 
                                                          
185 Ca despues que sale de la boca, non puede ome fazer, que no(n) sea dicha. 
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spoken, they cannot be recalled” (2.4.5).186 Auditory perception is what causes the irreversibility 
of enunciation, aggravated by the fact that once sound is produced and starts propagating there is 
no way for it not to be heard; a sensory image will be formed using this aural material, and it will 
become part of the cumulative experience of the listener, thereby altering his auditory 
expectation. Despite all efforts to control it, sound propagates inexorably, and actual listeners do 
not abide by the theoretical model of perception. One of the ways in which the legislator 
attempts to solve this problem is by regulating the king’s utterances. This is another instance of 
an extended allegory of a body whose head is the king (2.1.1). As the head of the social body and 
God’s vicar, the king constitutes the model all subjects must follow (2.1.5). To be effective, this 
model must be replicated throughout the jurisdiction, and this is accomplished through the 
appointment of officials who are portrayed as the king’s “brain and members” (2.9.1). Different 
officials are compared to specific members of the king’s body (2.9.16-25). The adelantados, for 
example, are compared to the king’s hands (2.9.19). The messengers are classified according to 
their duties: those who transport letters are likened to the king’s feet, while those sent to observe 
and report are his eyes and ears (2.9.21). Others embody the king’s power of enunciation: “On 
this account Aristotle compared them to the king’s tongue, for the reason that, wherever he sends 
them they are required to say for him what he cannot say,” thus, they should be “ready in 
speech,” otherwise “they will not be able to explain what the king ordered them to say.”  
The most interesting case for the present discussion is that of a heterogeneous group of 
officials who are referred to as “voz de rey” [“the voice of the king”] (my trans.), something 
which is unfortunately lost in the English translation. The original uses this phrase consistently, 
                                                          
186 The ambiguity of this English translation is not present in the original: “Daño muy gra(n)de 
viene al rey e a los otros omes qua(n)do dixeren palabras malas e  villanas, e como no(n) deven, 
porq(ue) despues que fueran dichas no(n) las puede(n) tornar q(ue) dichas no(n) sean.”    
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while the English translation uses different phrases for each case. For instance, the “merinos 
mayores” [“chief merinos”], are said to act “in special cases in which the authority of the king is 
invoked,” which I would rather translate as “only in specific cases, known as the voice of the 
king” (2.9.23).187 Similarly, the officials sent to appoint “adalides” [“commanders”] do so “in the 
name of the king,” which should read “as the voice of the king” (2.22.3).188 The official who 
takes possession of the war booty from a city or castle in the king’s absence is said to be “there 
in his stead,” which more accurately would be “him who is the voice of the king” (2.26.19).189 
Partidas 2.36.33 describes what the king’s auctioneers should do regarding the sale of the spoils 
of war, which, being a public event, requires that the amounts offered and paid be communicated 
aloud to attendees, “crying the amount given for it. . . whatever is offered for them, they should 
state many times in a loud voice so that all may hear it.”190 In Partidas 7.10.4-5, specific 
penalties are prescribed for judges and tax collectors who violate the law while acting as “the 
voice of the king,” which is also changed in English to “the authority of the king.” Of special 
interest is the case of a specialized reader that the code presents under the title of “questor,” and 
who is in charge of reading aloud the “secret letters” sent to the king, as well as “laws recently 
made, before they are published” (4.18.10). This particular official is not included with the others 
just referred to in the Segunda Partida, but is instead mentioned in the Cuarta Partida as one of 
the court officials who, by virtue of his position, is no longer under the control of his father. The 
use of the Latin name points more to a remnant from Roman law than to an actual individual in 
the service of the king. Nonetheless, it is quite telling that Alfonso’s scholars felt the need to not 
                                                          
187 In the original: “si no(n) sobre cosas señaladas, a q(ue) llama(n) boz del Rey. . .”  
188 In the original: “en boz del Rey.”  
189 In the original: “en boz del Rey.”  
190 E aquello que ovieren prometido por ellas deven decir . . . a gra(n)des bozes quanto es 
aquello: de manera que todos lo oyan.    
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only mention him, but also to describe his task of reading the laws aloud before their publication, 
which is a clear step in a process of literary cultural production. It is necessary to hear how the 
laws sound before allowing them to be heard in the public space. This is another instance where 
the code betrays a constant anxiety regarding the irrevocable nature of auditory perception.191 
The voice of the king makes present the sound of power and authority; it is in charge of 
maintaining the social order through the administration of justice. Thus, the law must protect its 
integrity and regulate its diverse manifestations, either as actual, live speech, when the king or 
one of his representatives is physically present in judicial acts, or as dead voice, or potential 
utterance, in the documents emanating from the king’s court or its representative entities 
(Partidas 2.4; 3.18).192 In both cases, regulation implies a range of measures, from outlining the 
features of legitimate utterances, through specifying the body language that should accompany 
them, to silencing or destruction when the voice does not conform to legislated norms. The best 
place to start this analysis is the treatment of actual utterances. The Partidas present the statutes 
related to the regulation and protection of the king’s voice in terms of the effects caused by its 
                                                          
191 The promulgation of the law is so important that Saint Thomas Aquinas includes it in his 
definition of law (Treatise on Law, Question 90, Article 4). He considers the act of promulgation 
essential for the enactment of the law upon its subjects, so that it may have the force of law. 
Every subsequent repetition of the act of enunciation guarantees that the law will reach all those 
who were not present during its initial promulgation. This includes written law, which is and 
extension of the act of promulgation in time, and, I would add, also in space. For Aquinas, “the 
durability of written characters” makes it possible for the law to be continuously promulgated. 
He bases his conclusion on Saint Isidore’s Ethimologies (vol. 3; ii.10), which connect “lex” with 
“legere,” thereby showing that he is not referring to silent, individual reading of the law, but to 
its promulgation and subsequent transmission.   
192 Although the English translator uses “dead speech,” I follow Rodriguez-Velasco in using 
“dead voice” with all the connotations he outlines in his lectures “Dead Voice” and “Archiving 
Memory,” where he traces the beginning of the use of this term to refer to written transcriptions 
of oral statements into documents to be used as proof in legal proceedings, as well as the initial 
resistance of jurists to their use as substitutes of live voices. Rodriguez-Velasco argues that dead 
voice is made possible through the imposition of form, consisting on material specifications and 
fixed written structures. 
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resonance throughout the jurisdiction, conceptualized as the body of the king. These statutes go 
beyond actual sound, to construct a new sonority and auditory expectation. For instance, 
Partidas 2.5.4 frames the regulation of the king’s live utterances within the totality of his body 
language, which makes power and authority present to the senses. The title of this law gives a 
good idea of what this entails: “A King Should Perform His Actions With a Good Demeanor.”193 
The law covers a wide spectrum of everyday activities, like manners for eating and drinking; the 
speed and manner of his gait while walking; in which posture and how long he should be 
standing; what length of time he should be sitting in one attitude; and what he should mind when 
riding through a town on horseback, as not to linger too long, nor pass too fast. Included in these 
considerations is the way his speech should be uttered to accompany this body language:  
Moreover, he should take care to assume a good mien when he speaks, especially as 
regards his mouth, his head, and his hands, which are members that are constantly 
employed by men in conversation. He should also be careful rather to explain by words, 
than by gestures, what he desires to say. The ancient sages, who considered everything 
minutely, showed that kings should observe all this which we have mentioned. . . as men 
imitate their example in what they see them do.  
The utterances of the king are part both of a production of his presence and a performative view 
of power and authority, thus they are also cultural production. The balance between them and the 
gestures that complement them reflects the correct function of the social body. The order of the 
public sphere can be both maintained and altered by the clarity and completeness of his speech.  
Speech is such a fundamental aspect of the performance of the king’s power and 
authority that there is an entire title dedicated to the subject, which specifically addresses it as the 
                                                          
193 Que el Rey deve fazer sus fechos, en buen continente. 
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basis for enunciation, and highlights its ability to make present that which the king “wishes to 
say, and what is in his heart” (Partidas 2.4.1).194 To regulate enunciation, it is necessary to go 
beyond words and their meaning, into the different qualities of sound. Partidas 2.4.2 talks about 
loudness. In a very telling gesture, it returns to Aristotle to frame the issue, echoing again the 
awareness of a theory of sound and its perception: “On this subject Aristotle spoke to King 
Alexander, in the way of criticism, when he told him it is not becoming of a king to be a great 
talker, and that he should not utter what he had to say in a loud tone, except in a place where it 
was suitable:. . .”195 There is also the matter of speech quantity: “because the use of too many 
words makes him who utters them contemptible.”196 The lack of control over these two 
characteristics impacts the order of discourse: “loud tones, exceeding moderation, prevent him 
from speaking with elegance.”197 Intonation and pitch also need regulation: “a king should be 
careful to have his words uniform and harmonious.”198 It is important to remember that loudness 
and pitch are basic sound qualities that affect auditory processing, and together with speech 
quantity, they are related to the ability to interpret prosodic elements like inflection and 
rhythm.199 One of the means to control these sound properties is through the selection of 
appropriate vocabulary, avoiding “useless and foolish words, for they cause great injury to those 
who hear them, and still more to those who utter them.”200 This sentence underscores the 
                                                          
194 . . . muestra con ella aquello q(ue) dezir, e lo que contiene en el coraço(n). 
195 E sobre esta razon fablo Aristoteles al Rey Alexandre, como en manera de castigo, quando le 
dixo q(ue) non conviene al Rey de ser muy fablador, nin que dixesse a muy grandes bozes, lo 
que oviesse decir: fueras ende en logar: do co(n)veniesse. . . . 
196 . . . por quel uso de las muchas palabras, envilesce al q(ue) las dize. 
197 E otrosi las grandes bozes, saca(n)le de mesura fazie(n)dole, que no(n) fable apuesto. 
198 . . . por esto deve el Rey guardar, que sus palabras sean eguales, e en buen son.  
199 See Chapter 1, pp. 32-9, for pitch and loudness, and Chapter 2, pp. 66-87, for the importance 
of prosody in reward systems, neural plasticity and mirror systems. 
200 . . .palabras enatias e necias, . . . : ca estas tienen muy grand daño, a los que las oye(n) e muy 
mayor a los que las dize(n).  
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importance of the perception of the formal dimension as a reflection of the loftiness of discourse. 
This is a radically acoustic aspect of speech that encompasses pronunciation, articulation, syntax, 
semantics, and the overall prosodic flow of phrases and sentences. It is further supported in the 
law that follows, which cautions against uttering “words so rapidly, that those who hear them 
cannot understand them” (Partidas 2.4.3).201 The proper articulation of speech acts implies the 
control of the temporal dimension on account of its effects on the listener, for whom 
intelligibility is essential for accurate interpretation.202  
Poor enunciation has a double impact on the image of the king before society. On the one 
hand, listeners may attribute it to a lack of intellectual ability, eroding his power and authority. 
On the other, it sets a bad example that may hamper communication, cause misunderstandings, 
and even lead to chaos. In order to prevent such outcomes, and to preserve the king’s ability to 
rule, it is necessary to set preemptive norms that regulate speech acts before they become actual 
sound phenomena and cease to be under the control of the law. As seen above, after they become 
utterances, words cannot be unsaid. What is more, even when intelligibility is poor and the actual 
meaning of the words may be lost, other features of sound may still relay auditory information 
that, once perceived, will leave its trace in memory, increasing the chances of future replication 
by those exposed to it. The legislation needs to be proactive in its approach to utterances 
because, “ears do not have eyelids” (Listening 14). In their treatment of utterances, Alfonso’s 
scholars acknowledged the power of auditory stimuli to spread their effects, affecting both 
listeners and the speakers within the jurisdiction, defining “the king as a space and as a space in 
                                                          
201 . . . quando dixesse las palabras, ta(n) breves e tan apriessa, que las non pudiessen entender 
aquellos que las oyesen. 
202 In the science of speech perception, speed is one of the main determinants of speech 
intelligibility (Plomp 103). 
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which discourse resonates” (“Theorizing” 68).203 This regulation of the performative aspect of 
the king’s utterances is also a strategy of literary cultural production, insofar as it capitalizes on 
the potential for such performances to reiterate the norms that all subjects should later imitate. 
The strategies for the regulation of the voice of power and authority are not limited to the 
king. It was shown above how they extend to his officials insofar as they make him present 
throughout the jurisdiction. This extension also has a written manifestation that involves some of 
those officers and the development of specific strategies of literary cultural production. The 
replication of the king’s voice, both in utterance and in writing, is encompassed in the figure of 
the chancellor as mediator between the king and his subjects, and as the guardian of the royal 
secrets (Partidas 2.9.4). In his role as the first instance of replication of the king’s utterance, the 
chancellor is subject to the same regulations just reviewed. He must also have a good memory 
and be well versed in Latin and vernacular, so that all his communications, whether oral or 
written, conform to the aforementioned sound qualities (Partidas 3.20.4). Although the 
chancellor may delegate some functions to his subordinates, he is responsible for reviewing and 
correcting the oral and written communications that convey the sound of power and authority of 
the king. In fact, the very definition of chancellor rests on the need to erase all potentially 
problematic texts: “And if he finds a law which ought not to have been drawn up he must tear it, 
or deface it with his pen, which is called in Latin cancellare, and from this word the term 
chancery is derived” (2.9.4).204 This officer subsumes all the spectrum of preemptive literary 
cultural production strategies aimed at protecting the sound of the voice of power and authority, 
                                                          
203 This is also a manifestation of the “capilarization” of society proposed by Rodriguez-Velasco 
in “Dead Voice,” where he uses it to refer to the power of the legal persona authentica to 
produce and multiply the presence of authority in society. 
204 E si fallasse, q(ue) alguna y avia, q(ue) no(n) fuesse assi fecha, deve la ro(m)per o desatar, 
con la peñola, aq(ue) dize(n) en latin ca(n)cellare, e desta palabra tomo nome cha(n)celleria. 
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from guaranteeing its conformity to established norms to ensuring its destruction when its 
integrity and intelligibility are in danger. This matter is central to the concept of auditory 
expectation. I had argued earlier that, due to the nature of perceptual acts as simultaneous 
processes of feedback and interaction, auditory expectation can be both created and creative.205 
One of the ways in which this is manifested in the written documents that are under the purview 
of the chancellor is through the imposition of a particular form which results in what the 
legislation calls mortua voce, the dead voice we mentioned above:206 “we desire to speak here of 
all instruments in writing of every description whatsoever, from which evidence or verification 
may be obtained in court, which is another kind of testimony called dead speech” (3.18).207  
Partidas 3.18 outlines a comprehensive taxonomy of documents, including detailed 
descriptions of their material and rhetorical characteristics. 208 Legibility, for instance, is 
repeatedly mentioned in this title of the Tercera Partida as part of the criteria for determining the 
authenticity and authority of written documents.209  These documents, be they letters, privileges, 
                                                          
205 See p. 92. 
206 See note 182.   
207 . . . queremos aqui dezir, de todas las escrituras, de qual manera quier que sean, de que pueda 
nascer prueva, o averiguamiento en juyzio, q(ue) es otra manera de prueva aque llaman boz 
muerta. 
208 The use of letter samples is connected to the tradition known as the Ars Dictaminis, which 
were collections of letter models in Latin that started being compiled in the Middle Ages for the 
benefit of officials in Europeans courts and chanceries. These were in turn one of several kinds 
of corpuses with similar compilations based on classical rhetoric for different types of written 
compositions, which also included, among others, the Ars Notariae and Ars Poeticae. The 
Summa Totius Artiis Notarie de Passeggieri is perhaps the most comprehensive example of the 
Ars Notariae on which Partidas 3.18 was modeled (“Archiving Memory” 2). For the history and 
varieties of Ars Dictaminis, see Camargo.  
209 See Partidas 3.18.28 and 44, regarding the use of abbreviations and other alterations; 3.18.63, 
where the use of the physical act of tearing the letter signifies the settlement of a debt; 3.18.111, 
where accidental or deliberate alterations that make the document illegible invalidate letters and 
privileges; 3.18.114, where other physical damage to the document do not render it invalid as 
long as it is still legible; and 3.19.12, where legibility is one of the criteria to decide if a copy of a 
letter should be made. 
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registries, or any other type admissible, are repositories of the king’s voice, containing the 
potentiality of his sound and the auditory expectation it creates. Their destruction is the 
destruction of unauthorized voice, and it is equivalent to the prevention of speech acts in oral 
communications. When the document is torn, it is rendered illegible, thus eliminating any 
possibility of potential enunciations to be actualized in speech. Their destruction is needed to 
safeguard the integrity of the voice of the king throughout the jurisdiction, eliminating any 
possibility of unauthorized versions to become utterances and to be perceived by the ear. The 
ultimate goal of the codification of these acts of destruction and silencing is to prevent an 
exegesis of judicial proceedings by turning writing into something fixed and regulated.210 This 
regulatory strategy underscores the performative character of the administration of justice, which 
encompasses both the role of the king’s officials and the preparation of written documents, their 
functions similar to the one that McKenzie sees in theatrical texts, which “are perhaps best seen, 
not as fixed, determined artifacts in a specific medium, but as potential” (51). This is, in sum, 
another way of preventing the memorization of unauthorized voices through the deployment of 
literary cultural production strategies.  
The foregoing does not preclude the use of memory as part of the tactics to regulate 
voice, taking advantage precisely of the features of auditory perception that facilitate 
memorization in order to modify auditory expectation. Since repetition is the mother of learning, 
another cultural production method where practice supersedes theory is the repetitive use of 
written and oral formulae to affix the sound of power and authority in the memories of readers 
and listeners. In the case of writing, one instance are the dozens of models of letters outlined in 
                                                          
210 This process of codification corresponds to what Armando Petrucci has called “escripción” 
[“scription”] (my trans.), a way of turning writing into a kind of inscription (42).  
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Partidas 3.18. Aside from providing templates for letter writing, their use of repetitive formulae 
constitutes a form of sensory education that capitalizes on auditory expectation to disseminate 
the sound of the voice of power and authority. The more salient example is the sort of theme and 
variations on the formula “know all those who see this letter,”211 which appears initially in 
Partidas 3.18.4, and recurs in almost all the remaining letter models in this title.212 A notable 
subgroup of four letters call special attention because they use a variation of the formula with 
“know all those who see and hear.”213 They are: the “Letter of Agreement” (3.18.15);214 the 
letter with the mandate “for Watching the Ports” (3.18.17);215 the letter “to Assure the Safe 
Passage of Beasts” (3.18.19);216 and the letter “Evidencing a Donation Made by One Party to 
Another” (3.18.67).217 It is quite tempting, and beneficial for the present argument, to conclude 
that these four letters represent the explicit intention of the legislation for certain documents to 
be read aloud and not others. However, some of these models already appear in the Espéculo, 
considered to be an earlier stage in the writing of the Partidas, and the aforementioned variation 
of the formula appears in some letters that do not use it in the latter.218 For instance, in the 
Espéculo the formula “know all those who see and hear” appears in the “carta de vendida” 
[“letter of sale”] (my trans.; 4.12.25). There are ten different models of letters of sale in the 
Tercera Partida, and none of them uses that formula (3.18.56-65). Similarly, the letter of loan in 
                                                          
211 . . . que sepan los q(ue) aquella carta vieren. . . . 
212 As in other instances, here the English translation also obscures the repetition of the formulae 
by varying the terms used for what in the original is always the term “carta,” rendered 
alternatively as instrument, document, or letter.   
213 . . . sepa(n) los q(ue) esta carta viere(n), e oyeren. . . . 
214 Carta de avenencia. 
215 . . . para guardar los puertos. 
216 . . . porque anden los ganados seguros. 
217 . . . de la donacion que un ome faze a otro. 
218 See Alfonso the Wise, Opúsculos legales del rey don Alfonso el sabio: El Espéculo o espejo 
de todos los derechos. For a history of the stages in the writing of the Partidas see Craddock. 
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Espéculo 4.12.27 uses the formula, while none of the models in the Partidas uses it (3.18.70-71). 
What can be concluded from these letter templates is that their usefulness went beyond 
administrative convenience into a deliberate process of cultural production, and that they enabled 
the use of the power implicit in the public reading of documents to disseminate a particular mode 
of expression that made the voice of power and authority present in the context of judicial acts, 
creating auditory expectation. 
The particular mode of expression of the voice of power and authority does not depend 
only on the presence of formulae in written documents. It is also present in basic prosodic 
attributes, as previously mentioned.219 It was established above that the Partidas regulate sound 
qualities and prosody in the speech acts of the king. This also occurs in the case of dead voice, 
and written documents are expected to bear the aural marks that help the ear identify the voice of 
power and authority of the king, not only for the issuance of the law, but also for its 
authentication and interpretation. In Partidas 3.18.27, the king is the last instance for the 
resolution of conflicts arising from the interpretation of letters and privileges.220 Both kinds of 
documents, because they originate in the king’s court, should be interpreted “without malice and 
without fraud, as law” (Partidas 3.18.28).221 In order to replicate the presence of the king’s voice 
in his absence, it is necessary to replicate the auditory expectation that will guarantee his 
                                                          
219 See pp. 171-2. 
220 A privilege is both a specific type of law and the resulting document granting it, issued 
directly by the king: “A privilege means a law given or granted by the king especially to some 
place or to some man, as a matter of kindness and favor” [“Previlejo tanto quiere dezir como ley 
que es dada o otorgada del Rey apartadamente, a algun lugar: o algun ome para fazerle bien e 
merced”] (my trans.; Partidas 3.18.2). The rest of this law and the one that follows it describe in 
detail the formal structure that the text of the privilege should follow, as well as the materials that 
should be used in its elaboration.  
221 In the original it reads “sin escatima e sin punto, así como ley,” which literally means without 
having to consult the legal glossae or commentaries to interpret the law.  
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presence in the legal document. The document leaves always open the possibility of an oral 
performance, a potential enunciation, and therein lies the power of the auditory expectation it 
embodies. When the text is read aloud, quoted, paraphrased, or explained, this potentiality 
becomes actuality, and it leaves an impression in the listener. Thus, auditory expectation is 
inserted into this material manifestation of cultural production through the aural features that 
allow the recognition and classification of a style of expression, just as the stroke of a paintbrush 
allows the identification of the author of a painting and its authentication. Partidas 3.18 shows 
great concern for the regulation of the material and textual criteria to authenticate documents. 
Aside from being templates for letter writing, many of those models are also tools for the 
comparison and reiteration of the aural features that ensure such authenticity, and complement 
other features of their cultural production, like leaden seals and silken chords (Partidas 3.18.3).  
An example of such an aural feature in the Tercera Partida implies the appropriation of a 
rhetorical strategy that had heretofore been associated with the voice of spiritual power and 
authority, and its adjustment and incorporation into the auditory expectation of royal power. It is 
an adjustment because, while the voice of spiritual power in the Middle Ages speaks Latin, the 
voice of the king that appears in the Partidas speaks that revolutionary “castellano drecho” 
[“proper Castilian”] 222 that was already in use in Alfonso’s royal chancery (“Dead Voice” 4). 
Taking into account Alfonso’s imperial ambitions, it is easy to gather that there was an active 
exchange between his court and the Papal chancery.223 This is important because the Papal 
chancery was at the forefront of rhetorical and material innovations in the cultural production of 
legal documents, which would spread during the Middle Ages throughout all of Europe, in part 
                                                          
222 Rodríguez-Velasco’s translation. 
223 For Alfonso’s aspirations to become Holy Roman Emperor, see Doubleday, pp. 94-5.  
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via treatises for notaries and dictatores.224 These innovations greatly influenced the aural 
conception of authority in written documents emanating from European courts. An example of 
this influence is Partidas 3.18.44, where one of the rhetorical strategies that characterized the 
prosody of the written documents of the Papal chancery is presented as a marker of the 
authenticity of royal privileges: “We also decree that if said privilege does not coincide in form 
and terms with other privileges which this same king was in the habit of granting, it shall not be 
admitted.” Although this English translation still expresses the need for a specific style of 
writing, the most important part, which connects this law to the innovations of the Papal 
chancery, is lost. The original states: “Otrosí dezimos, q(ue) si el previllejo desacordasse del 
curso, e de la manera, en q(ue) costu(m)brava(n) a fazer los otros previllejos q(ue) solía dar 
aq(ue)l Rey mismo q(ue) non deve ser creydo”. The key word that does not make it to the 
English version is “curso.” Charles Faulhaber has argued compellingly that this passage proves 
that the cursus, which originated in the Papal chancery, had by this point already been adapted to 
be used in Castilian (76).225 Here, the cursus appears as part of a writing style characteristic of 
the privileges issued by a certain king, which refers back to the notion of auditory expectation as 
part of an oral and written mode of cultural production. The rhythmic patterns of the cursus can 
be identified visually and aurally, which makes them extremely useful as a tool for the evaluation 
of the authenticity of a document. In the case of privileges, the cursus is a stylistic marker of 
authenticity and authority expressed in terms of auditory expectation. Just as the style of a 
painting or a text allows one to recognize the work of an author and certify its authenticity, the 
                                                          
224 Regarding the history of the Papal chancery and the innovations implemented during the 
Middle Ages, see Poole. See also note 190 regarding the Ars Notariae and the Ars Dictaminis.  
225 Regarding the history and adaptation of the Latin cursus to Castilian, and the different 
accentual patterns that were used, see Verástegui, pp. 7-16. 
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author of privileges is the collective body of the chancery, and its mouth utters the authorized 
voice of the body of the king, which follows a series of recognizable rhythmic patterns.  
The extent to which the Partidas attempt to regulate the oral and written manifestations 
of the voice of the king underscores the importance of sound and its perception in the 
codification of the law. This comes back full circle to the initial argument of this chapter: there is 
a theoretical discourse of sound and its perception in the legal code, which needs to be reconciled 
with the actual auditory phenomena encountered in the everyday practice of the law. The 
analysis started with the Aristotelian discourse present in the Segunda Partida, and now the 
focus can shift to the way in which it is used as sensory education of another sort. In the quote 
from Partidas 2.13.2, the Aristotelian account of hearing is used as an allegory for the 
relationship between the king and his people.226 In Partidas 2.12, the relationship between the 
people and God had been compared to the operation of the rational soul. This establishes a 
separation where the relationship between the people and the king is merely perceptual, and has 
no intellective component, and therefore precludes subjects from interpreting the voice of power 
and authority.227 This theorization is in line with the general concern of preventing a 
hermeneutics of the law, evinced in Partidas 1.1:   
All that might be added to the word of the law or to the word of the king is a determinant 
to justice, because it causes not only imbalance, as both truth and law are just and equal, 
but also hermeneutic errors from which, according to the exegetic principles of tropology 
and anagogy, “nasçeria danno e grand blasmo en este mundo e en el otro dar les ya dios 
                                                          
226 See pp. 160-1. 
227 It should be noted that this does not necessarily correspond entirely to the account of 
Aristotle, for whom hearing was the dominant sense in the development of intellect, even if in 
general he followed tradition in privileging vision in the hierarchy of the external senses (see 
Gouk 139).  
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pena” (great injury and harm will come to this world and in the next, God will punish 
them) [1.1]. The words are air and have a dangerous quality. . . . (“Theorizing” 69)  
This danger, as previously discussed, lies in the inexorable character of enunciation, in its ability 
to remain even when its source is no longer present, as Nancy has pointed out: “The visual 
persists until its disappearance; the sonorous appears and fades away into its permanence” 
(Listening 2). Sound perception, in addition, entails the potential of being shared and replicated 
in speech, becoming methexis in the propagation not only of a message, but also of the aural 
qualities of its enunciation.228 In fact, all of the literary cultural production strategies for the 
regulation of voice that have been surveyed are methexic to different degrees and to different 
extents, and not all those who participate in them do so knowingly or even willingly. As a 
consequence, the law needs to impose limits and define roles for them. 
The first six laws of Partidas 2.13 reaffirm the methexic nature of perception and also its 
radical separation from intellection. It was previously shown that the second law of this title 
refers to the ear’s healthy function using language that evokes reactions to sensory 
experiences.229 These reactions allow the participation of the people in the exercise of the law, 
but only insofar as they are adequate according to the law. They also exemplify the way in which 
the people should react when they hear anything said about the king, depending on if it is 
positive or negative. They are instinctive responses that make unnecessary any further reflection 
on the nature of such messages. The law that treats the sense of taste presents the tongue as part 
of the act of enunciation; hence, the people should use it to spread the good name of the king:  
                                                          
228 In this sense, it corresponds to Nancy’s insight regarding the difference between visual and 
auditory perception: “the visual is tendentially mimetic, and the sonorous tendentially methexic 
(that is, having to do with participation, sharing, or contagion)” (Listening 10).  
229 See p. 161. 
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For as taste distinguishes sweet things from those that are bitter, is gratified with such as 
are savory, and detests others, and as the tongue is the experimenter, and the intermediary 
between all these things; the people should likewise be acquainted with the good 
reputation of their lord, and speak of it with their tongues, and cherish it: and words 
which are spoken to defame him should not be uttered by them, or preserved in any way, 
and they should be seldom repeated or remembered. (2.13.4)230 
This is another example of the use of sensory images that evoke physical reactions to stimuli in 
order to establish adequate responses to aural messages. Here, however, these reactions include 
potential utterances, which need to be limited and precluded from possible interpretation. Central 
to this need is a term that appears twice in the original but is translated in ways that evince a lack 
of awareness of its meaning, which points directly to the subject of voice. The word “retraer” 
means to orally narrate, and in the Partidas it is used regarding past events, whether historical or 
exemplary. 231 There is a complete law, 2.9.30, which establishes the correct context, structure 
and moment for such narratives to be orally performed. It is replaced in the English translation 
with the terms “cherish” and “preserved.” Rodriguez-Velasco has argued that “we could 
understand the act of retraer as a way to regulate not agreement between words and events, but 
rather between words and their hermeneutic problems” (“Theorizing” 70). The act of narrating 
                                                          
230 Ca assi como el gustar, departe las cosas dulces de las amargas, e pagase de las que bien 
saben e aborece las otras, e la lengua es provadora e medianera, de todas cosas. Otrosi a 
semejante desto, debe al pueblo fazer bien la buena fama, de su Señor, e dezirla con las lenguas, 
e retraerla. E las palabras que fuessen a enfamamiento del, non las querer decir nin retraer en 
ninguna manera. 
231 The English translator completely misses the meaning of “retraer” in his rendering of this law, 
where he chooses the terms “ridicule” and “jest.” I follow here Rodríguez-Velasco’s translation 
of “retraer” as “to narrate” (“Theorizing” 70). 
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implies a double danger. To narrate is to listen to oneself narrating, and thus not only replicate 
voice for others to hear it, but to reinforce its presence in one’s own memory. 232 
In both instances of Partidas 2.13.4, what is at stake is the ability to encourage the 
dissemination of desirable messages while dissuading from doing the same with unauthorized 
ones. But instead of engaging in a theoretical explanation, the law again takes recourse to words 
that make present the act of articulation, “speak of it with their tongues,” and the sensations that 
speakers and listeners feel according to the suitability of the words, “sweet” versus “bitter.” 
Furthermore, it is not enough to prevent the words from being pronounced, it is also necessary to 
avoid the temptation of remembering them, an act that is directly related to auditory expectation 
and its effect on memory. This same approach continues in the law that follows, where 
articulation is further restricted by ascribing to the tongue of the people a legislated function:  
God not only gave man his tongue for the purpose of taste, but also for speech, and to 
display his reasoning power by its means. And, just as he bestowed upon him the sense of 
taste, in order that he might distinguish things which are palatable from others which are 
not so; in like manner he gave him taste in words, to enable him to make a distinction 
between falsehood which is bitter, and which nature, when normal and loyal, detests, and 
truth, with which the understanding of a good man is delighted, and derives great 
pleasure from. For this reason, the people in like manner, as wise men have said, should 
always speak true words to the king, and avoid lying to him openly. . . . (2.13.5)233  
                                                          
232 See Nancy, p. 8, regarding the self-referential character of sound, and the sounding body that 
is simultaneously the source and the receiver of its resonance, which the French philosopher 
frames within Aristotelian aisthesis as a “feeling-oneself-feel.”  
233 La lengua non la puso Dios ta(n) solamente al ome para gustar, mas aun para fablar, e mostrar 
su razon con ella. E bien assi, como le dio sentido en el gusto para departir las cosas sabrosas de 
las otras que lo non son. Otrosi gelo dio, en las palabras, para fazer departimiento, entre la 
mentira, que es amarga, que aboresce la natura, que es sana e complida de lealtad, e entre la 
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Authorized responses continue to be instinctive, even though the tongue is supposed to show a 
person’s power to reason. This power, however, is limited to separating truth from falsehood 
when listening to voice, and, if used well, will lead to immediate gratification, presented in terms 
that specifically evoke the kinds of rewards the brain gives during purely sensory experiences: 
delight and pleasure. The mere idea of dwelling into falsehood evokes bitterness, assigning an 
immediate aversive response that also precludes reasoning. Both reactions appeal to basic 
participatory functions of the brain, whose somatic manifestations are familiar, causing the 
listener or reader to have an expectation based on previous experience. It is clear that this 
strategy comes from a framework that considers it is actually possible to enact a separation 
between perception and intellection, and to attempt to limit the latter if it cannot be avoided.  
The legal context in which this approach can be seen in action is when judicial acts 
necessitate actual human interactions and oral performances to be valid, which is the case of 
betrothals, marriages and contracts. In the case of marriages, the law also takes recourse to the 
use of formulaic dialogue that must be repeated aloud by the parties. Partidas 4.1.2 lists six types 
of betrothals, and for each one there is a formula preceded by a variation of the phrase “as if 
saying,”234 which are variously translated in the present tense, losing the connotation of 
possibility of the imperfect subjunctive in the original. This is important because five of the six 
types of betrothals are celebrated “related to the future,”235 and thus the subjunctive shows that 
there is an agreement to formalize the union at a future date. In fact, some examples of formulae 
are given to illustrate when the oral performance ends in actual marriage and when it only ends 
                                                          
verdad, de que se paga el entendimiento, del ome bueno, e a grand sabor con ella. E porende el 
pueblo a semejante desto dixeron los sabios deve siempre dezir palabras verdaderas al Rey , e 
guardarse de mentir, le llanamente:. . .  
234 . . . como si dixesse. . . . 
235 . . . que muestra el tiempo que es por venir.  
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in betrothal (4.1.3-4). Some of them sound very familiar to the modern ear: “where a man says: 
‘I take you for my wife;’ and she replies: ‘I take you for my husband;’ or other words similar to 
these. . .” (4.1.2).236 The law allows the use of words similar to the given formula, which are still 
valid, a clear consequence of delving into the quicksand of orality. As a cultural production 
strategy, the oral performance of marriage is framed as a return to the origins that justifies the 
imposition of codified formulae: 237 “The words by which marriage was contracted are the 
following which Adam said when he saw Eve his wife. . . namely, that her bones and flesh were 
his, and that they should both be one flesh” (4.2.4).238 In such cases, interestingly enough, those 
who are deaf or mute may still consent through gestures, because marriage is valid upon consent, 
whereas in the case of promises the deaf and mute are excluded, because they are unable to ask 
further questions regarding the obligation (4.2.5; cf. 5.11.2).  
The phrase “as if saying” reappears in the context of contracts, where the presence of 
voice alongside writing leads to a quite unstable dynamic, more prone to conflict. The case of 
promises is remarkable in the amount of times the phrase is repeated (Partidas 5.11.3, 7, 10, 11, 
15-17, 21, 23, 24, 26 and 27), and several times accompanied by the notice that similar words 
can be used (5.11.3, 11, 21, 24 and 27). These oral exchanges must be carefully regulated to 
prevent the entrance of elements foreign to the law, absent a written record to consult after the 
agreement is closed. This is especially important when the contracts are performed in front of 
others, since those are ideal circumstances to deploy the pedagogic strategy of repeating the 
legislated voice. This is the case in Partidas 5.11.2, where, given the purely oral nature of 
                                                          
236 . . . como qua(n)do dize el ome: yo te rescibo por mi muger: e ella dize: yo the rescibo por mi 
marido, o otras palabras semeja(n)tes destas: . . . 
237 Genesis 2:23. 
238 E las palabras por que se fizo el casamiento, son aquellas que dixo Adam quando vio a eva su 
muger: . . . que los huessos, e la carne della que fueran del. E que serian ambos como una carne.  
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promises, irrelevant words and nonverbal expressions must be excluded from authorized verbal 
exchanges. The legislator explains that this type of transaction implies “question and answer. . . 
verbally and with an understanding of the obligation, and when this is done no other words 
should be spoken. When one party asks the question the other should answer whether he gives 
his consent or not.”239 The legislation even provides examples of the kinds answers that obligate 
the parties, and clarifies that silence should always be interpreted as denial of consent. The 
effectiveness of this strategy lies mainly in the repetition of formulae, revealing in the process 
the difference already underscored, between the legislation and the actual workings of 
perception. The focus is always on the listener, while the speaker is secondary. Thus, promises 
may be performed even if the parties do not speak the same language, or only understand each 
other partially.  It is sufficient if “they both understand the question and the answer,”240 or if they 
do it “through an interpreter” (5.11.1).241 In the second case, the power of words is based on a 
legal fiction:242 if there is an interpreter present, the promise is equally valid “just as if those who 
made the contract understood one another.”243 All the foregoing examples display the use of the 
repetition of formulae, whether oral or written, in different contexts of the legislation, and they 
show the desire of the scholars involved in the literary cultural production of this legal code to 
take full advantage precisely of those features of auditory expectation and the perception of the 
voice that threaten the stability of the legislation, and which arise in the daily practice of the law.  
                                                          
239 Pregunta e respuesta. . . por palabras, en co(n) ente(n)dimie(n)to de se obligar. E qua(n) esto 
fiziere(n) no(n) deve(n) entremeter otras palabras. Mas qua(n)do la una parte pregu(n)tare, deve 
respo(n)der la otra, si le plaze, o si no(n). 
240 . . . q(ue) se entie(n)da el uno al otro, sobre la pregunta, e respuesta. 
241 . . . Por algu(n)a trujamania, . . . 
242 The legal fiction I am referring to is the fictio legis of Roman law, the use of which 
experienced a revival and expansion in the thirteenth century. For more on its origins and 
medieval use see Plebeyos márgenes, pp. 29-47. 




“Seneca, the philosopher, who was born at Cordova, said that it is not becoming to a man 
to mention publicly everything which it is improper to do. It is also said that bad words corrupt 
good manners: for which reason we declare that every kind of speaking of the character above 
mentioned, is intemperate” (Partidas 2.4.2).244 In his commentary to De Anima, Saint Thomas 
Aquinas mentions that for Aristotle temperance was related to the sense of touch (261). This is a 
subject he treated in the third book of the Ethics, where he argues that if taste is seen as the 
ability to discriminate flavors, there is no problem with temperance, and this only arises if one 
sees taste as something that “distinguishes tangible qualities” (260). As seen previously, 
according to Aristotle, touch is the only sense common to all animals.245 The idea that “hearing 
is a specialized form of touch”246 is implied in most the accounts of sound propagation and 
perception surveyed in the previous chapter, including both Plato’s and Aristotle’s. They 
describe these phenomena in terms of contact between surfaces, which include bodily surfaces 
like the eardrum and the ear canal. The same connection has been recently shown to go deeper, 
to areas of the brain that are shared by the auditory and somatosensory systems; there are many 
interactions where one of these systems generates a reaction in the other (Ro et al. 1724). It is no 
wonder then that, over the centuries, intemperance has been linked to sound with as much 
emphasis as to other sensory modalities. It is enough to remember the rueful acknowledgement 
of St. Augustine that he had also fallen prey to auditory temptations: “The pleasures of hearing 
                                                          
244 E sobre esto dixo Seneca el filosopho, q(ue) fue de cordova, que toda cosa q(ue) es fea de 
fazer, non esta a ome bien, de la dezir paladinamente. E aun dixeron, mas que las malas palabras 
afuella(n) las buenas costu(m)bres, por que dezimos, que toda manera de fablar, que fuesse de 
alguna destas sobredichas, seria sobejana. 
245 See p. 121. 
246 This phrase was made famous by deaf percussionist Evelyn Glennie in her “Hearing Essay.” 
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had held me in tighter bonds and had imposed their yoke upon me” (Confessions 306). The perils 
that Seneca cautioned against come from the fact that voice has an effect on others that goes 
beyond being perceived and remembered. Sound in general shares this characteristic: it causes 
emotional reactions, which may include pleasure or aversion, thus impacting brain reward 
systems and even causing plastic changes. Sound also has the power to evoke sensations from 
past events, many times making one feel as if one is living someone else’s experiences, like the 
sensation of shivers and the appearance of goosebumps after hearing someone scream in 
agonizing pain. These reactions are consistent with mirror-like mechanisms, which, together with 
reward and plasticity, are of a methexic nature. Such experiences have been shared across 
centuries and human groups, driving the search for ways to explain them and to harness their 
power, leaving their particular imprint in the way human beings produce culture.  Because 
pleasure and emotion are deeply intertwined, and they can both cause and be caused by each 
other, sound and its perception have a very important affective component, and the scholars that 
worked in the literary cultural production of the Partidas were keenly aware of its importance.  
One way the legislation answers the problem of affective responses to auditory stimuli 
consists in changing codification strategies. More than imposing a specific interpretation, the law 
seeks to make the voice of power and authority present in concrete actions, in order to elicit 
responses that are in line with the communication standards established by the legislation. In this 
case, the change begins with another return to origins that illustrates the practical imperative of 
the legislation. The ways in which the legislation regulates the utterances of the king in Partidas 
2.4 were examined earlier.247 This title provides a definition of speech and its virtues, where 
theory seems insufficient for the law, which resorts to exemplary narrative by framing the 
                                                          
247 See pp. 167 and 173-4. 
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explanation as advice that Aristotle is giving to Alexander the Great (2.4.2). This recourse to 
exemplary narrative is a form of return to origins that presents regulations as the result of 
cumulative experience manifested in the wisdom of the ancients and in popular tradition. Sound 
perception underlies this wisdom. In this title, as previously discussed, the warning against 
uttering too many words is related to the problem of intelligibility of speech and its dependence 
on the temporal aspect of enunciation (Plomp 103).248 Although the science regarding the 
perception of speech is fairly new, its daily occurrence is not, and the legislation relies on 
centuries of accumulated experience that have led to the conclusion that the faster someone 
speaks, the harder it is to understand them. This is corroborated in Partidas 2.4.3, which 
approaches the problem in terms of speed: “when a person utters such words so rapidly, that 
those who hear them cannot understand them.”249 It is quite telling that the law appeals to this 
kind of empirical knowledge, given that it could have invoked the copious and venerable 
grammatical and rhetorical traditions, which also rested on ancient authority. This evinces the 
need for codification strategies that can reach as many subjects as possible within the 
jurisdiction, and it entails writing the law in ways that facilitate its repetition and dissemination 
by word of mouth. 
Another form of return to origins in the Partidas is the use of the concept of concord as a 
means to justify the existence of the legal code. On the one hand, it explains the origins of the 
law as a consequence of the very nature of human relations. On the other hand, it presents the 
code as the indispensable means to reconcile custom and written legislation, the two pillars that 
sustain common law. The groundbreaking character of the Partidas as a legal code made this 
                                                          
248 See p. 172. 
249 . . . quando dixesse las palabras, ta(n) breves e tan apriessa, que las non pudiessen entender 
aquellos que las oyessen. 
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double legitimation even more urgent. Concord is the requisite sine qua non for a stable and 
prosperous society, and the new law is its guardian: “Concord is a virtue similar to friendship, 
which sages and great lords who made the books of the law favored bringing about, so that men 
may live together in unity” (4.27.1).250 It is different from friendship, love and benevolence, 
which represent different levels of affective dynamics. Friendship appears at the beginning of 
this title as a virtue which Aristotle considered good and useful, and which “arises when one 
person who loves another is beloved by him for, under other circumstances, true friendship could 
not exist.”251 Love, contrariwise, does not require mutuality: “A man can love an object and 
receive no affection in return, as happens with lovers, who are sometimes enamored of women 
who dislike them. For this reason wise men have said that love conquers all things, for it not only 
causes a man to become attached to those who love him, but also to those who hate him.”252 
These are striking statements in the context of a legal code. While emphasizing the virtues of 
concord is clearly relevant for evaluating the usefulness of legislation, delving into deeply 
subjective manifestations of affect like love and friendship seems to exceed the scope of what the 
law should ponder. The discussion, however, continues: “Moreover, men love precious stones 
and other things which have neither souls nor understanding to love those who love them. Thus it 
                                                          
250 E concordia es una virtud que es semejante ala amistad. E desta se trabajaron los sabios, e los 
grandes señores, que fizieron los libros delas leyes, porque los omes biviessen acordadamente. 
251 . . . e ha logar propiamente, quando aquel que ama, es amado del otro aquien ama. ca de otra 
guisa non seria verdadera amistad. . . . 
252 E puede ome aver amor ala cosa, e non avra amistad a ella: assi como aviene alos 
enamorados, que aman a las vegadas a las mugeres, que les quiere(n) mal. E por ende dixeron los 
sabios, que amor vence todas las cosas, ca non tan solamente faze amar al ome alas quel aman, 
mas aun alas que le desaman. 
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is evident that friendship and love are not one and the same thing, because love can proceed from 
one side only, but it is proper, under all circumstances, for friendship to exist on both sides.”253  
Notwithstanding the purely political implications that terms like love and friendship had 
in the medieval context, what is happening in this title of the Cuarta Partida is different.254 The 
discussion is of a general and deeply affective tone. It describes human connections and 
passions, and it establishes important differences in regard to levels of interaction or lack thereof. 
It also references the connection between the soul and affective relations, establishing a need for 
reason only in those which require mutuality. Love, conversely, is linked to purely sensory and 
irrational connections like romantic entanglements and material yearning. Benevolence appears 
as an alternative to friendship and love, because it appeals to the loftiest of virtues: 
Benevolence is, properly speaking, the good will which springs up in a man’s heart, when 
he hears some excellent quality attributed to a certain person, or to something which he 
does not see, or with which he has no other connection; he experiencing [sic] particular 
fondness for the party on account of the goodness he is said to possess, and not knowing 
him to whom he wishes well. (Partidas 4.27.1)255   
It is interesting to see the use of the vision/hearing binary to illustrate the affective level that 
separates benevolence from the other forms of interaction considered in this title. It is also a 
                                                          
253 E otrosi han amor los omes alas piedras preciosas, e alas otras cosas, que non han almas, nin 
entendimiento para amar a aquellos que las aman. E assi se prueva que non es una cosa amistad e 
amor: porque amor puede venir de una parte tan solamente: mas la amistad conviene en todas 
guisas que ve(n)ga de amos ados. 
254 Regarding the concepts of love and friendship and their different uses in the Middle Ages, see 
Oschema. For the specific case of the Iberian Peninsula see Liuzzo Scorpo, especially the section 
about Alfonso X. 
255 E bien querencia, es propiamente buena voluntad, que nasce enel coraçon del ome, luego que 
oye dezir alguna bondad de ome, o de otra cosa que non vee, o con quien el non ha otro 
afazimiento queriendol bien señaladamente por aquella bondad que oyedel, nolo sabiendo aquel 
quien quiere bien. 
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good example of the power of spoken words to evoke strong emotions and of how the legislation 
harnesses that power in order to establish a continuum of affect, both ends of which are affective 
states where no actual human interaction is needed. On one end is love, which can be non-
reciprocated or directed towards inanimate objects, while on the other end is benevolence, which 
does not require the presence of a person for one to experience a strong emotional response to 
their assumed qualities. In the middle are friendship and concord; while the former constitutes a 
reciprocal, rational form of love, the latter only requires simple mutuality manifested in peaceful 
coexistence, without love or friendship present. Thus, concord as a virtue is the more realistic 
alternative in front of the precarious reality of human relations, as it has the lowest affective 
component of the four. This allows the law to distinguish between idealistic forms of human 
interactions, which the law has very little power to regulate, from the one form that the law not 
only regulates, but also realizes through its daily practice. Concord is contrasted to love as the 
rational is to the irrational, and this is done at the end of the Partida that legislates marriage and 
family matters, the area of social life where affect is more visible and potentially destabilizing. 
The Primera Partida already seeks to justify the writing of the legislation as the only 
weapon that allows the king to maintain justice and peace throughout the jurisdiction. Partidas 
1.1.2 develops this idea further in the context of the ius naturale and the ius gentium. While the 
first is something that all animals, including men, naturally have, the second “was established by 
reason as well as by force, because men could not live properly with one another, in concord and 
in peace, if all did not observe it.”256 This is another form of return to origins which establishes 
an immemorial genesis of the law that is parallel with the genesis of living beings. In the case of 
                                                          
256 E este fue hallado con razon, e otrosi por fuerça, porque los omes non podrian bien bivir 
entresi en concordia, e en paz si todos non usassen del. 
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humans, additional regulation is the necessary answer to the permanent threat that affect presents 
to social stability. In the practice of the law, such response function is actualized in the resolution 
of conflicts through agreement: “Peace is the end of the hatred and strife which exist between 
those who make it. . . the discord and malevolence which men cherish against one another arise 
from three things. . . either from homicide, injury, or dishonor which they commit, or on account 
of evil speech which they utter. . .” (7.12.4).257 Voice takes center stage again, and as a category 
of its own. Extreme affective reactions are underscored as well: strife, hatred, discord, 
malevolence. In response to them, the law establishes two manifest actions that must be part of 
the judicial act of reconciliation: the individuals involved must forgive each other verbally and 
kiss. After this performative stage, the restoration of concord is further affirmed in a written 
record of the event, an “instrument of peace,”258 which is also a beautiful example of literary 
cultural production of letter models reviewed earlier:  
Know all persons who see this instrument, that Don Diego Alfonso, for himself, and for 
So-and-So, and So-and-So, of the first part; and Don Ramir Ruiz for himself, and for So-
and-So and So-and-So of the second part; have mutually agreed to keep peace with one 
another perpetually with regard to the disagreements, disputes, grudges, and insults, of 
which they have been guilty toward one another in word and deed, up to the day and ear 
of this instrument, and especially with reference to the ill feeling growing out of such-
and-such a homicide. And as a mark of the true love and concord which should be 
preserved between them, they kissed each other before me, notary public, and the 
                                                          
257 Paz, es fin, e acabamiento de la discordia, e del desamor que era entre aquellos que la fazen. . 
. . el desacuerdo, e la mal querencia q(ue) los omes ha(n) entresi nasce de tres cosas. Por 
omezillo, o por daño, o por deshonrra que se fazen, o por malas palabras que se dizen los unos a 
los otros.  
258 . . . carta de la paz. . .  
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witnesses whose names are subscribed to this instrument, and promised and agreed with 
one another that this peace and concord should forever remain secure. . . . (3.18.82)259  
The letter actualizes written legislation. It corroborates its effectiveness for posterity as part of an 
archive, while at the same time it guarantees the preservation of peace and concord in the 
present. And because it is presented as inscribed into the ancestral practice of the law, as the 
actualization of natural and common law, it appeals to tradition and custom. 
This chapter began with an analysis of the way Partidas 2.21.20 presents the education of 
knights through hearing, especially historical narratives, as an activity proper for them in times 
of peace.260 There was also discussion regarding the way the law regulates the production, 
content, and performance of such narratives (2.9.30).261 This sensory education through the 
reading or relating aloud of histories and stories is specifically intended to generate an affective 
response in order to achieve its pedagogical aim: “This was done in order that, hearing them, 
their minds and hearts might be enlarged and strengthened by the performance of good actions, 
and to awaken a desire to attain to what others had accomplished, or to surpass their efforts” 
(2.21.20).262 The act of perceiving through the ear is what arouses the emotions that inspire men 
of arms to emulate the heroes of the past. The act of hearing, however, is not only relevant for 
                                                          
259 Sepan quantos esta carta vieren. Como don Rodrigo Alfonso por si e por fulano e por fulano 
de la una parte, e don Ramir ruyz porsi por fulano e por fulano dela otra fiziero(n) entresi 
acordadamente paz que durasse para siempre sobre todas las desavene(n)cias e desacuerdos e 
mal q(ue)rencias e desonrras que los unos oviessen feho co(n)tra los otros de palabras, o de fecho 
fasta el dia del la era desta carta e señaladamente por razon de la malquerencia de tal omezillo. E 
en señal de verdadero amor e de concordia que deve entrellos ser guardada se besaron ante mi el 
escrivano publico elos testigos que son escritos en esta carta. E prometieron e otorgaron los unos 
a los otros esta paz e esta concordia de la aver siempre por firme . . . . 
260 See p. 158. 
261 See p. 183. 
262 E esto era porque oyendo las les crescian las volu(n)tades, e los coraçones, e esforçavan se, 
faziendo bie(n), e querie(n)do llegar, a lo que los otros fizieran, o passaran por ellos. 
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learning, but also for the maintenance of the appropriate behaviors for optimal social 
interactions. Partidas 2.5.21, for instance, discusses the kinds of entertainments the king can use 
to lift his spirits in times of affliction, like “listening to songs and musical instruments, and 
playing chess, draughts, or other similar games,”263 although it cautions that such use should be 
moderate and limited to specific times. Such activities “also include histories, romances, and 
other books, which treat of those matters from which men derive joy and pleasure.”264 The law 
acknowledges that these activities, which involve different types of cultural products, can impact 
behavior in extreme ways, like compulsive gambling, or excessive listening of songs, which can 
take away the enjoyment and “transform it into a kind of insanity.”265 In regulating the way in 
which the king may participate in these activities, the legislation again emphasizes the 
importance of his demeanor as an example to all his subjects, while it also highlights the threat 
that unchecked affective responses pose to the general stability of his court and his kingdom.  
This is not an attempt to diminish the importance of the pedagogical goals of the legislation 
in the aforementioned laws; however, it is imperative to recognize that for too long the study of 
cultural production has shied away from giving feelings the place they need to have in theoretical 
discussions, often dismissing them as too vague or subjective to be worthy of serious 
consideration, or excusing indifference by alleging that they are the purview of other disciplines. 
In the case of literature, specifically, the study of affect is always restricted within the confines of 
specific “literary theory” areas, safely tucked away in the analysis of plays or poetry, or studied 
as something that authors write about. Even in approaches that supposedly focus on the readers’ 
                                                          
263 . . . oyr cantares, e sones, de estrume(n)tos, e jugar axedrez, o tablas, o otros juegos 
semejantes destos. 
264 . . .esso mismo dezimos de las estorias, e delos romances, e delos otros libros, q(ue) fabla(n) 
de aq(ue)llas cosas, de que los omes reciben alegria, e plazer. 
265 . . . e tornarla ya, en manera de locura. 
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reactions to a text, there is a surprisingly aseptic presentation of those reactions that rarely 
reflects the highly embodied, disorganized nature of such experiences, and the intense responses 
that they produce in readers and listeners. Doing this implies the loss of the radically methexic 
character of literary cultural production, manifested in ways as varied as outward gestures and 
reactions, from crying to laughter, to extreme mental states, to purely somatic changes in 
heartbeat, breathing, sweat, tremors, goosebumps, sexual arousal, euphoria or pain. The practice 
of the law is probably one of the human activities where the chaotic nature of affect is more 
evident, where its effects are the very subject of lengthy judicial processes and theoretical 
dissection, and where its power reveals its more frightening side.  
Fear is perhaps the most important emotion for the exercise of the law. Its pervasiveness 
guarantees very similar effects regardless of the characteristics of individual subjects, and, 
contrary to positive affective reactions, which have varying degrees of relation to brain reward 
systems, fear is deeply ingrained in the most ancient fight-or-flight mechanisms.266 Fear also has 
the advantage of manifesting in ways that affect the body and which can be perceived in the 
bodies of others, especially through hearing and vision. Perhaps hearing takes the upper hand in 
effectiveness, because it can still arouse fear even in the absence of visual or other stimuli. 
Hearing a scream in the middle of the night will instantly generate this response even before 
there is time to wake up or turn on the lights. Its effectiveness is enhanced when multimodality is 
involved, and most experiences of fear involve several senses acting simultaneously.267 The 
legislation of fear is, thus, of primary importance. There needs to be a monopoly of fear just as 
much as there needs to be a monopoly of violence, and it has to be part of the literary cultural 
                                                          
266 See p. 63, note 61. 
267 Regarding multimodality see p. 30, note 31. 
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production of the law. While in the case of violence the main focus of the law is punitive and 
procedural, as is the case with torture, fear covers a greater part of the judicial process, from the 
individual stages like interrogatories and confessions, to the public ones like trials and 
executions, and even into their aftermath as part of the legal archive and collective memory. In 
the public sphere, its power is multiplied in the way Foucault described so eloquently:  
Furthermore, torture forms part of a ritual. It is an element in the liturgy of punishment 
and meets two demands. It must mark the victim: it is intended, either by the scar it 
leaves on the body, or by the spectacle that accompanies it, to brand the victim with 
infamy; even if its function is to `purge' the crime, torture does not reconcile; it traces 
around or, rather, on the very body of the condemned man signs that must not be effaced; 
in any case, men will remember public exhibition, the pillory, torture and pain. . . the fact 
that the guilty man should moan and cry out under the blows is not a shameful side-
effect, it is the very ceremonial of justice being expressed in all its force. (34) 
Infamy, as will be discussed below, is of primary importance in the practice of the law. Fear and 
violence are the most extreme negative manifestations of methexis, and public judicial events of 
torture and execution capitalize on them to ensure the maximum diffusion of the voice of power 
and authority in its most terrifying expression. 
As previously argued, one of the consequences of the distance between the theory and the 
reality of auditory perception is that the subjects of the legislation end up divided in two groups: 
compliant and noncompliant. For the second group, fear and punishment are the legal strategies 
of choice. Auditory perception is fundamental for the functionality of punishment in the 
Partidas, and it is part of a framework that takes advantage of the power of affect to influence 
memory and expectation, and which is outlined in the introduction of the Septima Partida: 
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Forgetfulness and boldness are two things which cause men to err greatly, for 
forgetfulness induces them not to remember the evil which can come upon them on 
account of the offenses which they commit, and boldness gives them daring to do those 
things which they should not. In this way they practice evil so that it becomes natural to 
them, and they receive pleasure from it. And for the reason that acts of this kind which 
are committed with pride should be severely punished, in order that those who are guilty 
of them may receive the penalty which they deserve, and that those who hear it may be 
stricken with fear and take warning so as to avoid doing anything for which they may 
receive the same treatment. . . .268  
Communication allows the deterring effect of the law to reach the largest amount possible of 
subjects, beyond those who were physically present during the enactment of punishment. But 
this dissemination is subject to auditory expectation, because aside from infusing terror in those 
who hear about the event, affecting their auditory expectation, it will have an impact in the way 
they interpret the facts and relay them to others. Auditory expectation turns the chain of 
communication into something akin to the children’s game telephone: the initial message is 
clear, but there is no way of knowing what message will come out at the end of the game. 
The affective aspects of communication, and the problems they generate, also receive 
considerable attention in the legislation. A case in point is infamy, a form of punishment which is 
predicated upon the transmission of information that permanently damages the reputation of the 
                                                          
268 Olvidança e atrevimiento son dos cosas que fazen a los omes errar mucho. Ca el olvido los 
aduze, que non se acuerden, del mal que les puede venir por el yerro, que fizieren. E el 
atrevimiento les da osadia, para acometer lo que non deven, e desta guisa usan el mal demanera 
que se les torna como en natura rescibiendo en ello placer. E por que tales fechos como estos que 
sefazen con sobervia, deven ser escarmentados crudame(n)te, porque los fazedores resciban la 
pena que merescen, e los que lo oyeren se espa(n)ten, e tomen ende escarmiento, porque se 
guarde(n) de fazer cosa, porque non resciban otro tal. 
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criminal. Partidas 7.6.6 distinguishes between evil-repute and infamy; while the former is the 
result of an individual’s own misdeeds, the latter occurs without guilt. In both cases, nonetheless, 
“after the tongues of men have given any one a bad name, he never loses it, although he may not 
have deserved it.”269 In the case of infamy, the law may provide remedy through a royal pardon, 
successful appeal, or the imposition of corporal punishment where monetary fines are available. 
The flipside of this situation is the actual crime of defamation, which appears throughout the 
Partidas, in both oral and written form. The legislation addresses the consequences of 
defamation early on, comparing them to a wound that never heals (1.5.55). Partidas 2.13.4 goes 
even further: “there are two offenses which are equally serious, to kill a man, or to accuse him of 
infamy, because after a man has been rendered infamous, although he may not be guilty, he is, as 
it were, dead to the good and honor of this world; and, in addition to this, his defamation may be 
so great that he would be better dead than alive.”270 Once lost, good reputation is irretrievably 
lost, making infamy a kind of death. But while death represents the end of methexis, infamy, 
does not; it simply represents the most extreme negative form of participation in society: being in 
the mouth of everyone without hope of redress. This particular law refers to the death of the good 
name of the king when his subjects speak ill of him, which requires a punishment proportional to 
the effects of the crime: death and loss of property. The legislation reiterates this strategy by 
attempting an aesthetics of punishment, where the type of violence exacted upon the condemned 
makes present to the senses the very actions that led to its implementation, in those cases where 
clemency is granted and the culprits escape death: “he should cut out the tongues with which 
                                                          
269 . . . q(ue) despues q(ue) las lenguas de los omes ha(n) puesto mala nombradia sobre alguno 
no(n) la pierde jamas maguer no(n)la meresciesse. 
270 . . . dos yerros son, como yguales, matar al ome, o enfamar lo de mal, por q(ue) el ome, 
despues q(ue) es enfamado: maguer no(n) aya culpa, muerto es qua(n)to al bien, e a la ho(n)rra 
deste mundo, e demas.tal podria ser el enfamamiento, que mejor le seriala muerte, que la vida. 
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they committed the offense, so that they can never again make use of them to speak.”271 This 
only an attempt at an aesthetics of punishment because it follows what had already been 
legislated in Partidas 2.1.5 and 2.13.1, where those who wish to see the king death should have 
their eyes gouged out. However, the strategy fails to maintain its aesthetic character in Partidas 
2.13.2, where the law is at a loss regarding the punishment for those who want to hear anything 
that threatens the wellbeing of the king. Cutting their ears is not contemplated, and it would not 
constitute a severe enough punishment. The solution is to revert to proportionality: given that the 
desire to hear ill of the king is similar to wishing for his death, the penalties must be, again, death 
and loss of property. This proportionality continues in regard to smell and touch (2.13.3 and 6).  
The proportionality of punishment is also indicative of the mirror-like mechanisms that 
underlie the ability to put oneself in the place of others, either to feel their pain or to understand 
and predict at a somatosensory level the potential consequences of tarnishing their good name. 
The strategy of making present the consequences of a crime in the punishment imposed is not 
exclusive of cases where the victim is the king. Defamation can also affect his subjects. Partidas 
7.6.8 states that those who falsely accuse another of a crime punishable by death or banishment 
should themselves be sentenced to capital punishment or banished. This proportionality rests on 
another instance of legal fiction: the need to assume the victim was already judged and found 
guilty of the false charge, in order to impose the corresponding punishment to the slanderer. 
Such fictions are effective precisely because they appeal to the brain mechanisms that enable 
methexis in the form of empathy. The same fiction reappears in the context of a written form of 
defamation, the famosus libellus, which the law considers even more serious “because if not lost 
                                                          
271 . . . deve(n) le cortar la lengua, con q(ue) lo dixo, de manera, que nunca con ella fable. 
 
 202 
the remembrance thereof endures forever” (7.9.3).272 The same proportionality of punishment 
applies here, but it covers the entire chain of textual production and transmission: authors, 
scribes, readers, listeners, and those who orally perform them, either by reading or singing. 273  
The common denominator in this chain is auditory expectation, as mentioned in the example of 
the game of telephone: people not only repeat what they hear, but also distort it, embellish it, add 
to it, mix it with other auditory events, and they go as far as to turn it into a cultural product, like 
an artistic performance as song or declamation, engraving it more permanently in the collective 
memory. That is why the legislation seeks a retribution that may leave, through fear, an even 
deeper imprint in the minds of its subjects through the use of exemplary punishments that can be 
disseminated through the same channels as the libelous text. 
The problem of the libelous texts is not so much that they speak ill of others, but that they 
do so outside of the legislated channels: “Whoever decides to speak ill of anyone should accuse 
him before a judge of a crime or offense which he has committed, as the laws of this our book 
direct; and where he proves it he is liable to no penalty on this account, and the party whom he 
accuses is rendered infamous, as he should be” (Partidas 7.9.3).274 Even when its contents are 
true, the libelous text is an attempt to supplant the voice of power and authority, and to bypass 
the procedural structure established to regulate authorized voice within the jurisdiction. What is a 
stake, then, is not only the reputation of the victims, but also the integrity of the most important 
spaces within the jurisdiction, where the texts could be performed outside of the accepted 
                                                          
272 . . . porq(ue) dura la remembrança dello para siempre, si la escritura non se pierde:. . . 
273 The same penalties were already established in the Corpus Iuris Civilis. See Las Siete 
Partidas, ed. Burns, Vol. 5, p. 1352, note 1.  
274 Mas quien quiere dezir mal de alguno acuselo del mal, o del yerro, q(ue) fiziere delante del 
judgador, assi como mandan las leyes de aqueste nuestro libro. E provandolo, non caera en pena 
porende, e fincara infamado aquel que acusa en la manera que deve. 
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parameters: the church, the court and the public square. The imposition of extremely severe 
forms of punishment for these crimes also rests on their classification within the typology of 
crimes of dishonor that occupies Partidas 7.9, which go from simple insults to defamation and 
tomb desecration. The written forms of libel discussed above “are called, in Latin, atroces, which 
means cruel and grievous in Castilian,”275 as opposed to those of little significance (7.9.20). One 
of the parameters of classification is the type of consequence the victim suffers after being 
defamed, which in grievous crimes can include maiming, wounding, or degrading bodily 
injuries. Other important aspects are the part of the body that suffers injury, as well as the place 
and the rank of the persons present during the crime. Another aggravating factor is the 
relationship between the victim and the perpetrator, and the differences in their authority or the 
type of familial relation between them. All of these factors support the proportionality of 
punishment, which correlates directly with the level of fear that must be produced in order for it 
to achieve not only the reparation of the offense by the general dissuasion of potential offenders. 
Aside from corporal punishment, the law imposes other penalties that seek to exclude offenders 
from the social sphere in different ways. Even when they are spared from death or banishment, 
they lose their own reputations, which precludes them from receiving honors and excludes them 
from the court (7.6.7). They lose the right to be witnesses of testaments, which includes them in 
the varied group of individuals that are considered incompetent before the law: crooks, apostates, 
profligates, serfs, mutes, the deaf, women and minors (6.1.9). They also lose the right to make 
their own testament, which implies the loss of the status of legal person, something that only 
happens to hostages, serfs and heretics (6.1.16). The law seeks to do more than just punish; it 
                                                          




seeks to erase as legal persons the agents of production and dissemination of unauthorized voice, 
in order to protect the jurisdictional space, where the only voice that should sound is the voice of 
power and authority as legislated in the code. This type of exclusion is a form of negative 
methexis, of radical separation from participation in society made possible by the use of fear and 
punishment, and in itself a source of fear for all subjects. 
Whereas the uses of fear just discussed are all related to the public sphere, the law also 
has a private sphere where fear fulfills, at least in theory, a different purpose: eliciting the truth. 
This is the case of interrogations, where the use of fear and torture is part of the procedural 
structure to elicit a special kind of voice: the confession (Partidas 3.13.3). In this context, the 
utterance of voice is as important as its absence; silence is a destabilizing factor within the 
private space of interrogation, in part because its affective characteristics, namely individual 
intentions, are not readily discernable. The silence of the accused represents a radical break in 
the question and answer scheme that controls the process of eliciting the truth, and, as a result, it 
is immediately interpreted as a sign of rebelliousness. It is interpreted thus because it interrupts 
and alters the order of the proceedings; it is an act of defiance and it is punished as such: “Where 
anyone is interrogated by a judge. . . and he proves contumacious, and refuses to answer the 
question; his obstinacy in not being willing to answer, will be of as great disadvantage to him as 
if he had admitted the matter concerning which the interrogatory was put.”276 But even when the 
defendant decides to comply with the expectations of his interrogators and answer all their 
questions, there is an additional problem. Any attempt to fill the space that his silence would 
have left, must be in accordance with the standards of what the law assumes to be a correct 
                                                          
276 . . . seyendo alguno preguntado del judgador. . . , si fuere rebelde, non queriendo responder 
ala pregunta: que tanto le empece aquella rebeldia, de no(n) querer responder, como si otorgasse 
aquella cosa, sobre que le preguntaron. 
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answer, and where his guilt is not a possibility but a given fact. From this perspective, any 
answer of the accused is interpreted as inherently suspicious. Peter Brooks has shown the 
pervasiveness of these criteria in modern manuals for interrogators, underscoring the ease with 
which the question and answer system leads the defendant to affirm that which he seeks to deny 
(40). In the face of this possibility, silence seems to be the only reasonable alternative; however, 
in the practice of interrogation it will still be interpreted as a tacit admission of guilt (23, 31). 
This is the result of a preconceived narrative structure built on the basis of the defendant’s 
presumed guilt (30). Any answer that falls outside this narrative will be immediately construed 
by the interrogator as evasive, not as indicative of innocence. The law echoes this position when 
it cautions that the same admission of guilt applies to any person “who answers equivocally, so 
that from his answer what is asked cannot possibly be ascertained” (Partidas 3.13.3).277  
This reflects the connection that Brooks sees between modern police interrogatories and 
the confessional and inquisitorial model established after the Fourth Lateran Council (93).278 
Brooks offers as an example Paolo Segneri’s manual for confessors (1685), where the confessor 
passes from listener of sins to interrogator, due to the ineptitude, malice and ignorance that make 
the confessant hide his sins (99). This mentality fits perfectly into a conception of human 
perception as independent from cognition, where the latter does not always take place, and which 
the reality of a largely illiterate population must have made quite appealing. This conception is 
also present in manuals for confessors chronologically much closer to the time of the Council 
and of the production of the Partidas. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Martín Pérez 
cautions in his manual that “the sinner can never confess properly the first time, either due to 
                                                          
277 . . . si respondiere escuramente, de guisa que non puedan ser ciertos de su respuesta, de 
aquello que le preguntan. 
278 The Fourth Lateran Council took place 1215. 
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fear, either due to the shame that overwhelms him, or because he does not know how to 
differentiate properly between sins” [“apenas el pecador nunca se bien puede confesar de la 
primera vegada, que por miedo, que por verguença que el embarga, o porque non sabe los 
pecados conoçer bien....”] (my trans.; 15). Affect and ignorance are presented here as the basis 
for the need to pass from confession to interrogation: fear, shame, or confusion, prevent the truth 
from coming out. It is the task of the confessor to go beyond the initial attempt into a full 
inquiry. The manual proceeds to provide a very detailed description of the sins the confessor 
should inquire about, which constitute a kind of taxonomy, classified according to the different 
members of society. Whatever the social status, age, education level, or occupation of the sinner, 
it is assumed that there is something hidden that the confessor needs to discover.  
While the manuals for confessors assume incompetence in the confessant, the 
inquisitorial model of questioning sees the heretic as sly and capable of all manner of evasion 
and subterfuge, bringing him closer to the defendant as presented in modern interrogation 
manuals, as well as to the accused portrayed as equivocal in the Partidas. In the middle of the 
fourteenth century, Nicolau Eymerich presents the following portrayal: “Heretics are very sly in 
concealing their errors, they feign holiness, and they shed phony tears. . . an inquisitor must arm 
himself against these tricks, and always assume they want to deceive him” [“Los herejes son 
muy astutos para disimular sus errores, afectan santidad, y vierten fingidas lágrimas. . . un 
inquisidor se debe armar contra todas estas mañas, suponiendo siempre que le quieren engañar”] 
(my trans.; 17). Affect assumes here a more sinister aura: it is only an act, a theatrical 
performance by a very skilled actor. The manual proceeds to describe ten such schemes in a way 
that guarantees that virtually every question will seem suspicious. A category that results 
particularly troubling is what Eymerich classifies as ambiguities and mental restrictions, where, 
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after an answer that appears to be correct, inside their mind, heretics are answering something 
different: “if they are asked, is this the body of Jesus Christ? They answer yes, meaning by this 
their own bodies, or a stone close by, insofar as all the bodies that exist in the world belong to 
God, and thus to Jesus Christ, who is God” [“si les preguntan ¿es esto el cuerpo de Jesucristo? 
dicen sí, significando por esto su propio cuerpo, o una piedra inmediata, en cuanto todos los 
cuerpos que el mundo contiene son de Dios, y por tanto de Jesucristo, que es Dios”] (my trans.). 
If the answer indicates ignorance or modesty, these are also assumed to be feigned (19). Any 
somatic reaction, like fainting o having a headache, or any outward signs of mental illness, are to 
be interpreted as delaying tactics.  
Around the same period, Bernard Gui describes these same tactics in his manual for 
inquisitors, but he classifies them according to the religious sect to which the heretic supposedly 
belongs, although all of the tricks he describes share the common goal of allowing the heretic to 
avoid confessing his trespasses (30). It is interesting that these manuals do not address the 
subject of silence, perhaps never a real alternative taking into account the violent means of 
coercion at the disposal of inquisitors. If the space left by silence was not filled with evasive and 
equivocal answers, the effects of torture would fill it with untrustworthy confessions. This is 
echoed in the Partidas: “Men sometimes influenced by torture, or wounds, or the fear of death, 
or by the disgrace which they desire to inflict upon others, confess things, which they would not, 
of their own accord, acknowledge. For which reason we decree that a confession made in any of 
these ways, shall not be valid, or be a hindrance to any one who makes it” (3.13.5).279 In order 
                                                          
279 Por premia de tormentos, o de feridas: o por miedo de muerte, o de desonrra q(ue) quiere(n) 
fazer alos omes, conocen a las vegadas algunas cosas q(ue) de su grado no(n) las conoceria(n). E 
pore(n)de dezimos, que la conoce(n)cia que fuere fecha en alguna destas maneras, que non deve 
valer, nin empece al que la faze. 
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for a confession under torture to be valid, the law requires that it be repeated afterwards, without 
the threat or use of violence. Although this gesture of the legislator seems incredibly progressive 
for the historical context in which it is made, it is unlikely that it had any meaningful effect. 
Keeping in mind that traumatic events like torture and extreme fear leave lasting marks in the 
brain, including mirror-like aversive reactions and maladaptive plastic changes, it is easy to see 
that the immediate absence of the threat would not have caused an affective change equivalent to 
the absence of fear, and that most corroborating testimony obtained at a later time would be 
made under levels of fear very similar to the ones experienced under torture.280 The private space 
of the interrogatory prolongs itself through memory, including somatosensory mirror-like 
experiences, and it follows the subject into daily life. The fear of the law becomes a bodily 
experience that the mind carries around and has the potential of being felt even when not actually 
experienced. This is not simple remembering, but mirror-like embodied methexis. Given that the 
space of the interrogatory has become movable, it is now part of the internal conceptualization of 
the jurisdiction, and in this its effects are similar to those of a public execution. The jurisdictional 
space thus not only completely surrounds but also invades the bodies of its subjects, creating in 
the process a real rule of law, one that has access to the deepest recesses of the mind. It is the 
mental state that John Milton masterfully recreates in Paradise Lost, in Satan’s soliloquy after he 
flees from hell: “Me miserable! which way shall I fly / Infinite wrath, and infinite despair? / 




                                                          
280 See pp. 76-7 and Depperman et al.  
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Jurisdiction and Relative Positioning 
The creation of a jurisdictional space is essential for the enforcement of legislation. Aside 
from the establishment of geographical and administrative boundaries, or the definition of a 
scope according to demographic and hierarchical principles, there is the accepted reach of the 
rule of law. Different from the first two areas, the rule of law is not only a theoretical concept, 
made possible by rational legal arguments, but it is also a sensory space, able to submit the will 
of its subjects through their bodies by virtue of its affective power. In this sense, it is also a 
methexic space, where the law attempts to regulate the types and levels of participation of 
individuals, and to define their relative positioning according to specific parameters. Otherwise, 
there would be no real effect of authority. There is a need for strong affective motivations, like 
fear, love, loyalty, hatred, just to name a few, in order to make the individual feel as a participant 
in the act of submitting to the law. Modern concepts like patriotism share this same aesthetic 
substrate, which entails the existence of deep emotional attachments to a complex series of ideals 
and subjective notions of origin, belonging, homeland, duty, loyalty, among others, to 
complement the already existing attachments to immediate family and friends. In the Middle 
Ages, these attachments work in structures of patronage and feudal regimes, where the land is a 
moveable space, constantly changing due to incessant war and shifting borders. There are also 
two partially overlapping hierarchies: the Church and the nobility. In the case of the Iberian 
Peninsula at the time of the writing of the Partidas, there were dozens of fueros and other forms 
of custom law, with limited scopes that overlapped frequently, leading to confusion and 
jurisdictional vacuums caused by conflicting practices. Under such conditions, the enforcement 
of the law depended greatly on the power of local lords. The king’s power was limited and 
constantly threatened by the changing allegiances of the nobility. That is why the establishment 
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of a jurisdiction involved more than just the definition of a geographical space, and its legislation 
reflects an awareness of this fact in the way it uses various strategies to help expand as much as 
possible its own scope and the physical limits of the jurisdiction. One such strategy is related to 
interpersonal exchanges and the different ways in which the law regulates them. 
In the Quinta Partida, the validity of contracts is based, from a material standpoint, on an 
inversely proportional relation between voice and writing, where utterances fill the gaps caused 
by the absence of documentation within the contractual space. This inverse proportionality is 
necessary to restore and safeguard the stability of the human interactions that are germane to 
every transaction, given the possibility of “inconveniences and serious disputes”281 arising from 
the changes in opinion of the interested parties (“Introduction”). The contract is a space where a 
link is voluntarily established by both parties either by agreement or litigation; therefore, it is 
pure methexis. It is a space because in it transactions take place that are defined in terms of the 
changes and movement of bodies and objects, within a specific location system. The parties are 
bodies, either the bodies of the individuals entering into the contractual relationship or those of 
their representatives; the transaction between these bodies implies some manner of displacement 
or transformation of things, and thus implies participation. The possibility of change is a 
permanent threat to the stability of a contract, because what begins as a mutual agreement ends 
in conflict due to the fact that people “change their minds.”282 Movements within the contractual 
space are causal in nature, something that the legislation had already defined in the Tercera 
Partida in the context of trials: “The energy of action, according to natural laws, is the first thing 
that attracts others to itself” (3.2).283 The original actually does not talk about energy but 
                                                          
281 . . . enxecos, e grandes co(n)tiendas. . . . 
282 . . . que se mudan despues las voluntades. . . . 
283 Movimiento de los fechos, segund razon natural, es la primera cosa, que tira las otras assi. 
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movement, that is, change. This movement is inchoative, as it occurs when a plaintiff demands 
justice: the voice uttered by the plaintiff causes movement or change when it demands justice, 
and his claim is predicated upon a prior movement, that which led to the contract that sets forth 
the conditions for things to move or change. In order to establish a contractual space, the wishes 
of the parties must be expressed either orally or in writing. The instability of the oral agreement 
is always in tension with the relative stability of a transaction memorialized in writing. Inasmuch 
as writing may be either absent or incomplete, the oral must increase to fill the entire contractual 
space, in order to try to avoid that it may be partially or completely invalidated.  
In the case of sales and purchases, the legislation enacts a division in terms of voice and 
writing, where the contract can be performed with or without a letter (Partidas 5.5.6). When 
there is a letter, writing becomes the guarantee of the transaction, making the sale binding even 
before there is an actual exchange of things or monies between the parties. In the absence of a 
letter, the sale is only finalized with the exchange of goods and monies, which necessitates the 
presence of bodies to confirm the act through the enunciation of words. The importance of voice 
is confirmed when the law describes the exchanges, using as examples situations when there is 
no promise or concession: “as where one of them says: ‘I wish to exchange such-and-such 
property with you;’ and the other answers that he is willing, and the exchange is made by words 
of this kind or others like them, although the property exchanged is not at hand, nor passes into 
possession of either of the parties” (Partidas 5.6.1).284 The presence or absence of the things to 
be exchanged is irrelevant. It is the words that produce their presence and their movement from 
one party to the other. Mutual agreement is a prerequisite, but it does not replace the formulae 
                                                          
284 . . . mas diziendo assi quiero cambiar tal cosa co(n) vos: e el otro respo(n)die(n)do que le 
plaze por tales palabras, o otras semejantes dellas, se faze el ca(m)bio, maguer las cosas que 
cambio, no(n) sean presentes nin passadas, a poder de ninguna de las partes. 
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because, in the absence of the legislated words, at least one of the goods must change hands in 
order for the exchange to be valid. The case of promises, which, as was discussed, rely mainly on 
the repetition of formulae,285 also exhibits this inverse proportionality, where the presence of 
voice in the transaction is greater than the presence of written documents:  
A promise is the consent verbally given by some men to others with the intention of 
binding themselves when they come to an agreement with regard to some certain thing. . .  
and when this is done justly and reasonably it is a great benefit to the people, for men 
make one another assured that they will do what they agree to, and they are bound to 
keep their promises. (Partidas 5.11.1)286 
This law shows full awareness of the higher likelihood of confusions in the oral context, absent 
clear regulation of the exchanges between the parties, a problem that it solves through the use of 
codified formulae, in the same manner it had outlined in Partidas 3.18. The difference resides in 
that, recognizing the greater versatility of the spoken word, the legislation explains that the 
formulae do not need to be repeated verbatim. It is the intelligibility of enunciation of the parties 
that guarantees their mutual understanding and the stability of the contractual space. That is why 
Partidas 5.11.2 takes the additional step of explicitly excluding from the authorized verbal 
exchange any unnecessary words or gestures. Silence, if it occurs, should always be interpreted 
as negation, in sharp contrast to its interpretation in the context of the interrogatory.  
Contrary to most types of transactions described in the Partidas, testaments surpass the 
physical and temporal space of the jurisdiction, as they perpetuate the presence of the testator 
                                                          
285 See pp. 186-7. 
286 Promission es otorgamiento q(ue) fazen los omes unos con otros: por palabras: e con 
entencion de obligarse, aviniendose sobre alguna cosa cierta. . . . E tiene gra(n)d pro, alas 
ge(n)tes, qua(n)do es fecha derechame(n)te, e co(n) razon. Ca assegura(n) los omes los unos a los 
otros, lo q(ue) promete(n), e son tenudos delo guardar. 
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after his death by means of the authorized articulation of his will. The authorized form of 
expression attempts to predetermine the future movement and change of persons and things by 
keeping an oral or written record of the voice that can fill the void left by the absent body of the 
testator. This production of presence is needed to validate the expression of the will in a way that 
conforms to the jurisdictional space, allowing the testator to participate even when permanently 
absent. In order to become a literary cultural product that is the repository of the authorized voice 
for the entire jurisdiction, the legal code needs to be structured as a sphere of action, the 
jurisdictional space, where the sound of power and authority propagates in an omnidirectional 
fashion, with the king as its epicenter. This is a tridimensional space, where the presence of 
justice is manifested in the practice of the letter of the law, defined by three axes: conditional, 
hierarchical, and transactional. The conditional axis covers all the conditions that must be 
fulfilled for litigation to be valid. The hierarchical axis determines the position the subject 
occupies in the stratified social order at the precise moment he comes in contact with the law. 
The transactional axis encompasses all types of authorized transactions, either between 
individuals, or between an individual and the law. These axes make it possible to determine the 
exact position of the subject inside the jurisdictional sphere by virtue of a complex equation 
where the transactional factor, insofar as it is a codified precept, functions as the constant value, 
while the hierarchical and conditional axes work as variables: the former as a simple variable and 
the latter as a complex one, given that it is determined by more than one factor. This results in 
each individual falling into a specific place inside this tridimensional space. The difference in 
positions amongst subjects is what is referred to in this thesis as relative positioning. This 
positioning is what determines the specific rights and duties of each individual, so that the law 
may be applied correctly in their different interactions. Only part of the jurisdictional space is 
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methexic, and that part can only be occupied by those subjects whom the law deems competent. 
Testaments are part of this participative portion of the jurisdictional space, insofar as they are a 
transaction initially originated by a living body. They occupy the place that the absent body of 
the testator can no longer occupy within this sphere in order for his voice to be performed at the 
moment the testament is to become effective.  
Contrary to other kinds of transactions described in the legal code, the expression of a 
subject’s last will and testament is a unidirectional act that precludes the possibility of 
amendment: “because if they should die after they have made their wills they cannot return to 
correct them, or to draw them up anew” (Partidas 6.1).287 Given that death represents a break 
between the body and the will, it is necessary to establish the requirements for the expression of 
the will to be valid, so that the future movements of persons and things that it will produce are 
consistent with the dynamics of the jurisdictional space. The importance of the three 
aforementioned axes for determining the validity of a testament is clearly expressed in Partidas 
6.1.18. In this law, the change in position of the testator, caused by displacements along the 
hierarchical and conditional axes, impairs his ability to perpetuate his presence through the 
expression of will. The act of drawing up a will functions as the constant value in the 
transactional axis, enacting an internal division inside the jurisdictional space, which traces a 
methexic transactional space, a sub-sphere of action that can only be occupied by those who are 
competent to be testators. The law describes three cases of displacement along the hierarchical 
and conditional axes which lead to the exclusion of the testator from the transactional sphere, 
                                                          
287 . . . porque despues que los han fecho, si se murieren, non pueden tornar otra vez a endereçar 
los, nin a fazer los de cabo. 
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inhibiting the production of his presence and, as a consequence, invalidating the testament. The 
first case covers the most radical displacements:  
First, when a party who makes a will, is sentenced to some punishment for life; for a 
party of this kind cannot afterwards live in any other place, but that where he is to endure 
the penalty, and he becomes the same as a slave, and subsequently doesn’t have his 
children under his control, as he formerly did. The same rule applies where a person who 
was emancipated is again reduced to slavery, because he was ungrateful to his master 
who enfranchised him, or lost his freedom for some other reason; and this change is 
called, in Latin, maxima capitis diminutio, which means the greatest change if condition 
which can happen to a man, for by means of it he loses his liberty, his home, and his 
family. (6.1.18)288 
The permanent loss of freedom, a displacement along the conditional axis, causes in turn another 
displacement along the hierarchical axis. These changes lead to both a geographical movement, 
from the place where the subject lived to his permanent place of confinement, and to a change in 
his relative positioning inside the jurisdiction, caused by the loss of power over his children. The 
displacement along the hierarchical axis caused by the loss of freedom leads to the exclusion of 
the subject from the transactional space where the testament is valid. In addition, the legislation 
considers life imprisonment as the first type of “civil death,” which results in loss of parental 
authority and the right to make a will (4.18.2). This is another example of legal fiction, where 
                                                          
288 La primera es, quando aquel que faze el testamento es dañado para siempre a sofrir alguna 
pena. Ca este atal non osa despues bevir en otro lugar, si non en aquel, o ha de ser penado, e es 
como siervo, e non ha despues sus fijos en su poder como avia antes. E esso mismo seria, quando 
alguno que fuesse franqueado, lo tornassen a servidumbre, porque fuera desconosciente a su 
señor quel aforro, o perdiesse la libertad por otra razon e a este mudamiento dizen en latin 
maxima caoitis diminutio: que quier tanto dezir, como el mayor mudamiento de estado que a 
ome puede acaescer, porque por ella pierde la libertad, e la cibdad, e su familia. 
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even though the subject “may not be actually dead, the laws consider that he is so, as far as the 
honor, the nobility, and the affairs of this world are concerned.”289 
The next case of invalidation of testament in Partidas 6.1.18 consists on a double 
displacement along the conditional axis:  
The second way is where anyone is perpetually banished, by a judicial sentence to some 
island so that he can never leave it, whether he is deprived of all his property or not. This 
is called, in Latin, media capitis diminutio, which means, in Castilian, the moderate 
change of a man’s condition, for by it he loses his residence and his family.290  
Although in this case there is no loss of freedom, exclusion occurs because banishment is the 
other type of “civil death” contemplated in Partidas 4.18.2, leading to the same loss of parental 
authority and the right to make a will. The last case implies a much milder form of displacement: 
The third is where a party who is under control of another permits himself to be adopted, 
and for this reason is placed under the control of the person who adopted him, for he 
changes his condition. This change is called, in Latin, minima capitis diminutio, which 
means, in Castilian, the least change which a man can endure with respect to his 
condition, for by means of it he only changes his family, and nothing more. (6.1.18)291  
                                                          
289 E como quier que. . ., non sea muerto naturalmente: tienen las leyes, que lo es quanto a la 
honrra, e a la nobleza e a los fechos deste mundo. 
290 La segunda manera es, quando alguno es desterrado para siempre, en alguna ysla, por juyzio, 
que nunca ha de salir della, quier le sean tomados todos sus bienes o non. E a esta dizen en latin 
media capitis diminutio, que quier tanto dezir en romance, como mediano mudamiento del 
estado del ome, ca por este pierde la cibdad e la familia.  
291 La tercera es, como si aquel que non es en poder de otro, se dexa porfijar, e cae porende en 
poder de aquel q(ue)l porfijo: ca muda su estado. E a este mudamiento dizen en latin minima 
capitis diminutio, que quier tanto dezir en romance, como el menor mudamiento q(ue) ome 
puede aver en su estado, ca por ella muda la familia tan solame(n)te, e no(n) mas. 
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The common denominator in these three cases is the loss of the ability to participate, due to the 
changes in relative positioning caused by the displacements along the hierarchical and 
conditional axes. Given that the transactional space of the testament is methexic, any subject 
considered legally incompetent is automatically excluded. The body of the testator disappears by 
virtue of civil death or loss of power over himself, which are two different legal fictions. But 
even though they are fictions, the power of the law is evidenced in the fact that the subject will 
feel unable to access said space, even when no actual obstacle prevents such access. It is the 
mental state that enacts the separation, and leads the individual to self-segregate from the space 
or the human group of where he had previously felt he belonged. In this sense, legal fictions are 
cultural products of great affective power, able to create mental spaces and barriers, and also to 
elicit feelings of belonging or permanent separation. Contrary to these fictitious forms of death, 
natural death, the only real and definitive disappearance of the subject, is the one that enables the 
production of presence of the testator by means of a written or oral record of the expression of 
his will. In doing so, the transactional space opens up to scrutiny with the oral performance of 
the will of an absent body, taking the voice out into the public sphere. 
The private jurisdictional space, as seen in the foregoing examples, is not permanently 
closed, and there is always the potential for voice to overflow into the public sphere. Thus, the 
legislation takes a different approach to voice depending on what spaces it covers, either private 
or public, or in between; on the extent to which writing is present in said spaces; and, finally, on 
the kinds of movements and changes that may take place inside them. In order to better 
appreciate this contrast, it is important to look at the way the law approaches the dynamics of 
two spaces that are neither fully private, nor fully public, where the voice of power and authority 
resonates: the court and the palace. Although both words may be used to describe actual physical 
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structures, their functions often exceed the limits of a building or architectural structure, to open 
into the public sphere. For instance, medieval courts were itinerant; the kings and their retinues 
traveled often throughout the kingdom. Most of these travels were related to administrative, 
judicial, and military duties. Alfonso the Wise traveled often for all those purposes.292 He was at 
war with neighboring realms, and achieved important military victories throughout his reign.293 
He also visited cities and towns, and he held Cortes, which were administrative and judicial 
proceedings, in different parts of his kingdom.294 There were also public punishments and 
executions that resulted from these proceedings, carried out in the name of the king and often in 
his presence. This ability to expand beyond the limits of structures and geographical boundaries 
meant that both institutional bodies could fill their jurisdictional limits by means of displays of 
power and authority where sound, and especially voice, were key elements. 
Partidas 2.9 contains four laws related to the court and the palace, which include their 
definitions and their specific functions, as well as the activities that may be carried out inside 
them. These laws are incredibly invested in a spatial conception consistent with a methexic 
approach to jurisdiction and relative positioning. Partidas 2.9.27 begins with the court: 
 The place where the king, his vassals, and his officers, whose duty it is daily to advise 
and serve him, and where the men of the kingdom gather, either for his honor, or to 
obtain justice or dispense it, or to transact other business, which they are required to 
                                                          
292 For a detailed account of Alfonso the Wise’s itinerant court see Ballesteros Beretta. 
293 For the military achievements of Alfonso the Wise see Doubleday. 




communicate to him, is called the Court. It takes its name from a Latin word, called 
cohors, which means union of companies. . . .295 
The court is identified as a space not by virtue of its geographical location, which does not exist, 
but of its function as a place of gathering. In this sense, it is consistent with Michel de Certeau’s 
idea that what defines a space is the “animation of these places by the motion of a moving body” 
(Augé 79). The conditional axis of this moveable place contains values like the type of 
individuals that it gathers, the functions they perform, and the reasons for their presence there. 
This law also describes the hierarchical axis of this space, predicated upon another meaning of 
the word: “It has also another name, in Latin curia, which means a place where supervision is 
exercised over all the acts in the country, for there it must be determined to what each one is 
entitled, according to his rights and his station.”296 Lastly, the definition refers to the 
transactional axis: “It is called corte, in the Spanish language, because there is kept the sword of 
justice, with which all evil acts in word or deed are punished, as, for instance, the wrongs, 
violence, and arrogance which men do and say.”297 The three axes of the space called court give 
it consistency in spite of its movability, so the fact that its dimensions may fluctuate does not 
threaten its stability. They also provide the parameters necessary to determine the relative 
                                                          
295 Corte es llamado el lugar do es el Rey, e sus vasallos, e sus oficiales, co(n) el q(ue) le ha(n) 
cotidianame(n)te de co(n)sejar, e deservir, e los omes del reyno, q(ue) se llega(n) y, o por 
ho(n)rra del, o por alca(n)çar derecho, o por fazerlo o por recabdar las otras cosas q(ue) ha(n) de 
ver co(n) el. E tomo este nome, de una palabra de latin, q(ue) dize(n) cohors, en q(ue) nuestra 
ta(n)to, como ayuntamie(n)to de co(m)pañas. 
296 E otrosi ha nome en lati(n) curia, q(ue) q(ui)ere tanto dezir como lugar do es la cura de todos 
los fechos de la tierra: ca alli se ha de cater, lo q(ue) cada uno deve aver, segu(n) su derecho, e su 
estado.  
297 Otrosi es dicho corte, segu(n)d le(n)guaje de España, porq(ue) alli es la espada, de la justicia, 
co(n) q(ue) se ha(n) de cortar todos los malos fechos, tan bie(n) de dicho, como de fecho, assi 
como los tuertos, e las fuerças, e las sobervias, q(ue) faze(n) los omes, e dize(n). . . .  
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positioning of all those present in the court at a given time. This helps to offset the permanent 
threats that the space of the court faces from unauthorized discourses and behaviors. 
When considered from the perspective of sound perception, and specifically of voice, the 
court is faced with the same problems previously analyzed in the context of private spaces. The 
unpredictability and inexorability of sound and its perception are still at odds with the theoretical 
considerations of the legal code, and therefore practical approaches to it must be taken. 
Rodriguez-Velasco defines the court, as presented in this section of the Partidas, as a “space of 
uncertainty and instability,” due to the constant movement of people that go there seeking justice 
(71-3). He argues that Partidas 2.9 seeks to protect this space through the use of a “rhetoric of 
irony” based on the concept of “retraer” or “narrate” that was mentioned above (69-77).298 The 
aim of this rhetoric is to avoid the violence which may arise from verbal conflicts, which result 
in a disruption of friendship and concord, and to create a “space of certainty” (71). This goal is 
clearly predicated upon the hierarchical axis: “Friendship is the fundamental value upon which 
political solidarity in the heart of the court is settled, and, in the case of nobles, it has a historical 
character that goes beyond mere friendships between persons to being the expression of a 
friendship, or fraternity of a social class. . .” (78). The hierarchical axis rests upon a series of 
behavioral norms that set this social class apart, and which consist in avoiding unauthorized 
conduct and using “words which are proper and well-considered” (2.9.27).299 The subjects who 
follow these norms are labeled as “good and educated,” and, more importantly, as 
“courteous.”300 Courtesy is the standard that encompasses all the behavioral requirements of the 
hierarchical axis, which the king’s subjects can learn by living in the court: “For this reason it 
                                                          
298 See p. 183. 
299 . . . palabras buenas, e apuestas. . . . 
300 . . . llamaro(n) los buenos, e e(n)señados. E otrosi llamaro(n) los corteses. . . . 
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was always a custom, in Spain, for men of rank to send their sons to be brought up at the courts 
of kings, that they might be polite and well-informed, . . . and might acquire good manners in 
speech as well as in action. . . .”301 The court is, then, a space of methexic cultural production 
insofar it fosters a continuous process of education that depends largely on the imitation of 
models of behavior and their perpetuation through cultural products like music, literature, games 
and performances. The law reinforces such behaviors through rewards, while subjects who do 
not adhere to them are to be banished from the court and punished, with the aim of not only 
encouraging those who comply to continue with the appropriate behavior, but also deterring 
potential offenders. 
The spatial conception is confirmed through an extended metaphor in the law that 
follows, where the court is compared to the sea: “as the sea is long, and large, and surrounds the 
entire earth, and there are fish of many kind in it; . . . the Court of the king should be large 
enough to contain, accommodate, and receive everything which goes there. . . ; for there great 
suits must be decided, and important advice taken, and valuable gifts bestowed” (2.9.28).302 The 
metaphor of the sea also illustrates the ability of the court to resolve all the legal matters that are 
brought before it, and the varying opinions and mentalities of the parties that litigate them. The 
transactional axis of this space, contrary to the very limited hierarchical axis, must be not only 
large, but it must also be able to expand so as to contain all possible cases and claims that 
subjects bring to the court. The metaphor also uses the contrast between calm and stormy waters 
                                                          
301 E pore(n)de fue en España sie(m)pre acostu(m)brado, de los omes ho(n)rrados, de embiar sus 
fijos, a criar a las cortes, de los Reyes, por que aprisiessen a ser corteses, e enseñados, . . . e se 
acostumbrassen, bien asi de dicho como de fecho. . . .  
302 . . . ca bien assi, como la mar es larga, e gra(n)de, e cerca toda la tierra, e ay pescados de 
muchas naturas, otrosi la corte del Rey, deve ser en espacio, para caber e sofrir, e dar recabdo, a 
todas las cosas, que a ella vinieren, . . . ca alli se han de librar, los pleytos grandes, e tomarse los 
grandes con(n)sejos, e darse los grandes dones. 
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to symbolize what awaits those who go there with just claims and what awaits those who bring 
forth “unreasonable complaints.”303 The king and his advisors need to proceed with caution and 
be unanimous in their opinions, to avoid being led asunder by “extravagant speeches, which men 
may utter or by the prejudices or envy which they entertain towards one another. . . .”304 The 
importance of voice is palpable in this passage, where it is at the center of that which threatens 
the stability of the space of the court. The king and his advisors must all adhere to the standards 
of courtesy and reason because they are also at risk of falling into the affective trap of 
unauthorized speech. All of these behavioral mores are presented in metaphorical form, 
demonstrating once more that when it comes to matters where affect is involved, non-theoretical 
explanations are more effective and appeal to a larger potential audience.  
The following law, Partidas 2.9.29, proceeds to describe the place where the court 
commonly gathers: the palace. Contrary to the modern understanding of it, and although it is a 
physical structure, the law defines it outside of that fact: “Any place is called a palace where a 
king publicly associates with men to talk with them.”305 Thus, the palace is halfway between the 
two different concepts that Michel de Certeau and Marc Augé have called “non-place:” while De 
Certeau’s non-place is conceptual and based on the negation of itself, Augé’s is the one that does 
not have enough significance to be considered a place, a space of anonymity (Certeau 197; Augé 
43-8).306 The palace in the Partidas is decidedly conceptual insofar as it only exists when the 
                                                          
303 . . . co(n) cosas sin razo(n) . . . . 
304 . . . por palabras sobejanas, q(ue) los omes dize(n), ni por los desamores, ni por las embidias 
q(ue) los omes han entresi . . . . 
305 Palacio es dicho qualq(ui)er lugar do el Rey se ayunta paladinamente, para fablar con los 
omes. 
306 The translator of Augé’s work offers and interesting insight regarding the use of the term: 
“The expression non-lieu... is more commonly used in French in the technical juridical sense of 
‘no case to answer’ or ‘no grounds for prosecution’: a recognition that the accused is innocent” 
(102, note 6). Note that the same is true for the Spanish expression “no ha lugar” in its legal use. 
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king and court occupy a certain location, but it is also consistent with Augé’s definition in the 
sense that those who occupy it are no longer individuals, but subjects of the law, defined in 
relation to their predetermined functions within the space of the court. The law specifies three 
functions: “in deciding suits, in dining, or in audiences” (Partidas 2.9.29).307 Thus, the palace as 
non-place is in sharp contrast with the court as space, but it can only exist because the court 
brings forth the moving bodies De Certeau speaks about. These bodies enter transactional 
relationships by virtue of their ability to utter: “Place is completed through word” (Augé 77).  
The law stresses this idea stating specific accepted verbal exchanges: “And, since men 
assemble here rather than elsewhere to converse with the king, it is called a palace, which means 
a public place, and for this reason it is proper that no other words be spoken there but such as are 
true, sincere, and polite” (Partidas 2.9.29).308 This requirement leads to the successful 
completion of the different interactions between subjects in the palace; it guarantees a fair 
outcome in judicial cases; it ensures that entertainment activities remain friendly through the 
adherence to the norms of courtesy; and, most importantly, it avoids misunderstandings and 
possible violent engagements by setting specific parameters for verbal exchanges, especially 
when some kind of narrative is involved. These parameters, which are outlined in the law that 
follows, are the ones previously analyzed in the context of oral narratives:309 “For this to be done 
suitably attention should be paid to three things, namely, the time, the place, and the manner” 
(2.9.30).310 Narratives are subject to a series of conditions according to their objective, their 
                                                          
307 . . . o para librar los pleytos, o para comer, o fablar engasajado. 
308 E por que en este lugar, se ayuntan los omes, para fablar co(n) el, mas que en otro lugar, por 
esso lo llaman palacio, que quiere tanto dezir, como lugar paladino. E porende conviene, que se 
non digan y, otras palabras si non verdaderas e complidas, e apuestas. 
309 See pp. 183 and 195. 




subject matter, the interlocutors and those who are listening to them. To succeed in telling a story 
or in rebuking someone’s perceived shortcomings, the law requires specific affective qualities, 
like “cheerfulness,” while it precludes “anger or sadness.”311 Those subjects capable of following 
these precepts correctly fall into a specific classification in the hierarchical axis: “a person who 
knows how to avoid outrageous and improper words, and employs such as we have mentioned in 
this law, is called palanciano.”312 The law requires the king to reward them, while those who do 
the opposite, he should punish and expel. This is an instance of relative positioning taken to its 
ultimate consequences. The specific use of utterances is the same that regulates the conditional 
axis of the space of the court, which confirms the centrality of the voice of power and authority 
for the existence of the moveable space-place, the court and the palace, from which justice 
emanates and overflows to fill up to the last corner of the jurisdiction. 
The case of purely public spaces in the context of the law also reveals the centrality of 
sound and its perception, and specifically of voice, for the establishment the rights and duties of 
all subjects through the demarcation of a communal space and the relative positioning of those 
who inhabit it. Some of these spaces are highly methexic, because the potential for human 
interaction is greatly enhanced by the proximity and concentration of individuals, making it 
peremptory to set specific parameters to identify them and set their physical and theoretical 
boundaries. The importance of the delimitation of spaces for the practice of the law can be seen 
comparing the approach of the Partidas with other important legal texts of the time. In De insula, 
Bartolo da Sassoferrato uses voice as a means to demarcate the boundaries of villages, insofar as 
they are social units that claim possession of a portion of land. His argument uses as precedent a 
                                                          
311 . . . con alegria. . . e non consaña, ni con tristeza. 
312 Onde quien se sabe guardar de palabras sobejanas, e desapuestas, e usa destas q(ue) dicho 
avemos, en esta ley: es llamado pala(n)ciano. 
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law in Justinian’s Digest that addresses the case of a murder that takes place inside a house 
(29,5,1,27). The Septima Partida uses the same precedent, without acknowledging its source, 
although it remains closer to the original Latin text. In this case, the law uses voice in order to 
establish the levels of responsibility of those who live inside the domestic sphere. In both this 
law and Sassoferrato’s text, the focus is on a definition of social unit which can be specified 
depending on the auditory perception of the human voice, making it possible to identify the 
individuals that belong to the group, to determine their relative positioning, and to calculate the 
spatial limits of the household. Considering relative positioning within the household in terms of 
voice enables the law to conceptualize the specific rights and duties of each individual member 
of a social unit. In De insula, Sassoferrato argues that the same geometrical calculations he 
proposes for determining which part of an island belongs to the properties on the river banks can 
be used to solve other territorial disputes. His calculations are based on the differences between 
cities, castles, and towns. The cities are easily defined according to the government officials in 
charge; castles are even easier, given their structural features and the absence of the government 
officials present in cities; towns, on the contrary, have no government officials, nor walls, nor 
any other perceptible characteristic that helps to ascertain their limits, “because the houses are 
scattered” [“porque las casas están desparramadas...”] (my trans.; 67). Given that, according to 
Sassoferrato, any measurements should be made beginning in the part of the city, castle, or town, 
that is closer to the disputed land, in order to calculate the limits of the town it is necessary to 
determine how far each house can be from the other: “if there is any house that is too far from 
the others, such house is not considered part of the vicinity, especially if the voice cannot be 
heard” [“si hay alguna casa que dista mucho de las otras, tal casa no se considera de la vecindad, 
máxime si no puede oírse la voz”] (my trans.). Hence, being part of the social unit called town 
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depends on being within earshot of the rest of its inhabitants, a requirement that does not apply in 
the case of larger population units. Sassoferrato does not elaborate further regarding the matter, 
so it does not seem to have been important for him if one could actually understand the words 
that the voice is uttering; most probably words were not necessary and vocalizations of any kind 
were sufficient. This points to a methexic approach based on the perceptive limits of the social 
unit, which determine the ability of its members to participate at different levels, even when the 
interactions are not communicative and do not include an intelligible voice. 
The idea of being within earshot of the human voice, however, comes from sources even 
older than those Sassoferrato uses. It appears in part three of the third book of Aristotle’s 
Politics, where it refers to the size of a city: 
It is further asked: when are men, living in the same place, to be regarded as a single city 
– what is the limit? Certainly not the wall of the city, for you might surround all 
Peloponnesus with a wall. Like this, we may say, is Babylon, and every city that has the 
compass of a nation rather than a city; Babylon, they say, had been taken for three days 
before some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact. (1276a25-30) 
Being within earshot means being able to hear the presence of other human beings, in great 
measure as a matter of public safety, something that clearly relates to the ability to participate 
promptly in emergency situations, even when participation means running away from potential 
dangers. This is developed at the domestic level in the law from the Digest which Sassoferrato 
takes as a recourse. In this case, the goal is to ascertain the limits of a household in regard to 
what exactly can be considered as located under the same roof:  
Does this mean within the same walls, or, beyond that, within the same living room or 
bedroom or the same house or the same park or the whole country house? And Sextus 
 
 227 
says that it has often been decided by judges that whoever were in such a position that 
they could hear a cry are to be punished as having been under the same roof, although 
some people have stronger voices and others weaker ones and everyone cannot be heard 
everywhere. (29, 5, 1, 27) 
The purpose for delimiting the domestic space in the Digest is quite specific, and it is part of a 
law that addresses cases where a murder is committed within a household. In such cases, slaves 
who fail to aid the victim are subject to punishment if they were under the same roof. The cries 
that the slaves may or not hear are an instance of a maximization of the qualities of the human 
voice of timber and loudness; words are optional. Sassoferrato transposes these criteria to the 
delimitation of a town, making voice a tool for the defense of the members of a social unit.  
The Septima Partida takes the idea of voice as a one of the tools for safeguarding the 
social unit that appears in the Digest in a more literal fashion, and divided in two separate laws. 
The first law establishes the duty serfs have of aiding their lord and his offspring if someone is 
trying to kill them or if they are attempting to commit suicide (7.8.16). In this instance, it is not 
the voice of the victim, but that of the serf, that must be uttered: “They should afford them this 
assistance by protecting them . . . ; or by uttering cries or calling for help when they cannot give 
them any other aid.”313 The penalty for failing to aid the lord or his family is death. This law 
presents voice not only as a means of aid but also as potential evidence of cowardice, which can 
lead also to a death sentence for the serf who, although able to provide help, instead “goes about 
uttering cries for help.”314 In this scenario, voice is also an indicator of relative distances, similar 
to the function Sassoferrato describes, and such distances point to certain duties in terms of 
                                                          
313 E este acorrimie(n)to les deven fazer amparandolos . . . , o dando bozes, o demandando acorro  
qua(n)do otra ayuda non les pueden fazer.  
314 . . . e va dando bozes que acorran.  
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expected levels of participation. The second law addresses voice perception as manifested in the 
cries of the victim. Partidas 7.30.7 explains the conditions under which it is valid to torture 
servants and serfs during the investigation of a murder committed within their lord’s household: 
“What we stated in this law is understood to also apply to slaves who live in houses adjacent to 
that where the master was found dead, or so near to it that they could have heard his cries from 
the place where they were.”315 The context here is much closer to the one Sassoferrato presented, 
and here there is a specific demarcation of the limits of the domestic sphere, similar to that of the 
villa in the Digest, which can consist of several independent houses, which are considered as one 
roof because the inhabitants are within earshot of each other. The legislated voice is that of the 
victim, which works as an alarm warning for other members of the social unit, and also as a tool 
to estimate their relative positions inside the domestic sphere. In this sense, the law goes beyond 
legislating the duties that serfs owe to their lords only in terms of accepted behaviors and 
possible punishments; it also establishes a space of action, the domestic sphere, inside of which 
the relative positioning of individual subjects is presented in terms of expected participation, and 
it may act as an aggravating or mitigating factor in the context of criminal proceedings. This is 
all possible because auditory perception enables the identification of said subjects and provides 
the perceptual evidence of their spatial location within the household.  
 
Back to Methexis 
The foregoing discussions of the case study underscore how, both in its written and oral 
manifestations, the attempts to codify sound and its perception, and specifically voice, reveal that 
                                                          
315 E esto q(ue) diximos en esta ley, se entiende de los siervos que moreava(n) en aquella cohita 
de casas: do fallaron muerto a su Señor o tan acerca della, que podian oyr las bozes del Señor de 
aq(ue)l logar do estava(n). 
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the scholars who elaborated the literary cultural product called Siete Partidas were keenly aware 
of the distance that separates the practice of the law from the theoretical discourse of their time 
regarding auditory perception. While the relatively safe realm of the written word allows the 
code to be its own guarantor, any instance where sound becomes a factor brings this distance into 
full view, threatening the integrity of the legislation. That voice Saint Augustine spoke of, which 
at first glance seems to be devoid of meaning, absent the support of authority, is actually full of 
messages, open to all kinds of interpretations, resounding inexorably throughout the space of the 
jurisdiction. The law opposes to this unauthorized voice the voice of the power and authority of 
the king. What is at stake is not the safety of an individual voice, but of the entire body of the 
king, the one that utters the voice of power and authority. Faced with a reality that refuses to 
submit to its precepts, and that theory cannot adequately explain, the Partidas goes beyond the 
simple punitive measures, simultaneously deploying specific literary cultural production 
strategies that attempt to harness the power of perception and auditory expectation manifested as 
methexis. The combination of a punitive approach with a sensory education has critical 
consequences for the definition and relative positioning of the subject before the law. Insofar as 
there is a hermeneutics of individual acts, a clear distinction is made between those subjects who 
are good and those who are not, predicated upon the ability to listen to and keep in their 
memories a specific concept of justice, with all the duties and rights that it entails. All those who 
inhabit the jurisdictional space and somehow deviate from what is legislated are to be excluded 
from their participation in the group of the good. From the perspective of the aural-oral, the 
hermeneutic problem is yet to be explored, because auditory expectation forces one to abandon 
all certainty regarding concepts like obedience, intention, testimony, confession, among many 
other fundamental aspects of the permanent process of redefinition of the criminal subject. The 
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stability of a paradigm that models the subject before the law through the imposition of form, 
only works in the realm of writing.316 In the realm of voice, form is inherently unstable, easily 
destroyed in processes of oral transmission that the legislation can neither explain nor regulate. 
This instability threatens the structure predicated upon the extended allegory of the body of the 
king, which fails to account for the participation in the chain of transmission of members of the 
population who are not considered competent before the law.   
In regard to relative positioning, it is no longer enough to refer to the subject before the 
law. It is necessary to see the subject as immersed in the law, because in the realm of the aural-
oral, the jurisdiction is no longer a theoretical space, but a sphere of action, where the sound 
waves that carry the voice of power and authority propagate and literally surround the individual. 
It is essential to adopt this spatial conception of the jurisdiction in order to appreciate the extent 
to which the subject is not only surrounded but also penetrated by the law in a completely 
material, somatic sense. The particularities of sound propagation make the waves surround all 
obstacles, causing them to resonate. The individual perceives material changes in air molecules 
that can generate movement in everything they strike. Auditory perception implies a resonance 
of the body that takes place simultaneously with the brain processes of perception and cognition. 
A conception of the jurisdiction in spatial terms forces one to concede that the rule of law cannot 
be understood only as theory, because what makes it possible for the law to reach everyone and 
impose its dominion at all levels inside the jurisdiction is materiality, is the power of everything 
that is perceptible to the senses. This sensory, material experience of the law, which is the result 
of processes of cultural production, is the one that reaches most of its subjects, for whom the 
written code is something foreign, sometimes inaccessible, and completely unrelated to their 
                                                          
316 See page 170. 
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daily lives. This is possible because the legal text is made known through various means and at 
different levels, reaching all the inhabitants of the jurisdiction: it is promulgated, proclaimed, 
quoted and mentioned in letters and official documents, cited orally and in writing during 
judicial proceedings, public executions and in conflict resolution. Through acts such as these, 
certain passages of the law become part of daily life and even of conventional wisdom. 
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that the spatial change is possible because 
the codification of the law allows the incorporation of the sensory world in a completely 
different fashion, in the context of a radical change from a legal system based on custom to one 
based on written legislation. Whereas in the former the relation between the law and the 
individual is transient and litigious, in the latter, the legal code actively regulates the daily 
interactions between all its subjects. In this new kind of relationship between the individual and 
the law, all regulatory functions are deeply intertwined with sound and voice. The legislation 
advances a sensory education based on specific theoretical assumptions. At the same time, 
nonetheless, it recognizes the existence of a reality where, more than education, what is 
necessary is the production of presence of the voice of power and authority so that it can literally 
resound throughout the entire space of the jurisdiction, invading even the most inner recesses of 
the minds of its subjects. In taking advantage of precisely that which threatens the integrity of the 
legal code, the inexorability and permanence of auditory perception, the legislation enacts the 
violent takeover of a sensory universe that heretofore had been outside of its purview. The 
invasion of the realm of the sensory means foraying into a fluctuating and conflictive space, 
where many other voices and auditory expectations compete for dominance, and where ancestral 
customs and collective memory drive many of the affective engagements and reactions of the 
subjects of the law and of the different social groups to which they belong. In the writing of the 
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legal code, literary cultural production becomes a weapon of invasion and control, but it also 
becomes a driving force for methexis, made possible by sound and its perception. Parallel to the 
social and political consequences of such changes, the ripple effect of a revolutionary new 
cultural product reaches far beyond in space and time, impacting cultural production in all its 
manifestations, and unleashing new creative forces that only become visible after centuries have 
passed. The effects of the cultural revolution sparked by Alfonso the Wise, of which perhaps the 
most important piece is the literary cultural product known as the Siete Partidas, is one of the 
best examples of the power of methexis in cultural production. Even though the cultural product 
itself was quickly disavowed and superseded as legislation, its effects are still visible in centuries 
of legal tradition, literature, history and scholarship, well beyond the confines of the Iberian 
Peninsula, and in both sides of the Atlantic.317 A lasting testament to a brilliant mind driven by 










                                                          
317 For a comprehensive analysis of the lasting effects of the Partidas in legal tradition, see 
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